Foreign
Broadcast
Information
Service
50
ANNIVERSARY
1941 - 1991

Daily Report

Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-065
Thursday
4 April 1991

Daily Report
Soviet Union

FBIS-SOV-91-065 CONTENTS *4 April 1991*

NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

ARMS CONTROL & DISARMAMENT

State of U.S., USSR Arms Negotiations Viewed *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 27 Mar]* 1

WORLDWIDE ISSUES

TASS Reports Churkin News Briefing 3 April 4
- Previews Syrian Visit 4
- Reviews Relations With Panama 4
- Supports Afghan Settlement 4
- Hails Latin American Common Market 4
- Welcomes Change in Mali 4

UN Gulf Resolution 'Major Step' to Peace *[TASS]* 5
NATO Doctrine Still 'Coated With Gunpowder' *[PRAVDA 1 Apr]* 5
UN Resolution on Iraqi War Faces Problems *[IZVESTIYA 29 Mar]* 6

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

United States & Canada

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA List CIA's 'New Priorities' *[4 Apr]* 7
U.S. Spokesman Cited on 'Right of Assembly' *[IZVESTIYA 30 Mar]* 8
Obukhov Receives Canadian Ambassador *[TASS]* 8
Nixon Lecture on Soviet Realities Cited *[IZVESTIYA 25 Mar]* 8
U.S. Paper Report on Role in Iraq Criticized *[IZVESTIYA 27 Mar]* 9

China

Churkin Interviewed on Bilateral Relations *[Moscow Radio]* 9
Aides Discuss Stability, Security, Eye UN Role *[IZVESTIYA 30 Mar]* 10
CPSU's Kuptsov Meets With PRC Delegation *[PRAVDA 29 Mar]* 10

Northeast Asia

Churkin Interviewed on Gorbachev's Japan Trip *[Moscow Radio]* 11
PRAVDA Article Previews Gorbachev Visit *[2 Apr]* 11
Japanese LDP Official Interviewed on Ties *[TASS]* 12
New,'Serious' Approach to Kurils Welcomed *[PRAVDA 3 Apr]* 13
Russian Support for Kurils Handover Decried *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 28 Mar]* 13
Japanese Businessman Cited on Cooperation *[PRAVDA 2 Apr]* 14

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Le Quang Dao-led Vietnamese Delegation Visits 15
- Legislators Confer *[IZVESTIYA 29 Mar]* 15
- Falin Receives Visitors *[PRAVDA 2 Apr]* 15
- VNA on Nishanov, Falin Meetings *[Hanoi VNA]* 15
- Lukyanov Meets Delegation 2 Apr *[Moscow TV]* 15
- Hanoi on Talks With Lukyanov *[Hanoi Radio]* 16
- Yanayev Receives Delegation *[Moscow TV]* 16

PRAVDA Summarizes Lao Party Congress *[1 Apr]* 16
ASEAN Relations With U.S. Critiqued *[Moscow International]* 16

Near East & South Asia

Belayev Views Postwar Gulf Security Order *[Moscow International]* 17
Committee Urges Solution to Palestine Problem *[TASS]* 17
Soviet Entrepreneurs Urged To Assist Kuwait *[TRUD 29 Mar]* 17
Air Force Commander Visits New Delhi 31 Mar *[TASS]* 18
CPSU Officials Attend Sri Lanka CP Congress *[PRAVDA 29 Mar]* 18
    Secretariat Greets Congress *[PRAVDA 29 Mar]* 18
Yanayev Meets Pakistani Chief Justice *[TASS]* 18

East Europe

Polish Premier Previews Moscow Visit 18
    IZVESTIYA Interview *[4 Apr]* 18
    Moscow TV Interview 20
Spokesman Criticizes E. Europe 'Witch Hunts' *[IZVESTIYA 30 Mar]* 21
Bovin Sees 'Glimmers of Freedom' in Albania *[IZVESTIYA 3 Apr]* 21
Correspondents Report on Shkoder 'Tragedy' *[TASS]* 23
CPSU Greets Romanian Salvation Front Party *[PRAVDA 29 Mar]* 24

West Europe

Bessmertnykh, Greek Ambassador Meet 25 March *[IZVESTIYA 27 Mar]* 24
Bessmertnykh Receives Spanish Leader's Message *[TASS]* 24
Petrovskiy Receives French Ambassador *[IZVESTIYA 23 Mar]* 24
Spanish Aid Consignment Dispatched to Moscow *[PRAVDA 27 Mar]* 24
German Aid Flights Reach Into Siberia *[PRAVDA 3 Apr]* 25

NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Supreme Soviet

2 April Session Examines IZVESTIYA Coverage *[IZVESTIYA 4 Apr]* 26
1 April Supreme Soviet Debates Reported *[IZVESTIYA 3 Apr]* 28

Political & Social

French Paper Interviews Shevardnadze *[Paris LE MONDE 4 Apr]* 29
Meetings of CPSU CC Commissions Reported *[PRAVDA 28 Mar]* 33
PRAVDA Starts Column on New CPSU Program *[25 Mar]* 34
Secretariat Analyzes Orenburg Party's Work *[PRAVDA 18 Mar]* 36
Supreme Court Holds 'Routine Plenum' *[Moscow Radio]* 38

Economic

Government To Double Miners' Wages by 1992 39
    Gorbachev Addresses Miners *[PRAVDA 4 Apr]* 39
    Meeting Results Reported *[Moscow Radio]* 39
    Miners Comment on Meeting *[Moscow TV]* 40
    Cabinet Adopts Wage Package *[TASS]* 40
More Ukrainian Mines Go on Strike *[Moscow Radio]* 41
45 Kuzbass Coal Enterprises Idle *[Moscow TV]* 41
Price Increases 'May Trigger' 'Wave of Strikes' *[TASS]* 41
Gosplan Deputy on Measures To Ease Price Rises *[Moscow Radio]* 42
Officials Answer Questions on Price Rises *[Moscow Radio]* 43
Orlov Interviewed on Prices, Tax Cuts *[PRAVDA 2 Apr]* 43
Gorbachev Economic Adviser Interviewed *[SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA 15 Mar]* 45

Agricultural

Gorbachev Orders Acceleration of Land Reform *[Moscow TV]* 46
Russian Agrarian Union Statement to Congress *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 29 Mar]* 46

Military

Shlyaga Report to All-Army Party Conference *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 Mar]* ... 47
  Shlyaga Interviewed on Conference *[Moscow Radio]* ... 52
Chernavin Reviews Current Military Issues *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 3 Apr]* ... 52
General on Defense Expenditure, Market Economy *[TASS]* ... 53

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

Baltic Republics

IZVESTIYA Reports USSR-Estonia Talks *[30 Mar]* ... 54
USSR Deputy Defense Minister on Riga Talks *[Riga Radio]* ... 54
Attitude at Vilnius-Moscow Talks 'Constructive' *[TASS]* ... 55
  4 April Meeting Detailed *[Radio Vilnius]* ... 56
  Spokesman on 'Endangered' Talks *[Budapest NEPSZAVA 28 Mar]* ... 56
Lithuanian Security Chief Views January Events *[MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI No 11]* ... 57

RSFSR

Khasbulatov Addresses 1 Apr Congress on Treaty *[Moscow TV]* ... 58
Pavlov Meets With Deputies at Congress 2 Apr *[TASS]* ... 65
Reportage on 3 Apr Congress of People's Deputies ... 66
  Moscow TV Reports Proceedings ... 66
  Reaction to Trubin Speech *[Moscow TV]* ... 68
Reportage on 4 Apr Congress of People's Deputies ... 69
  Deputies Adopt Yeltsin Report *[TASS]* ... 69
  Yeltsin Requests Additional Powers *[Radio Rossii]* ... 69
  'Stormy', Mixed Response *[TASS]* ... 70
  Goryacheva 'Horrified' at Prospect *[Radio Rossii]* ... 71
  Congress Approves Powers Request *[Radio Rossii]* ... 71
Pechora Coal Basin Situation 'Deteriorated' *[Moscow Radio]* ... 71
Karaganda Court Refuses To Rule Strike Illegal *[Moscow Radio]* ... 72
Yeltsin Criticizes Attempt To Confiscate Paper *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 30 Mar]* ... 72
  Further on Newspaper Incident *[SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA 2 Apr]* ... 73

Western Republics

Minsk Workers Strike, Protest Price Hikes *[Berlin ADN]* ... 74
  Strike Causes Traffic Delays *[Tallinn Radio]* ... 74
  Negotiations Begin *[Minsk Radio]* ... 74

Caucasus

Gamsakhurdia Cables Gorbachev on Girls' Injuries *[Tbilisi Radio]* ... 74
Ignatenko Cited on Georgian Referendum *[PRAVDA 3 Apr]* ... 74
More USSR Troops Said Deployed in Tskhinvali *[Tbilisi Radio]* ... 75
Situation in South Ossetia 'Relatively Calm' *[TASS]* ... 75

Central Asia

Accidental Explosion in Kazakhstan Arms Dump *[Alma-Alta Radio]* ... 75
Uzbek-Turkmen Agreement on Flour Prices Signed *[Radio Rossii]* ... 75
Leaders Sign Kirghiz-Ukraine Cooperation Accord *[Moscow TV]* ... 75
Karakalpakstan Legislature Head Replaced *[PRAVDA 2 Mar]* ... 76
Uzbek Leader Greets Soldiers on Spring Festival *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 21 Mar]* ... 76
Move To Name Sovkhoz for Ex-Leader Rashidov *[IZVESTIYA 25 Mar]* ... 76
New Religious Weekly in Uzbekistan *[Moscow Radio]* ... 76

State of U.S., USSR Arms Negotiations Viewed

PM0204135791 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 27 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by V. Katayev, member of the Interdepartmental Working Party on Questions of Arms Limitation: "Those Hampering The Maintenance of Parity: Nuclear Games and Nuclear Charges"]

[Text] In our country the public receives extremely meager information about the disarmament processes. A real information "black hole" has developed here, although the Soviet Union is now simultaneously conducting several talks. The most important are on reducing and limiting strategic offensive arms, on space armaments, the preparation of multilateral conventions banning chemical weapons, and reducing arms in the Soviet-Chinese border area. A range of disarmament questions are being examined at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva. The specialists engaged in studying the relevant questions at the talks are under a constant heavy workload. They only have time to occasionally grumble at the appearance of another inept article in the press. Meanwhile there are more than enough cocktail party opinions and wrangling by perfectly estimable people on the pages of popular magazines and newspaper on the topic of "Why do we have so many weapons and generals?" Newspapers have also frequently carried articles by ordinary people: When will you explain to us—not the academicians and generals—what you are doing at the talks without confusing us with figures that even a specialist has trouble fathoming?

This is particularly important because the good old practice of "rubberstamping" will no longer apply when ratifying the treaty on strategic offensive arms and other treaties in the USSR Supreme Soviet. The fate of the treaty will in fact depend upon the depth of understanding of the problem shown by deputies who are at present remote from the vicissitudes of the treaty and will have to grasp quickly what our country's highly skilled specialists have been poring over for years.

Figures are, of course, important. But do figures give the whole picture? In the last five years much has changed in the actual approaches to questions of arms limitation. An efficient system has been established in the daily, multidimensional work carried out in this area. It is based on a balance of interests of all ministries and departments—directly involved or not—and the collective labor of the military, diplomats, designers, scientists, lawyers, and ecologists. The art of arranging the military policy mosaic has shifted from one-man cells to the forum of the professionals. The leadership has begun to trust specialists and to heed their prescriptions. New forces have also become involved in working out disarmament problems with their own ideas and thinking.

In this period of great insight and scaling of new foreign policy heights, what is now called "new political thinking," nuclear disarmament has been the main priority, but at the same time there has been no letup in argument about the level of nuclear charges necessary and sufficient to deter aggression, how many nuclear charges could be employed in a first nuclear strike, and how many are necessary for a counterstrike. There are calculations available for all these options.

At the same time life has shown that theoretical nuclear games are remote from reality. Nuclear charges are not the only determinant of a country's security. Quite new economic and domestic policy components of it have appeared. Clearly a new, wiser, and more complex mathematics is now needed here. Military theoreticians alone are not enough any more to tackle this task, and it is beyond the powers of the narrow circle of military specialists.

The first results of nuclear disarmament are at hand—the Treaty on Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is in operation. The USSR and the United States have begun cutting intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles under the committments assumed in 1987. As of this 1 March we have eliminated 1,794 such missiles (97.2 percent) and the United States 752 (88.9 percent). The elimination of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles continues.

Work on the Soviet-U.S. supertreaty on cutting strategic offensive arms is making difficult headway. History has not known such a treaty before. The contracting parties have complicated its technical aspects to such an extent that the serious question arises: Won't we have to open subsequent talks, regarding its implementation. A number of outstanding issues still have to be resolved before the planned signing of the treaty in the first half of the current year. Will these questions not fly like moths to the light because of the abundance of time spent? [sentence as published]

Movement has begun regarding another another major disarmament process—the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. After all, we and the NATO countries have more than 10,000 charges. Progress here will depend on the results of the strategic offensive arms talks.

Problems of armaments have always been tackled one way—by catching up with or, even better, overtaking potential adversaries both qualitatively and quantitatively. For example, the 1941 syndrome became very persistent for us. The state of the race became our customary way of thinking and acting. It was considered that weapons could not be superfluous. There could only be an insufficiency of them.

We overloaded the economy but thereby created the parity enabling us to embark on arms reduction talks. Without parity there would have been no talks. Unfortunately, there is another side to the coin here—the constant forging of weapons became an end in itself, a spontaneous requirement of not just the Army but industry too (and not just in our country). We were fearful of losing technology and quality. We pursued gross output. We transformed valuable manpower and material resources into piles of missiles and thousands of tanks. For parity and sometimes going beyond parity. We constructed arsenals for weapons instead of the accommodation so sorely needed by the Army.

Having passed the peak of weapons saturation, we are now destroying those weapons. With great difficulty. We are destroying more because we stockpiled more. Humanity is still only just learning to destroy weapons. They have accumulated from war to war and have been destroyed only in the process of combat operations.

The implementation of the Soviet-U.S. agreement eliminating chemical weapons, for example, has turned into a major socioeconomic problem in our country. We have to decide what is to be done with obsolete conventional munitions. The lifetime of a weapon is short and it will expire all the same—whether there is a treaty or not.

The Soviet-U.S. talks on reducing and limiting strategic armaments under way in Geneva form only part, albeit a very important part, of a disarmament process affecting the interests of everyone in the world. It is symbolic that the two states with the most powerful nuclear arsenals have become the main initiators of the disarmament process. They have demonstrated not only their high technical expertise in creating instruments of death but have also proven equal to the task of understanding mankind's concern. And they went further. Back in 1989 at the Conference on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in Geneva our delegation advanced for the first time jointly with the Americans the idea, for the time being only on the political plane, that the disarmament process needs to be globalized. This position was supported by virtually all participants in the conference. By then the American delegate no longer found it possible to adopt the traditional rigid stance on the question of a complete nuclear weapons test ban.

However, despite the Americans' public acknowledgment of the advent of the "postconfrontational" period, the U.S. Administration is still extremely slow to put its rhetorical statements and overassessment of strategic priorities and security threats onto a practical footing. U.S. military thinking is patently failing to keep pace with the political changes. The politicians are trying to build a structure of treaties on the basis of compromises between the administration and the Defense Department. These compromises are reflected in the military's dragging its consent to the dismantling of the war machine.

It is planned in this context, for example, to further develop nuclear production capacities. This was stated in a report prepared by the U.S. Department of Energy on the grounds that nuclear weapons will remain for the visible future, albeit reduced in number.

The military budget mirrors the process. The draft budget for fiscal 1992 ($298.2 billion) envisages a military expenditure cut of just 1 percent compared with the current year, and 3 percent annually thereafter. The pessimist will say—too little! The optimist will say—okay, the process has started and is going in the right direction!

At the same time in fiscal 1992 it is planned to purchase four B-2 heavy strategic bombers (almost $5 billion), to carry out the trial stage of the rail-mobile MX ("Peacekeeper") strategic missile with the commissioning of its rail-mounted launcher, and to continue developing the new "Midgetman" strategic missile and the production of sea-launched Trident-2 strategic missiles.

The strategic defense initiative (SDI) is still keeping afloat. There are shifts taking place here. Burgeoning realism has begun to make headway. But the program at present is only developing in the area of "repulsing an unsanctioned or accidental launch or an attack by a third party."

It would also be worthwhile our noting the following aspect of the American budget: It asks for almost half a billion dollars to implement the arms control treaties and agreements. We will also have to spend tens and hundreds of millions of rubles on specific disarmament work before reaping the conversion dividend.

We are now seeking to proceed on the basis of our minimal weapons requirements. For the "negotiators" the Soviet doctrine of reasonable sufficiency is no empty slogan but serves as a guide to action. Unfortunately, for the present this basically applies only to the Soviet side. It may be recalled that Jimmy Carter's "Presidential Directive 59," that envisages the possibility of the United States waging "limited nuclear war" against the Soviet Union, will have its 10th birthday this September. The directive has still not been countermanded. It is with cause that an American diplomat once complain that you in the USSR have perestroyka going on while we in the United States are still in the Brezhnev era.

That remark is pertinent not just in respect of the United States. Last year's meeting of the leaders of NATO countries in London demonstrated assiduous running on the spot, where the tread is audible but there is no movement. While recognizing publicly that nuclear weapons can only be resorted to in the most extreme case and moving away from the "flexible response doctrine NATO members nevertheless sought to duck specific questions about their participation in nuclear disarmament.

Everything is not so simple here. For example, the British will be carrying out a kind of strategic nuclear weapons revival at sea—fitting nuclear submarines with new Trident-2 missiles, purchased from the United States. From 1964 [as published] there will be 512 nuclear charges on British submarines instead of 384. There's disarmament for you! The English proverb "You can't have your cake and eat it too" inevitably springs to mind here..

The French continue to jealously protect their nuclear prerogatives. While talking about their nonparticipation in NATO military structures they actively intervene in all discussions on European nuclear affairs with the aim of fixing the independent position of their "strike forces." Possessing, like the United States, a nuclear triad (land-, sea-, and air-based forces—452 charges in all) and plans to improve it, the French with its firm, old-fashioned nuclear commitments could gradually come to bar the way to further nuclear disarmament by their NATO bloc allies. This should become particularly apparent as we approach the reduction of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.

France's static nuclear policy since back in the seventies has denied it the opportunity to occupy a proper leading place in East-West dialogue. France did not use the opportunity afforded this time at the NATO summit meeting in London either. In London NATO again stated that nuclear weapons should remain a means of diplomatic pressure to prevent a conflict degenerating into a military clash.

There is another major task here. At the present neither the United States nor NATO are limiting nuclear or other armaments at sea.

True, the Americans have announced the Navy's transition to a nonoffensive concept.

As studies by American and Soviet experts show, U.S. interests could be adequately met by a navy half the size.

Recently the Americans have stepped up their activity in the area of creating nonnuclear strategic weapons (cruise missiles and heavy bombers). On 9 February they carried out over Canadian territory the second test this year of a cruise missile launched from a B-52 heavy bomber. The events in the Persian Gulf have shown the high accuracy of cruise missiles. But where might that lead? After all, decisionmaking regarding the use of nonnuclear weapons is easier, but the systems that give warning of missile attack are unable to distinguish nonnuclear missiles and planes from nuclear ones. A dangerous syndrome which one might call the "pseudonuclear strike" is emerging.

Unfortunately, nuclear weapons, although they are now more a political bogey, will clearly exist until aggression ends. Their complete elimination, like the elimination of plague, cancer, and AIDS, is a very important task for mankind.

In terms of nuclear forces we have parity with the United States and plan cuts only in the area of superfluous charges. Both sides know the other's potential (military specialists have even visited that holy of holies—the launchers of the latest strategic missiles). They know that a nuclear attack will lead to a nuclear response unacceptable and destructive to the aggressor. This state will also be maintained after the 50-percent (actually, roughly 30-percent) reduction in strategic offensive armaments. It should also remain after possible subsequent cuts in strategic arms, talks will be held thereafter.

But the nuclear powder-kegs are still not empty and we are forced to keep the powder dry.

TASS Reports Churkin News Briefing 3 April

Previews Syrian Visit

LD0304134491 Moscow TASS in English 1326 GMT 3 Apr 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Oleg Polovko]

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—Vitaliy Churkin, head of the Information Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, held a briefing here today. He said Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh and his Syrian counterpart, Faruq al-Shar', who will arrive in Moscow this evening on a working visit, intend to discuss the post-war situation in the Gulf and Middle East issues as a whole.

Soviet-Syrian cooperation will also come under discussion, he added.

The spokesman noted that the present visit will be made "within the dynamic and trustworthy political dialogue" between the Soviet Union and Syria.

The visit will end in the evening of April 4.

Reviews Relations With Panama

LD0304181191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1340 GMT 3 Apr 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Oleg Polovko]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Apr (TASS)—"We are confident that the establishment of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Panama is in keeping with the interests of both countries and will facilitate the strengthening of international cooperation." This was stated at a briefing today by Vitaliy Churkin, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate.

In accordance with the joint communique on the establishment of diplomatic relations between the USSR and Panama signed a few days ago in New York, the sides agreed that at the present stage consulates general of the two sides will be established in Panama City and in Moscow respectively.

"We view this event as a significant fact capable of giving an important impetus to the development of our bilateral links, the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman said. I would particularly like to mention the area of trade and economic cooperation which has been developing quite successfully in recent years and which both sides believe has good prospects."

In this connection the diplomat recalled that the Soviet Union is one of the major users of the Panama Canal, which plays an important role in international cooperation. "Our country is in favor of strengthening the regime of neutrality of the canal which is a key condition of its functioning in a reliable and secure manner," he stressed.

Supports Afghan Settlement

LD0304151191 Moscow TASS in English 1414 GMT 3 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Oleg Polovko]

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—The capture by Afghan opposition detachments of the city of Khowst, on the border with Pakistan, was one of the subjects raised at a briefing today by a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman.

Vitaliy Churkin said mujahidin would hardly have captured the city, besieged for a long time, "if not for the massive outside support from Pakistani territory".

The Soviet diplomat referred to a speech by President Najibullah of Afghanistan, who "explicitly said that Pakistani military circles' were involved" in that action.

Having noted that U.N. Secretary-General Javier Perez de Cuellar urged the settling of intra-Afghan differences within the framework of the political process, Churkin reiterated the Soviet position that "under any circumstances, there is no and cannot be any alternative to the political settlement".

Hails Latin American Common Market

LD0304212191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1415 GMT 3 Apr 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Aleksandr Kanishchev and Oleg Polovko]

[Text] Moscow, 3 Apr (TASS)— Vitaliy Churkin, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Information Directorate, made a positive assessment of the presidents of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay signing a treaty on the creation of a common market of the countries of the southern cone by the end of 1995. The treaty was signed in Asuncion a few days ago.

Speaking at a briefing today at the press center of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he noted that political and business circles of the Latin American countries think that the creation of this economic grouping is in line with the trend toward regional integration processes that is increasingly gathering strength.

Vitaliy Churkin stated that a similar opinion is held in the Soviet Union and it is thought that this process "will assist in solving the social and economic tasks facing the countries of the region." He stressed that the USSR is interested in the advancing development of trade and economic ties with the participants in "Mercosur" and "is open to possible contacts with this sub-regional association."

Welcomes Change in Mali

LD0304163191 Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT 3 Apr 91

[By TASS diplomatic correspondents Alexander Kanishchev and Oleg Polovko:]

[Excerpt] Moscow April 3 TASS—[passage omitted] In connection with reports from Mali—where the process of forming new government bodies is now under way, a transitional committee for the Salvation of the People has been set up from among representatives of both the military and civilians, and the formation of a provisional government is being planned—Churkin welcomed the striving of the Malian people for resolving the problems of their society through dialogue and concord. [passage omitted]

UN Gulf Resolution 'Major Step' to Peace

LD0404085591 Moscow TASS in English 0836 GMT 4 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondents Mikhail Kochetkov and Yevgeniy Menkes]

[Text] United Nations April 4 TASS—Soviet U.N. Ambassador Yuliy Vorontsov called a resolution adopted by the U.N. Security Council on Wednesday a major step towards a Gulf settlement.

Speaking at a Wednesday meeting of the Security Council, responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, he noted that the Council had hammered out a document which would bring an end to the war and help establish lasting peace and stability in the Gulf and throughout the Middle East in the future.

The resolution provides for a ceasefire, settlement of all border issues between Iraq and Kuwait, the dispatch of U.N. observers to the region, the establishment of a mechanism to pay reparations for damage suffered as a result of the Iraqi aggression and a gradual process for the repeal of sanctions against Iraq.

Iraq will also have to agree to destroy, under international supervision, chemical and biological weapons and all ballistic missiles with a range of over 150 kilometers. The embargo on arms supplies to Iraq will be maintained indefinitely.

The replacement of the present suspension of hostilities with a permanent ceasefire creates conditions for the withdrawal of multinational forces, the Soviet ambassador said.

He stressed the importance of resolution provisions authorising the security council to guarantee the inviolability of the Iraqi-Kuwaiti border. For this purpose, the Council is empowered to take all measures in compliance with the U.N. Charter.

Vorontsov pointed to the humanitarian consequences of the resolution. Its adoption will enable the international community to begin supplying foodstuffs, medicines, as well as goods and materials to meet the needs of the civilian population.

The resolution is vitally important for the Iraqi people who are now on the verge of hunger and epidemics. He expressed the hope that the adoption of the resolution would bring about the restoration of normal economic relations in the region, to overcome the consequences of the ecological disaster and the damage to Kuwait and its people.

Following the adoption of the document, the United Nations should begin a detailed examination of issues concerning the technical aspects and financial consequences of its implementation.

The Soviet chief delegate pointed to the key role of the Security Council which should monitor the entire process of the resolution's implementation and take additional steps where possible.

NATO Doctrine Still 'Coated With Gunpowder'

PM0304112191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Apr 91 Second Edition p 5

["Editorial Office Commentary:" "The Last Day Is the First Day"]

[Text] The deadline set for the elimination of the Warsaw Pact's military structures expired at midnight 31 March and the Joint Armed Forces and their command and control organs ceased their activity.

The end of military activity within the Warsaw Pact requires comprehensive and in-depth reflection. What, then, can be said immediately after the event?

Quite a lot of critical fire is now being directed at the Warsaw Pact. That is no doubt inevitable. Major breakthroughs in public life are clearly always accompanied by destructive, blanket criticism of the past. Our country and its Western neighbors are now going through such times. The "black pages" in our military cooperation such as, for example, the introduction of the troops of five Warsaw Pact states into Czechoslovakia in August 1968 are highlighted in emotional articles and statements about the Pact's historical path and role.

Just as you cannot throw out the words of a song, you cannot expunge obvious facts from history. The facts are as follows: It was not the USSR or its allies that launched the exhausting and senseless arms race. The Warsaw Pact arose six years after the formation of the NATO military bloc. For years and decades the Warsaw Pact served as a guarantor of peace and security in Europe. The impetus to call the CSCE and the initiative for talks on disarmament problems came from the Warsaw Pact states.

Some people want to forget all this and extirpate it from the peoples' memory. The Soviet soldiers' march of liberation on Berlin in 1944-1945 is now represented as occupation. The elimination of the Warsaw Pact's military structures is declared as "restoring sovereignty" to the countries... But the past cannot be rewritten.

The Warsaw Pact's departure from the historical stage as a military alliance has made the elaboration of new military doctrines pressing and urgent for its members.

Responsible politicians are linking the strengthening of national security with the development of a system of collective security within the all-European process and the establishment of bilateral cooperation with their neighbors, above all the Soviet Union and the other former Warsaw Pact military allies.

But there are other approaches. Some politicians who previously agreed with the idea of simultaneously disbanding the two military blocs in Europe are now ready to see the "core" of the future "all-European security alliance" in... NATO. A veil is drawn over its longstanding aggressive thrust. Opposition to the Warsaw Pact is extolled as valorous and meritorious. Having left the Warsaw Pact military structure, some would like to become part of the NATO military organization. But, in the first place, the members of the North Atlantic alliance have no desire for the time being to swell their ranks by taking in the countries of East Europe. In the second place, such an incorporation would cost many billions of dollars to reequip and modernize communications and command systems.

By all accounts, NATO does not intend to disband. "Our objective," NATO Secretary General Manfred Woerner stated recently, "is not to threaten the USSR; on the contrary, we want to build along with the Soviet Union the architecture of the new European security where all the nations of the continent will be members." Mr Woerner draws a curious picture: The all-European house of peace has a heavily armed military alliance as its foundation.

Yet changes are underway in NATO. Its members are increasingly willing to talk about politicizing the bloc and reviewing its strategy. Some information on this score has filtered into the press. It is intended to create rapid deployment forces. There is argument over the interpretation of the principle of using nuclear weapons as a "last resort" and over the bloc's area of operation. It is said that the new doctrine will assume the form of an official document by the end of May. For the time being, however, one can only say that it is a doctrine lavishly coated with gunpowder.

Given this, it is not superfluous to recall the discussion on the question of whether the Warsaw Pact should be retained as a purely political organization. The advocates of this idea consider in particular that it is easier and more successful to conduct talks on the further reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe as before—on a coalition basis. Agreeing with them, we await the development of events.

UN Resolution on Iraqi War Faces Problems

PM0304161991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4

[Correspondent A. Shalnev report: "UN Security Council: Resolution Not Adopted"]

[Text] New York—Contrary to forecasts, this week the Security Council will most probably not adopt the resolution that would officially mark the end of the military conflict in the Persian Gulf. There will be no resolution. The present draft runs to about 20 pages (an unprecedented number in UN history) and is too complex a document to be adopted casually or to go through "on the nod."

According to information received by your correspondent, on Wednesday [27 March] the Soviet side submitted a number of amendments to and interpretations of the draft initially prepared by the U.S. delegation. Some of these amendments relate in particular to those provisions in the draft dealing with the elimination of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, especially its ballistic missiles. As far as I understand it, Moscow is asking for a precise description of the operational range of the missiles subject to the ban. In our view, the ban should apply to those missiles with a range of over 300 km. All other ballistic missiles are presumably to be exempt from this ban.

The Soviet side requested interpretations and clarifications on the provisions relating to Iraq's nuclear potential. Our request, as I was told, was made because these provisions—in their initial form—are too complex and involved to be properly understood.

At the Security Council Wednesday morning there were closed consultations that yielded no apparent result. Our amendments, comments, and objections, coupled with those submitted by other countries, are still to receive detailed discussion and consideration. In view of the approaching Easter holidays, that interrupt the working pattern of many countries' government departments, few people expect that the draft resolution will now be adopted earlier than the middle of next week.

Meanwhile, the draft resolution has already undergone several changes compared with the version that IZVESTIYA wrote about a few days ago. For example, France and Britain insisted that the United States drop its demand on the use by various countries' governments of Iraq's frozen financial assets in compensation for the damage inflicted on those countries by the Persian Gulf conflict. One of the main arguments that managed to persuade Washington was this: An unduly heavy financial burden could have results comparable with what happened in Europe after World War I when the reparations imposed on Germany helped to bring Hitler to power.

At the same time, the draft resolution provides for the creation by the United Nations of a special fund to include some of the resources received by Iraq from the sale of oil will be paid and will be used to compensate for the damage, including the ecological damage, caused by Iraq's aggression.

United States & Canada

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA List CIA's 'New Priorities'

PM0404131991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 91 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant General N. Brusnitsyn: "CIA's New Priorities"]

[Text] The new political thinking and the policy of openness and glasnost in the Soviet Union have substantially influenced Soviet-U.S. relations. Here the activity of the U.S. special services has also changed.

In the Soviet Union, in the opinion of representatives of the U.S. intelligence community, "a golden age has come for U.S. intelligence." "Glasnost and democratization... open up before the CIA unprecedented opportunities for gathering information by both open and clandestine means," CIA Director W. Webster believes. At the same time, THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE asserts, U.S. President G. Bush has repeatedly expressed displeasure at the fact that the CIA is making insufficient use of these new opportunities in its activity against the USSR, especially in the economic field.

It must be said that the CIA leadership has duly reacted to this criticism. A special directorate has been created to resolve problems connected with the new conditions in which intelligence is pursued. Six working groups have been formed in it to plan and coordinate new intelligence tasks.

What are these tasks? Named among the main ones are problems of the rapid changes in the situation in the Soviet Union and East Europe, the organization of intelligence from the positions of joint ventures and in the process of verifying the observance of treaties on arms reduction, the analysis of problems of the use of the enormous information resources accumulating in the world in connection with the automation of the control process and the creation of automated information systems.

According to THE INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE among the priority tasks which the administration has set the CIA first place goes to the preservation of the United States' economic and technological preeminence. In this connection a special task has been formulated for the entire intelligence community—getting scientific and technical and economic information about the Soviet Union in the institutes of the Academy of Sciences, sectorial defense industry institutes, state banks, and enterprises.

Speaking of the function of information of this kind, in a speech the CIA leader unequivocally indicated the government's intention to render aid to U.S. companies in buying up industrial enterprises abroad. Against the background of these intentions there is an odious ring to the "deal of the century"—the purchase of 140 billion rubles by the "Dove Trading International" firm. For this sum hundreds of Soviet enterprises could cheaply move into the hands of foreign owners.

U.S. scientific and technical and economic intelligence uses the broad potential of surveillance satellites and the powerful radioelectronic intelligence systems of the National Security Agency (NSA).

Right now the grouping of intelligence facilities operating against the Soviet Union includes 113 strategic surveillance aircraft, 39 ground centers including over 2,000 radio, electronic, and radar surveillance posts and 35 artificial earth satellites for various functions. They include:

—five artificial earth satellites for visual reconnaissance by night and day;

—14 artificial earth satellites for the radio and electronic surveillance of the electronic facilities of the armed forces and ministry of communications radio lines;

—11 artificial earth satellites for the surveillance of vessels, ships, and submarines;

—five artificial earth satellites for the surveillance of missile launches from test grounds.

Powerful technical surveillance facilities also operate from the territory of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow.

For over 40 years the Americans have spared no funds for the development, production, and operation of technical surveillance systems targeted against the Soviet Union. Under present conditions, when the information concentrated in automated control systems is of special interest, this tradition continues. Large appropriations are channeled into the development of means for unauthorized access to information stored and processed in computers.

Usually this is done as follows: Equisignal beacons are installed on the packaging of computers purchased abroad by our organizations. With their aid the special services trace where exactly a given computer will be delivered and where it will be used. But they do not restrict themselves to this. Upon studying a computer in detail it becomes apparent that additional "boards" which are not part of the circuit have been installed in it. These are intended to remove and transmit by radio information processed on the computer for subsequent recording and analysis. These boards consist of individual modules which can perform an espionage mission "in combination with" their regular function.

A number of computers conceal "inserts" with more barbaric aims. After a certain operation time the programed devices, which have so far not shown themselves, destroy the program and all information stored in the computer memory. According to our information, a special organization of the U.S. special services called "Computer Virus Countermeasures" engages in introducing harmful bugs and destructive "viruses" into computer networks.

Essentially a covert war is being waged aimed at nothing more nor less than destroying our national information resources, preventing them from accumulating at a modern level, and thus pushing our economy—now and in the long term—back from advanced technical frontiers. It remains to be added that until there are laws in the Soviet Union on responsibility for removing or destroying information in computers some people will continue to get away with these actions.

The United States' intelligence and subversive activity against our country is thus not ending with the emergence of Soviet-U.S. relations into a new stage. According to Senator Boren, chairman of the U.S. Congress Committee on Intelligence, it will merely differ considerably from what has been before.

U.S. Spokesman Cited on 'Right of Assembly'

PM0404084591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[Item in roundup of IZVESTIYA, TASS, INTERFAX, POSTFACTUM, URAL-AKTSEPT, REUTERS, and UPI reports: "White House Statement"]

[Text] At a briefing in the White House, spokesman Popadiak read out a White House statement which reads: "Peaceful protests are a legitimate means for people to express political views. The broadening of the right to express opinions and the right of assembly is an important factor in assessing the Soviet Government's adherence to reforms. We urge the Soviet Government to lift as quickly as possible all inessential restrictions on the right to express opinions and the right of assembly. The present political crisis in the Soviet Union cannot be overcome through confrontation."

Obukhov Receives Canadian Ambassador

LD0204132391 Moscow TASS in English 1239 GMT 2 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow April 2 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksey Obukhov today received the Canadian ambassador to the USSR, Michael Bell, at the latter's request.

They exchanged opinions on bilateral relations and some international issues of mutual interest.

Nixon Lecture on Soviet Realities Cited

PM0204105991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4

[Report by TASS diplomatic correspondent V. Shishlin: "Richard Nixon's Lecture"]

[Text] The curtailment of democratic reforms in the Soviet Union would do catastrophic damage to the USSR itself and to the cause of peace and freedom throughout the world. This was the main theme of a speech given by a major contemporary U.S. politician, former U.S. President Richard Nixon, at the USSR Academy of Sciences' World Economics and International Relations Institute 22 March.

He devoted a large part of his lecture to analyzing the internal situation in the Soviet Union in the last six years and as it is today. This is how the ex-president described the character of the Soviet head of state: "Like all successful politicians, Mikhail Gorbachev has many facets. He is a sincere, committed communist; he is a Russian patriot; and, particularly important, he is a brilliant politician and pragmatist. During the years he has been in power he has managed to change the whole world. Even more important, change the Soviet Union."

Nixon was unequivocal about the economic policy of the perestroyka era: "It has been a complete failure. There is no middle way between a command economy and a free economy. Business cannot be successful without private ownership." Recalling Khrushchev's words in this connection about how the United States would soon be unable to compete with the Soviet Union in the economic sphere, the former president said: "He was right. The last 30 years have proved beyond doubt that serious competition between a free economy and a command economy is simply impossible."

Dwelling on the difficulties being experienced by our country, the speaker said that the present situation is being aggravated by the atmosphere of mutual recrimination, intolerance, and blatant personal enmity. "We know," Nixon stressed, "that Soviet people are in a state of disarray; we can easily understand why. It is very tempting to abandon all undertakings and succumb to nostalgia for the pre-perestroyka era, when at least elementary commodities were available and it was possible to talk of some stability and predictability."

"However," the guest continued, "any attempt to return to the 'good old days' would lead to tragedy. Attempts to turn back the clock always end in failure. There is nothing more destabilizing than trying to 'arrest a revolution halfway.' Whether the initiators realize it or not," he stressed, "your revolution is genuine and is making the final break with the old Marxist-Leninist ideology and the old habits of submitting to an authoritarian, dictatorial leadership and relying on the state's ability to take care of your material and spiritual needs."

"I am sure that you will be able to overcome your doubts and confusion at this worrying time," the speaker said. "You are experiencing the moment of truth. The decisions you take today will determine your children's future. The future of Soviet-U.S. relations as well."

Touching on another sensitive subject, as he put it—the future relationship between the central USSR Government and the republics—Nixon said, in particular: "It is customary to view this as a purely domestic problem of yours. When domestic problems have a direct impact on international politics, they become the business of each and every one of us." In the U.S. guest's opinion, the USSR leadership's refusal to recognize the Baltic republics' independence is "poisoning" Soviet-U.S. relations.

The ex-president stressed that Americans feel respect and admiration for the Soviet people. "Differences between our governments may still remain, but this certainly does not mean that our peoples cannot be friends." "If you abandon the path of economic and political transformations," Nixon said in conclusion, "you will not only be letting your own country down. You will be letting the whole world down."

U.S. Paper Report on Role in Iraq Criticized

PM0104125491 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 27 Mar 91 Union Edition p 6

[G. Valko report: "Notes Apropos": "Andy Messing's Psychological Experiments"]

[Text] Reports on the activities of the anti-Iraq coalition allied forces special subunits during the war were few and far between. But then the whole idea of special subunits is that nobody should gossip about them. Later, admittedly, it became known that British "green berets," having been airlifted deep inside Iraqi territory by helicopter, conducted reconnaissance missions, while U.S. soldiers from "Seal" naval subunits undertook mine clearance along the shores of the Persian Gulf under the pretext of awaiting paratroop landings there. But only to deceive the enemy. By all accounts the operation was successful.

Unsuccessful operations are not publicized, especially when special subunits are involved. But you know there was one, they had a "superplan" which was left unfinished. Officers involved in this plan revealed this to former U.S. Army Major Andy Messing, who spent nine whole days in Saudi Arabia. Admittedly, they were at the beginning of February, which was before ground operations began. But all the same, Andy Messing is a reliable source, for he is not just a retired major but also the director of the National Defense Council Foundation, a private organization in Alexandria, Virginia, which deals in military research.

A. Messing imparted his findings to USA TODAY journalist Juan Uolt [name as transliterated], who promptly revealed all on the pages of his newspaper. Thus, the secret was out.

But what was the big secret? Apparently it was not reconnaissance at all, and they were not diversionary operations. Andy Messing states that the special subunits' aim was to "capture a Soviet adviser" to "prove Soviet involvement in the face of Kremlin denials."

The story of the Soviet specialists in Iraq is fairly well known. Everybody remembers how difficult it was to solve the question of their evacuation, and everybody knows that military specialists were recalled first, and that by the time military activities began not much more than 10 Soviet citizens remained in Iraq—diplomats and embassy officials. There is irrefutable evidence on this score. But you can't catch Andy Messing like that. He insisted to the journalist that there is evidence "proving the Soviet Union's participation up to battalion level." Further allegations voiced by Messing were quite sinister: "The Soviets were all over this region."

Of course, Messing also made reference to the covert interception of conversations in Russian over Iraqi military radio stations and other cock-and-bull stories, which were greeted at the very least with skeptical smiles. The Pentagon firmly rejected all conjecture of that sort. Juan Uolt quotes one such denial. He quotes General Thomas Kelly, who directed an operations section of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the hostilities, as saying: "We have no information on the presence of Soviet people in Iraq in the capacity of advisers during the war." Kelly added: "As for the 'plan' to take prisoners, it never existed..."

Our readers from the older generation probably remember the famous hypnotist Volf Messing, who managed to persuade his audience of the most incredible things during his psychological experiments. Of course, a mere coincidence of surname is not enough to suggest that Andy Messing possesses the same supernatural gift. But he has managed to win some people over to his way of thinking. Like (Daniel Perrin), aide to the Senate Armed Services Committee. He too is convinced both about the radio conversations in Russian and, moreover, about the claim that Russians helped Iraqis to target "Scud" missiles on Saudi Arabia. It is the same with aliens: If someone is convinced that little green men have landed in his neighbor's backyard, nothing will make him change his mind.

Andy Messing's "psychological experiments" are far from harmless. This is not simply an offshoot of the cold war. This is a concerted effort to resurrect former suspicion toward our country and to inspire new suspicions by sowing the field of Soviet-U.S. relations with the seeds of doubt. Unfortunately, Messing is not alone. In our country too you will find those to whom the image of the enemy is dearer and more acceptable than the face of a partner.

So I will conclude with these words. Of course, no "Russian adviser" was taken prisoner by the allied special subunits. And it is claimed that 11 men were lost—probably while carrying out other tasks. They also say that the allied special divisions continue to operate on Iraqi territory...

China

Churkin Interviewed on Bilateral Relations

LD0404063491 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0530 GMT 4 Apr 91

[Interview With Vitaliy Ivanovich Churkin, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's information directorate, by diplomatic correspondent Viktor Levin; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Levin] Vitaliy Ivanovich, during his trip to the Far East, Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh visited not only Tokyo but also Beijing, where there were very thorough and serious—as it was possible to deduce—talks. What can you say about the content of these talks?

[Churkin] This was a separate visit, but on the surface at least it was similar to those conversations that were held in Tokyo, namely in that a new summit meeting was discussed. In May the general secretary of the CPC Central Committee, the leader of the Chinese state, is to come to the Soviet Union. Both sides see this as a most important event, the third major event in relations between our two countries in the last two years. You remember that our relations were normalized in 1989 during Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to Beijing, then in April 1990 there were talks between Soviet leaders and Li Peng, the premier of the PRC's State Council; and now there will be a new Soviet-Chinese summit. On the whole this was the topic of discussion during the conversations between Bessmertnykh, the Chinese foreign minister, and Li Peng. I must say that no particular problems arose. It is very important that both sides very definitely confirmed their great interest in the further development of Soviet-Chinese relations, seeing in them the cornerstone of the two countries' foreign policies. Both sides showed interest in using the fact that the economies of our two countries are mutually complementary.

I would note one further aspect of the visit, something philosophical and conceptual so to speak, since between Bessmertnykh and the Chinese participants in the conversations and talks there was a profound, thorough, and serious exchange of opinions on certain tendencies in contemporary international developments, and both sides expressed interest in such an exchange of opinions being continued.

[Levin] Tell me, Vitaliy Ivanovich, can we be satisfied with the present level and condition of Soviet-Chinese relations, while noting that on the whole two years ago they entered a normal path?

[Churkin] To some degree I would say yes and no. Yes, in light of what I have already said; much has genuinly been achieved, and the turnaround in relations which has been carried out is historic. But on the other hand much can still be done in economic cooperation; much can still be done in cultural cooperation and in those other numerous areas which make up the substance of relations between any countries—especially between two neighbors, great states, such as the Soviet Union and the PRC. It was precisely about this that discussions were held by the Soviet foreign minister in Beijing.

Much draft work is still to be done. Apart from that, I want to note the fact that specific, important talks are going on between us; talks on the borders, talks on reducing the level of military confrontation between the Soviet Union and China on the Soviet- Chinese border, on reducing the armed forces of the two countries on this border. These talks are not going at all badly, and in the foreseeable future we are counting on concrete results being achieved at them. In the first place, this will allow a solution to a question of great importance in relations between the two neighboring states, and here this is a matter of a border 7,000 kilometers long, the longest border in the world. In general it is completely realistic to count on this border being completely demarcated in the foreseeable future, and this issue being completely closed. We are also counting on... [changes thought] it is hoped that there will be advancement at the talks on cutting armed forces and on confidence-building measures in the military field on the Soviet- Chinese border.

[Levin] So the prospects are good?

[Churkin] The prospects are good. The most important thing is that both sides have a very good attitude. Things are going very well in a friendly, constructive spirit, which gives hope for a further continuation of this work in this key area.

Aides Discuss Stability, Security, Eye UN Role

PM0304160591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 91 Union Edition p 5

[TASS report under general headline: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 28 March USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy received Li Luye, director of the PRC international research center, who is in the Soviet Union.

Satisfaction with the dynamically developing friendly and good-neighborly ties between the USSR and China was expressed during the conversation.

There was an exchange of opinions on a wide range of questions concerning the activity of the United Nations in resolving global problems of the present day and in ensuring stability and universal security.

CPSU's Kuptsov Meets With PRC Delegation

PM0104092991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 91 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] V.A. Kuptsov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, received a delegation from the PRC State Council International Research Center, which is in the USSR, headed by Li Luye, director of the center, 27 March. Talks were held on the features of the sociopolitical situation in our country, the results of the Union and Russian referendums, and the measures to stabilize social life.

Northeast Asia

Churkin Interviewed on Gorbachev's Japan Trip

LD0404050991 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 0341 GMT 4 Apr 91

[Interview with Vitaliy Churkin, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's information directorate, by diplomatic correspondent Viktor Levin; date and place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Levin] Vitaliy Ivanovich, in the Western media there have been reports that the visit by USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to Japan will take place from 16 to 19 April. Our official reports talk about the second half of April. I see a coincidence in these dates, but is this Western information close to the truth, or is it still necessary to be cautious about it?

[Churkin] Viktor Nikolayevich, maybe we read different Soviet newspapers, but the newspapers where I have seen official reports, for example IZVESTIYA, talk about the second 10-day period of April, and it seems to me that this corresponds more closely to those Western reports you have mentioned. But if you were to ask me directly whether this visit will take place from 16 to 19 April, I would evasively reply but I would not deny such a possibility.

[Levin] I think the question has already been illuminated.

[Churkin] Yes, here everything is on the whole quite clear, and we are proceeding from these very dates in the preparatory work with the Japanese side.

[Levin] Vitaliy Ivanovich, it is not a secret that the number one question which the Japanese side will put, and which is most widely discussed in the press, is the territorial problem. In this aspect, are there any advancements?

[Churkin] This is a very complicated subject, and there are many political and psychological nuances. For this reason I will not reply directly to your question. I think it is obvious that it will occupy a central place in the talks between Prime Minister Kaifu and the USSR president, and then there will be a little more clarity on this issue than at present. There is now much political speculation about this in the press—with hints at some kind of secret deals, buying and selling, and other detective stories. I can only say that nothing of the sort is envisaged; nothing of the sort will happen—there will be a serious conversation.

We, like the Japanese, consider one of our central tasks is movement in the direction of concluding a peace treaty with Japan, which unfortunately does not yet exist. This is certainly an anachronism in our relations; it holds back their further development. To conclude a peace treaty, it is necessary to resolve the problem of territorial demarcation. Evidently much effort is still necessary for this, but let us wait and see how all this will appear after the visit by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev to Japan.

[Levin] It is said that almost 15 other Soviet-Japanese agreements have been prepared which open up—as can be understood from reports in the press—new prospects. What could you say about these agreements?

[Churkin] It really is possible that there may even be more than 15 agreements, and these agreements will effectively broaden and strengthen the agreement and legal basis of our relations with Japan—in the political, trade-economic, scientific, cultural, and humanitarian spheres. That is, the visit by the USSR president will give additional momentum to the development of our relations, in which both we and the Japanese are interested.

PRAVDA Article Previews Gorbachev Visit

PM0304140191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Apr 91 Second Edition p 5

["My Opinion" Article by Vsevolod Ovchinnikov: "Is Breakthrough Possible?"]

[Text] And so there are two weeks left until USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's official visit to Japan. We recently witnessed the concluding stage of preparation for this event. O. Ozawa, general secretary of the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan, has visited Moscow. USSR Foreign Minister A. Bessmertnykh has had talks in Tokyo.

First of all it must be admitted that we are indebted to Japan—our close Far Eastern neighbor which has shot ahead into a leading position in the world economy. In postwar years alone four Japanese prime ministers have visited Moscow. The highest ranking official representative of our country ever to have visited Japan was the heir to the throne—the future Tsar Nikolay II. And he made that trip exactly 100 years ago—in 1981.

The unprecedented summit in Tokyo and the signing of over 10 agreements pegged to it—all this will undoubtedly lend powerful impetus to bilateral relations. But the question is broader: Will the historical chance be taken for a breakthrough to a qualitatively new stage of Soviet-Japanese relations which would accord with the spirit of the new era and the objective role of the USSR and Japan in the Asia-Pacific region and in world politics?

There is a striking discrepancy between the state of these relations and their unused potential. Is it not a paradox that trade turnover between two states which in terms of their economic potential rank second and third in the world is marking time at the level of $6 billion a year, while Japan's trade with China has passed the $20 billion mark and its trade with South Korea the $30 billion mark...

There is no doubt that both sides are seeking to make the forthcoming visit successful. But the criteria for this success do not coincide in every respect. If for us they mean primarily an increase in the effectiveness of bilateral relations and their real yield for the benefit of the two peoples, for the Japanese the main yardstick here is progress in settling the problem of the "Northern territories."

During my recent trip to Japan it was this theme which dominated literally every meeting. Everyone is perturbed by the question: With what will President Gorbachev fly to Tokyo? The forecasts on this score come down to four options. The first is that the Soviet leader will repeat Moscow's previous statements that there is no territorial problem. The second is that he will return to the 1956 joint declaration according to which the USSR promised to hand over to Japan the islands of Habomai and Shikotan after the conclusion of a peace treaty. The third is that the guest will not only confirm the 1956 declaration but will also voice the readiness to hold talks about Kunashir and Iturup. The fourth is that Moscow will agree to hand over all four islands. The Japanese consider the first and fourth options to be unlikely. They are counting on the third although, in the opinion of many of them, the second is more realistic.

Japanese commentaries devoted to the forthcoming visit frequently also contain the following theme. The Soviet Union should, they say, give a critical reassessment of its actions in the Far East at the end of World War II. It is claimed that it perfidiously violated the pact on neutrality and took advantage of Japan's defeat to seize the "Northern territories" and sent 600,000 Japanese prisoners of war to Siberia for many years. It is claimed that for all this the Soviet Union must express repentance to Japan, which was the victim of Stalin's expansionist policy.

We should not keep quiet about these sentiments in Japan. I am convinced that the public of both countries should know about the grievances which remain from the past and receive full and objective information about the events and facts which make up the history of Soviet-Japanese relations. For this it would be worth pooling the efforts of the two states' scientists, putting all archives at their disposal, and inviting foreign specialists. Only an unbiased, strictly scientific approach will give an exhaustive idea of the thrust of the problem and reveal the bias of existing ideas.

We should probably apologize for the fate of the Japanese prisoners of war. But I think that repentance is required not only of the Soviet side. After all there was the Japanese intervention—the most extensive and prolonged since October. There was Khasan and Halhiin Gol. There was the Kwantung army, more than 1 million strong, assembled near our Far Eastern borders from the first days of the Great Patriotic War, there were about 200 Soviet ships detained and sunk, as a result of which in April 1945 Moscow officially denounced the neutrality pact (which Tokyo seemed to have forgotten).

Finally, the recent conflict in the Persian Gulf reminds us that not only an aggressor's immediate victims have the right to unite against him. And during World War II Japan was the aggressor. Having perfidiously attacked Pearl Harbor it doomed itself to the fate of a vanquished power and was deprived of its overseas possessions. From my recent meetings with Japanese I took away the impression that a certain one-sidedness which it is time to overcome is inherent in their views and possibly also in ours.

The Soviet Union sincerely wants to develop relations with Japan with a consideration for the difficulties bequeathed to us by history, for the domestic situation in our states, and for the world situation. Moscow is inclined toward a new dynamic in talks on a peace treaty and is prepared to examine and resolve any questions on a basis of the utmost fairness. I think that the time has come for both sides to renounce their ironclad positions, to begin movement toward each other, to expand the scales of bilateral cooperation, and to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust. After all the Japanese thesis of the "indivisibility of economics and politics" can also be interpreted as meaning that the better economic relations are then the easier it is to resolve political problems.

As for the possible results of the visit, in my opinion we should not predict all options in advance so as to retain for the states' leaders more freedom for maneuver. The main thing is that they should display an innovatory view of existing problems and a flexible, creative approach toward their solution. But even if the first Soviet-Japanese summit meeting does indeed become a breakthrough, it is hardly realistic to expect that it will resolve all bilateral problems at a stroke. The most important thing is to overcome stagnation in Soviet-Japanese relations and to lead them onto the highway of genuine good-neighborliness.

Japanese LDP Official Interviewed on Ties

LD0304101991 Moscow TASS in English 0928 GMT 3 Apr 91

[By TASS corrrespondent Vladimir Kuchko]

[Text] Tokyo April 3 TASS—In an interview with TASS, Chairman of the Executive Council of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party [LDP] of Japan, member of parliament Takeo Nishioka expressed his hopes that perestroyka will succeed in the USSR. He said that the Soviet Union plays an important role in the international arena, and that peace largely depends upon it, which is why transformations in the country attract close attention in Japan.

"President Gorbachev has embarked on a huge undertaking, striving to rally the population, preserve a single state and lead the country and people along the road of profound transformation," Nishioka said.

"This is undoubtedly not a simple task. It requires huge efforts, and the Soviet president has to cope with various difficulties. But I would not dramatise the situation inordinately, as some news organisations do. A more profound and far-sighted approach is needed", he said.

Nishioka believes Japan can help the Soviet Union reform the economy. "Bilateral economic cooperation is possible in various areas and at every level," he believes.

At the same time there are problems in Japanese-Soviet relations that must be solved, he said. They include the question of "northern territories" and the prospect of concluding a peace treaty between the two countries.

"We hope that President Gorbachev's forthcoming visit and Japanese-Soviet summits will help us progress towards the solution of these complex problems," he said.

Nishioka also spoke about the deepening of contacts and widening of dialogue between the Liberal Democratic Party of Japan and the Soviet Communist Party.

He said it is believed in Tokyo that "the development of relations between the ruling parties is a foundation for achieving understanding between Japan and the USSR."

Noting the extreme importance of Gorbachev's recent meeting with General Secretary of the Liberal Democratic Party Ichiro Ozawa, Nishioka said that time has come for the formation of strong links between Japan and the USSR.

New,'Serious' Approach to Kurils Welcomed

PM0304160191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 91 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Hoping for a Successful Visit"]

[Text] Tokyo, 2 Apr—The Japanese Foreign Ministry is expressing the hope that this month's official visit to Japan by USSR President M.S. Gorbachev will be an "important turning point in moving Soviet-Japanese relations to a qualitatively new level." This was stated today by an official spokesman for the country's Foreign Ministry at a briefing for foreign journalists.

Concerning the results of last week's visit to Japan by Soviet Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh, the Foreign Ministry spokesman pointed out that at the meetings between the Soviet minister and Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama and Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu the sides had reaffirmed their joint opinion that the USSR President's forthcoming visit to the country "will be an important boost to the development of cooperation between our countries in all spheres." On the basis of this view, the sides agreed to continue work on the preparation of a number of bilateral documents.

With regard to the "territorial problem" in bilateral relations the Foreign Ministry spokesman pointed out that during the talks between the Japanese and Soviet foreign ministers "the Soviet side showed a serious approach, which is evidence of its desire to resolve the 'northern territories' question."

Russian Support for Kurils Handover Decried

91UF0596A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 28 Mar 91 First Edition p 5

[Article by A. Pavlov: "Staged Concessions"]

[Text] Not having managed to do anything useful for the people in domestic matters, some figures classifying themselves as Russian "democrats" are hastening to take up foreign affairs also. And, truly, why not? After all, a good opportunity arises, together with others, to travel abroad on yet another occasion at the expense of the host party, deliver lectures there setting forth ideas which will gladden the hospitable hosts, and obtain for this fees in foreign currency and "souvenirs." Television receivers, VCR's, and personal computers are valued particularly highly among "democrats" currently, it would seem. Ask any schoolboy where one should go for such technology, and he will immediately reply: Japan.

It is possible, of course, that it is not only these considerations that guide some scholarly gentlemen and public figures, who formerly became skilled in the glorification of "developed socialism" and who have undertaken to argue the terms on which the Soviet Union might agree to transfer to Japan four or, initially, just two islands of the Kuril chain. A considerable part could be played also by a desire to show the leaders of the leading Asian country that with the consolidation in power in Russia of "democrats," Japan would gain access on terms more profitable to itself to our national wealth—oil, timber, and fish stocks—not to mention a solution favorable to Tokyo of the question of the "northern territories." Hopes are being placed also in the fact that the Japanese, in turn, will take it into their heads to suggest to the leaders of other most developed Western states that it is necessary to bank not on the center headed by President Gorbachev but on more tractable "forces" in the Russian parliament. And the West's support in the struggle for power which has now been unleashed by Russia's "democrats" would, in their opinion, be very useful to them.

What is the "radical left," which has decided to act as amateur diplomat, proposing? One of the first to express himself in this connection was People's Deputy Yu. Afanasyev, rector of the History and Archives Institute. Visiting Japan in October 1989, he declared repeatedly in his speeches and interviews with the local media that the disputed islands "should be returned to Japan" and that "it is essential to put an end to the postwar injustices" and showed that the USSR's retention of the four islands was the principal obstacle to the establishment of wide-ranging relations with Japan.

Shortly after Afanasyev, B. Yeltsin expressed his opinion on this issue also. Speaking at a news conference in Tokyo on 16 January 1990, he set forth a plan for a staged solution of the "territorial question." How? To start with, recognition of the existence of this problem, then the adoption of measures for the creation on the islands of a free economic zone with benefits for Japanese capital, and subsequently the demilitarization of the islands and the establishment over them of a "common protectorate" of the USSR and Japan or transfer of the South Kurils to the Japanese, "depending on the actual situation."

Similar proposals were presented by G. Popov, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet, who visited Japan in October 1990 (who, it might have seemed, has enough on his hands in Moscow without the Kuril Islands, but no, the Land of the Rising Sun entices him also). In an interview with the newspaper MAINICHI he advocated as a result of a "staged solution of the territorial question" the islands switching to the joint administrative control of the Soviet Union and Japan in order that there might subsequently be discussion of the question of Japan's "potential sovereignty" over them.

Considering the positions of the "leading Russian democrats," the statements of A. Tarasov, president of the Russian Innovations Center, (POSTFAKTUM for 28 January 1991) that Gorbachev has agreed "in the name of rescuing the CPSU and its dictatorship" to sign in Japan a secret document on the transfer to it of the four Kuril Islands for $200 billion seem curious. "If in April the president really hands over the islands to Japan, Russia's natural reaction to the loss of its territories will be negative," the Soviet millionaire Tarasov writes in KURANTY. The president of the Russian Innovations Center has no time to read the papers, evidently. Otherwise he would have known that it is not the president of the USSR and not the Soviet Government which is putting forward plans for the transfer of the islands to the Japanese but A. Tarasov's associates from Russian "democrat" ranks.

We still have much to learn from the West. And not only in economics, science, and technology but also in the ability to defend our national interests. Remember M. Thatcher's reaction to Argentina's attempt to decide by force the question of the Falklands. And the Japanese also set us an example also, having for almost 50 years now firmly insisted on their right to the South Kurils. Why should we display any less firmness? Or has the time come when, having sold off the oil, gas, forests, and gold, we are starting to bargain away the last thing left to us—our own territory? And what would we get in exchange—television receivers, VCR's, and personal computers? And what would we do subsequently, when these toys, having become worn, begin to malfunction, and we have nothing left to sell?

As our quite recent experience shows, dilettantism in the management of foreign policy matters is highly dangerous. So let professionals, people who recognize and are capable of upholding our national interests, deal with these matters. Territorial issues are highly complex, delicate, and sensitive, and they cannot be used as small change for the accomplishment of momentary tasks in the course of the open struggle for a seizure of power which has begun in our country. It is sufficient to recall that it is territorial disputes which are at the basis of the Arab-Israeli conflict; Iraq's claims to the land of Kuwait led to the bloody war in the Persian Gulf. The examples could be continued.

The "democrats" are offering the simplest, not to say, primitive solution: giving Japan the Kurils and "having done with the problem." Are they once again about to astonish the world by giving away their territory in order subsequently, as was the case, for example, with Alaska, to regret the impetuous step at leisure?

Japanese Businessman Cited on Cooperation

PM0304154791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Apr 91 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Historic Chance"]

[Text] Tokyo, 1 Apr—Isamu Yamashita, a major Japanese businessman and chairman of the Japanese-Soviet committee for economic cooperation, called USSR President M.S. Gorbachev's forthcoming visit to Tokyo a "historic chance" of achieving an improvement in relations between Japan and the USSR which, unfortunately, still do not have a peace treaty. The first official visit to Japan by a top Soviet leader in the history of relations between the two countries could also serve as the incentive to the development of bilateral economic ties.

Japan, the businessman believes, could help the perestroyka of the Soviet economy. But for for that local business circles lack a more precise idea of what specifically the Soviet side wants from Japan. Is it aid in developing natural resources, assistance in converting the defense industry, or cooperation in some other spheres?

Isamu Yamashita is convinced that the persisting lack of clarity on the question of the sharing of powers between the center, the republics, and the local organs of power serves as a serious obstacle on the path of the development of bilateral economic ties. That complicates the Japanese companies' quest for a specific and reliable partner. "The problem is a fundamental one," he pointed out. "And it affects the creation of joint ventures, the development of the raw material base in the USSR, and other fields of cooperation."

In the opinion of Isamu Yamashita, who heads Japan's largest railroad corporation, "Dzhay ar khigasi nikhon" [name as transliterated], Japanese-Soviet cooperation could also extend to a sphere of economic activity like rail shipments, in particular on Sakhalin island, and it is proposed to discuss specific plans with the leadership of the USSR Ministry of Railways.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Le Quang Dao-led Vietnamese Delegation Visits

Legislators Confer

PM0304145391 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Spirit of Friendship"]

[Text] We are meeting as good friends and old friends. This mutual recognition determined the spirit of the conversations which the delegation from the Vietnamese National Assembly had at the Soviet of Nationalities and the International Affairs Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet. They took place 28 March.

The processes of renewal in our countries, delegation head Le Quang Dao, chairman of the SRV legislature, said, encourages a mutual study of the experience of the reforms. That is why great attention was paid during the conversation to an exchange of information on the course of the transformations in the USSR and Vietnam.

Falin Receives Visitors

PM0304124991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Apr 91 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Comradely Exchange of Opinions"]

[Text] V.M. Falin, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet committee for International Affairs and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, has received a delegation from the SRV National Assembly headed by Le Quang Dao, member of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee, chairman of the SRV National Assembly, and vice chairman of the SRV State Council.

There was a comradely exchange of opinions on the situation in the Soviet Union and Vietnam and on the basic avenues for the development of Soviet-Vietnamese cooperation.

Nguyen Manh Kam, SRV ambassador to the USSR, took part in the talk.

VNA on Nishanov, Falin Meetings

BK3103152891 Hanoi VNA in English 1444 GMT 31 Mar 91

[Text] Hanoi VNA March 31—Le Quang Dao, chairman of the Vietnamese Assembly and head of its delegation currently visiting the Soviet Union, held talks in Moscow on March 28 with R.N. Nishanov, chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet and member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The two sides informed each other of the present situation in their respective countries. R.N. Nishanov praised the Vietnamese people's achievements in the renovation process and the traditional Soviet-Vietnamese friendship, and said he believed the Vietnamese people would surmount the immediate difficulties to obtain still greater successes in renovation.

For his part, Le Quang Dao thanked the Soviet Union for her paramount and effective assistance to the Vietnamese people in the resistance wars in the past as well as in socialist construction at present. He said : "The Vietnamese people are following with keen interest the situation in the Soviet Union and believe that the Soviet people under the CPSU leadership will overcome all difficulties and trials. The Vietnamese people consistently strive to strengthen their solidarity, friendship and all-round cooperation with the fraternal Soviet people".

The same day, the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries and the Soviet-Vietnam Friendship Society held a get-together with the Vietnamese delegation.

At this function, Le Quang Dao said that the potentials of Vietnamese-Soviet cooperation are considerable and it is necessary to renew the mechanism and seek new forms of bilateral cooperation in order to successfully implement the tasks facing both countries.

On March 29, the delegation was cordially received by V. M. Falin, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Earlier, the visiting delegation had contacts with various committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet. On March 28, a state banquet was given at the Kremlin Palace in honour of the delegation by the chairmen of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities.

The Vietnamese delegation also paid floral tributes at V.I. Lenin's Mausoleum, the monument to the unknown combatants and the Ho Chi Minh Monument in Moscow.

On March 30 morning, the delegation left Moscow for the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic in continuation of its visit to the Soviet Union.

Lukyanov Meets Delegation 2 Apr

LD0204214991 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Apr 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Today Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, met with a Vietnamese legislative delegation that is in the USSR on a visit, headed by Le Quang Dao, chairman of the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. During the detailed conversation the common view was expressed that in the conditions of the growing role of the parliaments of our countries in solving the cardinal problems of social life, broader opportunities are opening up for enriching their cooperation. The Vietnamese legislators invited a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet to visit Socialist Vietnam on a return friendly visit. The invitation was accepted with gratitude.

Hanoi on Talks With Lukyanov

BK0304142291 Hanoi Domestic Service in Vietnamese 1100 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] On 2 April at the Kremlin, Kulyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, held talks with Le Quang Dao, chairman of the SRV National Assembly, and members of the SRV National Assembly delegation currently on an official friendship visit to the Soviet Union, a VIETNAM NEWS AGENCY correspondent in the Soviet Union reported.

On behalf of the Vietnamese National Assembly, Chairman Le Quang Dao expressed deep gratitude to the Soviet Union for its sincere and effective assistance to the Vietnamese people in their national construction. He wished the fraternal Soviet people success in overcoming difficulties in the current restructuring process. Chairman Lukyanov stressed that the Soviet Union attached great importance to its traditional friendship and cooperation. Chairman Le Quang Dao invited a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet to pay a friendship visit to Vietnam. Comrade Lukyanov accepted the invitation with gratitude.

The talks took place in a cordial atmosphere permeated with comradeship and fraternity.

Yanayev Receives Delegation

LD0304172991 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] Today, Gennadiy Yanayev, USSR vice president, had a meeting with a delegation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam National Assembly headed by Le Quang Dao, chairman of the SRV National Assembly and deputy chairman of the republic's State Council. At the delegation's request, Yanayev spoke about the measures taken by the Soviet leaderships to stabilize the economic and political situation, lower social tension, halt interethnic conflicts, strengthen law and order, and establish civic accord. On his part Le Quang Dao reported on the policy of renewal being implemented in the Socialist Republic of Vietnam and on the experience of using market methods of economic management. The interlocutors noted that comprehensive cooperation between the USSR and the SRV is of great significance to themselves, as well as to the other countries of Southeast Asia and the whole of the Asia- Pacific region. The conversation passed in a warm and comradely atmosphere.

PRAVDA Summarizes Lao Party Congress

PM0304143191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 1 Apr 91 Second Edition p 6

[Special correspondent M. Domogatskikh report: "Party Remains the Nucleus"]

[Text] Vientiane—The Fifth Lao People's Revolutionary Party [LPRP] Congress experienced 3 days of intense work. The last day saw the election of a new LPRP Central Committee, the adoption of a political resolution defining the party's action program for the next 5 years, and the approval of changes to the party's statutes.

At the LPRP Central Committee plenum held after the congress Kaysone Phomvihan was unanimously elected to the new post of party chairman.

The overall objective of the Communists—speeding up the pace of renewal—can clearly be seen from the proceedings of the congress and in conversation with delegates. At the same time the idea is expressed that perestroyka, renewal, improvement of the economic management mechanism, and reform of the political system must be conducted without haste, consistently, and in such a way as to avoid causing chaos in the country. The pace of economic transformations should have priority over the reform of the political system, its nucleus being the party. While directing renewal and perestroyka the LPRP intends to renew itself at the same time.

ASEAN Relations With U.S. Critiqued

BK0404092391 Moscow in Indonesian to Indonesia 1530 GMT 3 Apr 91

[(Viktor Vonin) commentary]

[Text] It is a fact that there is a trend in ASEAN countries' foreign policies that seems contradictory. On the one hand, there are obvious efforts to turn the Southeast Asian region into a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality. As advocated by ASEAN leaders, such a zone should lead to a nuclear-free zone. However, on the other hand, several ASEAN countries are still giving concessions to the Pentagon by allowing it to have military bases in those countries. Meanwhile, the U.S. military command has neither confirmed nor rejected reports that its ships and aircraft, making routine port calls at the U.S. bases in the Philippines, carry nuclear weapons. In addition, the Pentagon has recently obtained an option to use Singapore as another military base. The Pentagon also holds an annual Cobra Gold military exercise with Thailand.

At the same time, there is a positive response among ASEAN countries to the statements made by the Soviet Union and the United States that relations between their two countries are no longer confrontational. The so-called Soviet threat is no longer valid among the ASEAN circle. A sense of skepticism also prevails among ASEAN countries toward remarks by U.S. Vice President Dan

Quayle to the effect that the U.S. presence in Southeast Asia is required to safeguard international security.

Now the out-of-date thesis is even disputed by U.S. officials, whose statements at a Defense Conference in Kuala Lumpur last year can be cited. During the conference (Verserby), a U.S. participant, admitted the need to reduce the military presence in Southeast Asia because there is no longer superpower confrontation in the region. (Verserby) also expressed his hope that the United States will be able to give a positive response to Mikhail Gorbachev's proposals on maintaining security in Southeast Asia through peaceful means.

We ought to draw your attention to the recent meeting between ASEAN and Indochinese representatives in Kuala Lumpur. This meeting was held against the background of new and positive political developments in ASEAN countries.

Near East & South Asia

Belayev Views Postwar Gulf Security Order

LD0304183191 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1600 GMT 3 Apr 91

Igor Belayev commentary]

[Text] The war ended in the Gulf region with the victory of the anti-Iraq coalition and the question today is: What next? The question is not only to confront Iraq with a whole batch of UN Security Council resolutions, because the problem arises today of setting up a new security and peace order in the Gulf region and in all the Middle east.

In my view, this operation should deal with the Israeli-Arab conflict and its core, the Palestinian question. In my view too, after the end of the UN forces mission little will remain to be done in the region. Although speculation is rife in this respect, I believe U.S. politicians and members of the military lately have not been focusing on the need for the forces to remain for a long time in this region.

It is very important, in my view, that the interests are taken into account of all the countries and sides in the operation of setting up a new military and political order and a security system in the Middle East region. In this light, I would like to mention the taking of the interests of the Soviet Union into account. I mean first and foremost that we are neighbors of the countries that form the Gulf region. In every spot concerned with the liberation of Kuwait, and the adopting of the resolutions of the Security Council, we worked together with the United States. True, this is a fact that has no precedent in the history of the international community.

Likewise, I am of the view that the balance of interests that prevailed during the Gulf war should keep its positive substance, but one should proceed from the fact that war was not, however, the best way to resolve problems, even the most acute ones. The main thing now, as I imagine it, is the finding of an ideal solution that will, in the future, rule out resorting to war as a means of settling international problems.

Committee Urges Solution to Palestine Problem

LD0404060691 Moscow TASS in English 2030 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—Participants in the third conference of the Soviet Committee for Friendship and Solidarity with the Arab People of Palestine called for launching a campaigng to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, and first of all its core—the Palestinian problem—as soon as possible. The conference ended here on Tuesday.

A statement adopted at the conference says that more favourable conditions for a political settlement of the Palestinian problem have developed in the world due to new thinking and the end of the Cold War.

Participants in the conference condemned Israel for its disregard for positive steps by the leadership of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) towards a peaceful resolution of the conflict. They also censured Israel for the Israeli Government's continued inhumane, aggressive policy with regard to the Palestinian people.

The statement calls on all progressive forces in Israel to press for renunciation of power politics and of prospectless policy of the ruling circles of their country and help convene an international conference on the Middle East.

Participants in the conference urged the United Nations Security Council to take most resolute measures with regard to Israel so as to put an end to the occupation authorities' arbitrariness and to secure their compliance with U.N. resolutions which envisage a fair solution to the Palestinian problem.

Soviet Entrepreneurs Urged To Assist Kuwait

91UF0595A Moscow TRUD in Russian 29 Mar 91 p 1

[Article by A. Repin: "We Are Not Country Bumpkins, Either"]

[Text] Oil wells are still burning in Kuwait. In Iraq bitter battles between government troops and the Kurds and Shiites continue. However, the issue of the post-war reconstruction of the region is already on the agenda.

When it came to deflecting Iraqi aggression, most countries of the world community stood politically united: Almost thirty states participated in the military coalition. When it comes to contributing to the economic rebirth of the region, however, unity seems to be nowhere in sight. An acute competition for highly profitable contracts is flaring up between American, Japanese, and other Western companies. American economists calculate that reconstruction work in Kuwait alone will cost between $60 and $100 billion. And Kuwait can afford this price, because its foreign holdings are now over $110 billion, and it can count on new income from oil in the future.

The first large contracts have already gone to large American companies—the right of the victor, so to say. The British, the French, and the Japanese are also rushing in. What about us?

It is known that despite our self-deprecating attitude, we have some unique technologies for putting out burning oil wells (see TRUD, 23 March 1991) and combating oil spills at sea. It would be good if appropriate Soviet organizations took this opportunity to help Kuwait and to earn good money in hard currency. Newspaper articles and television programs are nice, but they must be followed by concrete steps. Oil is burning in Kuwait. Oil spills in the Persian Gulf are spreading. Let us get to work, Soviet entrepreneurs!

Air Force Commander Visits New Delhi 31 Mar

LD3103132291 Moscow TASS in English 1257 GMT 31 Mar 91

[By TASS correspondent Igor Kondratskiy]

[Text] New Delhi March 31 TASS—Colonel-General of Aviation Yevgeniy Shaposhnikov, commander-in-chief of the Airforce and deputy defence minister of the USSR, arrived in India on an official visit today.

During his week-long stay in India, Shaposhnikov will hold talks with the Indian minister of state for defence and chiefs of the Indian Army arms of the service staff and will visit several Indian Airforce bases.

CPSU Officials Attend Sri Lanka CP Congress

PM0204152791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 91 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report under the "Official Announcements" rubric]

[Text] At the invitation of the Communist Party of Sri Lanka leadership, a CPSU delegation comprising G.P. Kharchenko, member of the CPSU Central Committee and second secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, and V.P. Baydakov, executive worker from the CPSU Central Committee International Department, flew from Moscow to Colombo 28 March to participate in the work of the 14th Communist Party of Sri Lanka Congress.

Secretariat Greets Congress

PM0304110591 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Mar 91 Second Edition p 4

[CPSU Central Committee Secretariat Greetings Message to the 14th Communist Party of Sri Lanka Congress]

[Text] To the 14th Communist Party of Sri Lanka Congress.

Dear Comrades!

We cordially greet the delegates to the 14th Communist Party of Sri Lanka Congress and all Sri Lankan communists defending the interests of peace, democracy, and social justice.

We value highly the relations of friendship, mutual understanding, and cooperation between the CPSU and the Communist Party of Sri Lanka and we are ready to develop them still further.

We wish the congress success in its work.

[Signed] The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat.

Yanayev Meets Pakistani Chief Justice

LD2603155291 Moscow TASS in English 1543 GMT 26 Mar 91

[Text] Moscow March 26 TASS—Ussr Vice President Gennadiy Yanayev today received Chief Justice of Pakistan's Supreme Court Mohammad Afzal Zullah, now staying in the Soviet Union.

They had an open exchange of opinions on a broad range of questions of Soviet-Pakistani relations and the international situation.

East Europe

Polish Premier Previews Moscow Visit

IZVESTIYA Interview

PM0304181091 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Apr 91 Union Edition p 4

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki by special correspondents A. Druzenko and L. Toporkov in Warsaw "on the eve" of his visit to Moscow: "Good-Neighborliness Should Be Natural: Visit to Moscow by Polish Prime Minister J.K. Bielecki Begins 3 April"]

[Text] Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, a 40-year-old economist from Gdansk, became Polish head of government three months ago. After graduating from the Higher Economic School in Sopot, he was involved in scientific work. During the well-known events in the early eighties, he was one of Solidarity's experts. During the period of martial law he was unemployed. Then he became a private businessman. In 1985 he set up the consultancy firm "Adviser." Since 1989 he has been a Sejm deputy.

On becoming prime minister, J.K. Bielecki continued the course of reforming the Polish economy.

On the eve of his visit to Moscow, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki received IZVESTIYA's special correspondents in Warsaw and answered their questions:

[IZVESTIYA] This is your first visit to our country as prime minister of Poland. What are your thoughts as you set off for Moscow?

[Bielecki] For me, the question of good-neighborly relations is a key question for our country's development. We worked a long time on the Declaration on Cooperation Between Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary which was signed in Visegrad recently. Then I went to Germany to define new relations with that neighbor. If we are to be consistent, the same good, fruitful conditions should be created for cooperation between Poland and the Soviet Union, and also with the union republics. I know your country well, I have even worked there.

[IZVESTIYA] When was that?

[Bielecki] In 1976-1977.

[IZVESTIYA] Were you engaged in scientific work?

[Bielecki] No, I was employed as a construction worker. I was sent from Gdansk University to work on laying a pipeline in Novopolotsk.

[IZVESTIYA] The Polish experience of economic reforms is arousing considerable interest in the world, and naturally that includes the Soviet Union. What aspects of it, in your view, deserve a positive assessment, and what aspects are you critical of, what would you like to change? This is very important, because in our country people often draw parallels with Poland, when it comes to political development, but they pay far less attention to the economic aspects of the Polish transformations.

[Bielecki] Yes, but I think these things are inseparable. We are building a system based on democracy and the market economy. This is a process that will take years, not weeks. You cannot make the transition from the communist planned economy system to the other system, a market economy, in a short time, however much you may wish to. Therefore I repeat: This must be seen as a process, not a single measure. And the fundamental principle, apart from civil liberties and democracy, in political life is that the country's economy is based on common sense. These principles are outside the realm of debate. I am talking first and foremost about a healthy, convertible zloty; autonomy for every enterprise in taking decisions, based on economic accountability; and a dominant role for the private sector in a market economy, if a market economy is what we really want. These are our long-term goals, backed up by integration with the European Community countries and the liberalization of foreign trade, with a widening of opportunities for our sales markets. All this makes up the cornerstone of our economic policy.

[IZVESTIYA] But there are results already: The stores are full of goods...

[Bielecki] All the same, the main thing is real money. Thanks to this, we can put behind us the nightmare of an administrative economy, with its constant shortages, where everything is in short supply and when, nonetheless, the individual has no incentive to work well and there is always a shortage of manpower. That happens because all accounts are settled in artificial terms, not on the basis of real money. The restoration of the true force of money is a key aspect in establishing market equilibrium, as a result of which people can at last buy what they want, and then their only problem is money. Some people in our country find it psychologically difficult to understand this, because money was not the decisive element in our former system, the communist system as we call it, when ties and privileges were paramount, whereas today money has emerged as the sole barrier to the possibility of acquiring goods. But on the other hand, this makes it possible rationally to assess the effectiveness of the work of every enterprise, ultimately creating a market as a single whole.

[IZVESTIYA] Our conversation is taking place on the day when prices for what used to be called goods for the people have been increased sharply in the USSR. This is causing Soviet people concern and anxiety. Poland went through the stage of so-called shock therapy even earlier. What is now being done in your country to alleviate the consequences of the "leap to the market" and provide social protection for the less well-off population groups?

[Bielecki] A group that is very important for us is young people, who are still studying and only just preparing to embark on careers, and at the opposite pole there are elderly people who can no longer work. These population groups must be protected as far as possible. For all the others, the main thing we suggest is work. That is the only way that Poland can overcome the economic backwardness caused by its existence in unnatural economic conditions for decades. But overcoming this backwardness is costly, it is simply not possible to leave behind the old system without privations of some kind. And therefore I never tire of saying: This is a long and difficult process, not a few individual measures. I expect that during my visit to Moscow we will have the opportunity to arrive at a better understanding of the inevitability and urgency of changes in both the political and the economic spheres.

[IZVESTIYA] The very important changes taking place in Poland are inseparable from the Solidarity movement, which, it is well known, was born out of a wave of working people's protests against social injustice and declining living standards. Your emergence as a politician is also associated with that movement, which, in actual fact, has come to power. And here is the problem: on the one hand, the need for radical reforms, unpopular measures, including financial and taxation measures; on the other, opposition to these measures from below, especially from people working at state enterprises (miners, shipbuilders). What is your attitude to this situation?

[Bielecki] Since we have agreed that the transition from one economic model to another takes a long time, it follows that clashes, conflicts, and protests are inevitable during this process. That only means that the government must tell the people the truth. The government does not have a budget at its own disposal, it does not take for itself the resources that are saved, it can only manipulate all this within the framework of the existing potential. The main task now is to increase the efficiency of the national economy through structural changes, chiefly privatization. Those who earn least lose most through inflation, and that is why we attach such enormous significance to factors for economic stabilization. A pragmatic economy, which has proved justified in the civilized world, must in the end prevail in Poland.

[IZVESTIYA] But let us come back to your visit to Moscow. There is now much talk to the effect that Poland has reoriented itself toward the West. That is, of course, natural; the Poles fought hard for this orientation. But there is also the traditional cooperation and cultural relations with the East, with the Slavic peoples. Does this change in the direction of Poland's political strategy mean the abandonment of the positive elements accumulated in Polish-Soviet relations? How would you define the nature of these relations at the new stage?

[Bielecki] Poland's objective is long-term cooperation with the countries of the European Community. But that does not mean that good-neighborly relations with the Soviet Union are somehow unimportant to Poland. The same applies to your union republics. On the contrary, such relations are a fundamental factor in our economy. We want to lay better foundations for cooperation than there were, for instance, last year. Last year, Polish exports to the USSR exceeded imports from the USSR by 7 billion rubles. We have traditional ties with you. It follows from this that cooperation must be built not only at the upper levels, through state visits, but also on the basis of all other opportunities for contacts. Only then will good-neighborly relations be built, only this principle should be translated from the realm of speculation to the sphere of practical action. Contacts between ordinary people, young people, between politicians, parliamentarians, enterprises. Only in these conditions will natural, mutually beneficial ties become established between our neighbor countries.

Moscow TV Interview

LD0304175691 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1552 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Interview with Polish Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki by Poland correspondent Yuriy Ulyanov; place, date not given—recorded in Polish with superimposed Russian translation]

[Text] [Ulyanov] What is the chief aim of your visit to Moscow?

[Bielecki] The chief aim of the visit is to develop our goodneighborly relations, to which I personally attribute great importance. In this same context one can name the meeting in Visegrad devoted to the development of regional cooperation with Hungary and Czechoslovakia. I visited Germany with the same aim and now I am visiting you.

[Ulyanov] Poland and the USSR are implementing economic reform in the direction of the market economy. It would seem that this opens up broad opportunities for cooperation between our countries. However, we have witnessed a reduction in bilateral economic contacts. What are the reasons for this phenomenon? And how do you see the future of Polish-Soviet cooperation?

[Bielecki] I think that main reason for the difficulties in Polish-Soviet economic cooperation stems from the Soviet side. For it is the USSR which insisted on transfer to trading with mandatory handling of accounts in freely convertible currency, something neither side was ready for. In addition, there exists a difference in principle in our countries' mechanisms of foreign economic reform, the enterprises have gained the right to conduct foreign trade ties independently; while in the Soviet Union, this mechanism is very centralized, which is an additional factor complicating the adoption of decisions at whatever level. It would seem that we have opportunities for and a mutual interest in cooperation, but the state of it arouses concern, particularly since 1 January this year.

Thus, last year the foreign trade balance in our favor was in excess of 7 billion rubles [R] something rarely encountered in world practice. This year, too, we are selling more than we are buying, and the differences in our favor is already measured in millions of dollars. I think that this situation must be ended and we must seek a way out in a more elastic formula for our trade links so that they are advantageous to both sides. But I think that our neighboring countries should continue to be main trading partners for each other.

If neighbors are unable to coooperate and are unable to trade, this cannot serve as a positive example for others. Traditional contacts have already matured between us, and they can certainly become advantageous in the future, too. I would only hope that your side will show the will to make reciprocal trade more dynamic since, I repeat, the balance in our favor exceeds R7.5 billion. We are ready tomorrow to expand the sphere of our trade exchange, but the principles here should be clear and should be in accord with our countries' current possibilities.

[Ulyanov] Unfortunately, in recent months the Polish mass media have carried much material which in essence is anti-Soviet in nature, and objectively this does not promote goodneighborly relations between our countries. What is your point of view on this question?

[Biielecki] First of all, it is difficult for me to agree with this, since Polish society displays quite a high degree of goodwill toward the Soviet people. Poles even react calmly, for example, to some speeches by General Dubinin, commander of the Soviet forces in Poland, which run counter to our state interests.

In connection with the fact that we have quite a lot of important problems which it is necessary to regulate by means of treaties, it is now most important that we, in accordance with international norms, should create a reliable foundation for regulating existing problems and the prospects for cooperation.

As for what you called the anti-Soviet articles in the mass media, I follow the press attentively and I would like to say that they are not typical, but just very occasional instances.

As I have already said, Polish society displays a great desire for cooperation. However, please take into consideration the presence in our relations of certain negative elements. For, our people cannot by any means welcome the presence of Soviet troops in Poland on the basis of the now obsolete Brezhnev Doctrine. If we settle these problems on the basis of international norms, then the atmosphere for cooperation between our fine countries will become most favorable.

[Ulyanov] It is more than a year now since Poland embarked upon the difficult road of market development of the economy. There are successes and there are shortcomings too. If you had been prime minister from the very beginning, what would you have tried to avoid?

[Bielecki] Let's get away from passions. The ability to tell society the truth is the most important thing at the stage of a difficult transition from one economic system to another. Perhaps from the very beginning I would have said directly and unambiguously what is the price of overcoming the economic abyss which we have inherited from the system of artificial economics. I believe that we should continue to be full of resolve in implementing the radical reforms and tell people the truth. That is the only way we will be able to create a healthy economic system over the next few years, which is something I would sincerely wish everyone.

[Ulyanov] And what would you wish Soviet television viewers?

[Bielecki] In addition to the traditional greetings, I would wish Soviet television viewers, first and foremost, endurance in the process of creating a new economic order and a democratic system, which is the very best guarantee of mutually advantageous cooperation between neighboring countries.

Spokesman Criticizes E. Europe 'Witch Hunts'

PM0304141591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 30 Mar 91 Union Edition p 5

[Unattributed report: "USSR Foreign Ministry Spokesman's Statement"]

[Text] Attempts have been made recently in certain East European countries and also on the territory of the former GDR to prosecute in court or discriminate against former statesmen, politicians, and public figures or simply people who are or were members of parties which were in power until recently or who hold convictions which do not correspond to the present official line. Manipulating public consciousness and using for their ends the misdemeanors of certain former leaders, the organizers of this campaign are seeking to mount a kind of sociopolitical trial of thousands of party and state apparatus workers, party activists, servicemen, employees of law-enforcement organs, and scientific and cultural figures.

It is clear to every unbiased person that it is a question in this case of reprisals for dissidence, which, moreover, are assuming extreme and illegal forms. People are being badgered in the press, dismissed from work, and thereby deprived of their livelihood. Family members and elderly people also frequently suffer here.

Such a campaign elicits from the Soviet public a legitimate protest and a feeling of solidarity with people who have been made the objects of overt political revenge. Many citizens are asking the ministry and other establishments, as well as mass news organs, to set forth our attitude toward what is happening and toward the fate of those who are being persecuted.

In this connection I have been charged with declaring that nothing nowadays can justify victimization and persecution, which resemble the sadly well-known practice of "witch hunts." From the juridical viewpoint such methods of persecution run counter to not only the spirit but also the letter of the European states' pledges under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the international human rights pacts, the Paris Charter for a New Europe, and other CSCE documents.

In the event of applications for political asylum from persons who have been persecuted in neighboring countries, these applications will be examined individually in accordance with Soviet laws.

Bovin Sees 'Glimmers of Freedom' in Albania

PM0404104291 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Apr 91 Union Edition p 6

[Aleksandr Bovin article under the "Political Observer's Opinion" rubric: "First Glimmers of Freedom"]

[Text] On Sunday 31 March, elections to the People's Assembly took place in Albania. Not routine elections. Not the same as always. But the first elections of the age of Albanian perestroyka. Elections with the possibility of real choice. The candidates of the ruling Albanian Workers Party [AWP] were opposed by candidates from newly emerged opposition parties.

IZVESTIYA's readers are already familiar with the results. Let me remind you of the main thing: The communists won some 65 percent of the vote. Formally, it is a victory. But really it is a Pyrrhic victory. Really it is a victory for the opposition, which, despite being only three months old and lacking an all-permeating apparatus, mass media, and material resources, managed to secure one-third of the votes.

History lives and dies not only in words and slogans, but in monuments too. Not long before the elections, the statue of E. Hoxha that adorned downtown Tirana was thrown from its pedestal, to the joyous cries of the crowd. Yet only recently, at the beginning of last year, the 68th volume of E. Hoxha's works was published; the entire history of postwar Albania is linked with this man's name.

E. Hoxha—first secretary of the AWP Central Committee, chairman of the Albanian Democratic Front General Council, and commander in chief of the People's Army—died 11 April 1985. Official Albania mourned. "Comrade Enver Hoxha," said a message from the AWP Central Committee, the People's Socialist Republic of Albania People's Assembly Presidium, the Albanian Council of Ministers, and the Albanian Democratic Front General Council, "was the greatest historic figure of our people and country, and will forever light the way for present and future generations. Beloved, respected, and honored, he will live eternally in the hearts of all our country's communists. Thanks to his activity and his teaching, he will always inspire them in the struggle and in labor for the sake of the Fatherland and of communism... Let us mobilize ourselves even more to make our Albania the way Comrade Enver Hoxha would have wished to see it, namely—mighty, prosperous, and advanced."

Truly is it said—thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image. Every one of us can remember plenty of funeral eulogies. But however frequently words like "eternally," "forever," and "never" ring out, the former idol inevitably becomes a toppled idol. The CPSU traveled that distance in not much more than three years. The AWP, patently lagging behind the changes in the social consciousness, is only beginning, six years later, to rise with difficulty from its knees...

In Albania, the Stalinist model of socialism in what you could call its classic form was realized. In the economy—strict centralization, general "socialization," forcible collectivization, and primitive leveling. In politics—concentration of power in the hands of the leader and his servile entourage. No democracy. No glasnost. Terror. In the years of "soviet power" there were 11 "purges" in Albania affecting the highest echelons of power; in the same period, more than 10,000 political functionaries were executed. With a population of 3.2 million, the security service (the "sigurimi") numbers approximately 8,000 men, while the Army, swallowing up 11 percent of national income, numbers more than 48,000. The desire to close the country to harmful influences from outside led to a virtually total ban on travel abroad.

In some respects E. Hoxha even surpassed I.V. Stalin. In 1967 all churches and mosques (of which there were 2,169) were closed and refitted as movie theaters, sports halls, storehouses, and so forth. Thus the "world's first atheist state" was created. The 1976 Constitution (Article 28) banned the receipt of credits from capitalist, bourgeois, and revisionist states. All office workers not engaged in physical labor had to work in production: men for 30 days a year, women 15 days.

To judge by E. Hoxha's memoirs, Soviet-Albanian relations began to deteriorate in the first half of the fifties. On the one hand, Moscow did not approve of Tirana's plans to set up a heavy industry (they wanted to turn us into a "fruit and vegetable colony," Hoxha comments). On the other, Moscow and Tirana had differing views on the "Yugoslavia question." Moscow insistently called for the repeal of the well-known Cominform decisions on Yugoslavia and a review of the cases of Rajk (Hungary), Kostov (Bulgaria), and Koci Xoxe (Albania). Tirana vigorously objected.

But the event that, as E. Hoxha writes, "made us go into opposition against Khrushchev and the Khrushchevites" was the 20th CPSU Congress. You can understand Hoxha's point of view. The debunking of Stalin and the "thaw" that followed the 20th congress eroded the ground from beneath the feet of Stalin's satellites. Hoxha himself began to totter. In April 1956, at the Tirana city party conference, he came under sharp criticism. But the Albanian leader managed to isolate his opponents and stay in the saddle.

As relations with the USSR deteriorated, so the love affair with China began to develop. Soviet credits and specialists were replaced by Chinese ones. The idyll lasted about 10 years. The gradual muffling of the anti-Soviet campaign in China, the criticism of Maoism, and the establishment of relations between the PRC and the United States were perceived in Tirana as a betrayal of socialism and a switch to revisionist positions. Things began to cool off. In 1978 Beijing recalled its advisers and stopped economic aid. Tirana's propagandists claimed that "true socialism" remained in power in only one country in the world—Albania.

Our perestroyka was given a hostile reception by the Albanian leadership, and was declared to be a continuation of "Khrushchevian revisionism." But time is implacable, it is stronger than any social myths, ideological barriers, or political bans. The rising democratic tide in the Soviet Union and the radical transformations in Eastern Europe gradually changed the atmosphere in Albania. Especially because the country and society were tormented by the very same problems—the monopoly of political power by a small circle of individuals, the incompetence of the bureaucratic apparatus, low labor productivity and output quality, increasing laggardness in relation to the pace of the world scientific and technical revolution, and the working people's impoverished living standard. Albania remains the poorest country in Europe. The rumble of dissatisfaction is growing louder. The government is trying to maneuver, changing its slogans, and making minor cadre reshuffles. But the turbulent events in Romania and the execution of the Ceausescu couple have sharpened the self-preservation instinct and made the "top strata" act more resolutely.

I am leafing through the pages of the past because only for historians is it the past. For politicians, for everyone who is trying to drag Albania out of the socialist middle ages, and equally for everyone who wants to understand what is happening in Albania, the past has not yet become the past. It lives on in present difficulties, in the enormous inertia of authoritarian thinking, in resistance to change, in the timidity and vacillations of the reformers.

The new time begins to be reckoned from around the beginning of 1990. In April, the 10th AWP Central Committee Plenum sketches, however timidly, the outlines of change. Speaking at the plenum, R. Alia, first secretary of the AWP Central Committee, declares, in particular, the intention to normalize relations with the United States and the USSR. In May, the People's Assembly proclaims the right of every citizen to obtain a foreign passport, that is, freely to leave the country; a ministry of justice is set up; and freedom of religion is restored.

Events swamp the legislative process. Thousands of Albanians, wanting to leave the country and not wanting to wait, storm foreign embassies (the "embassies crisis") and demand immediate permission to leave. And so people in the streets begin to invade politics, to push and hurry the politicians.

The politicians are nervous. In July, reshuffles begin in the Politburo. In November, the authorities declare "profound and comprehensive" democratization (under the party's leadership) and "political pluralism." And again, the street intervenes. On 8 December, turbulent demonstrations by Tirana University students begin. Demonstrations, rallies, and disturbances spread to other cities. Attempts are made to "persuade" the protesters with the help of troops. The opposition begins to organize. To reduce the pressure, the 13th Albanian Workers Party Central Committee Plenum removes the most conservative figures from the Politburo. A multiparty system is sanctioned. The People's Assembly Presidium issues a decree on 16 December "On the Formation of Political Organizations and Associations."

Leka I, the "Albanian heir to the throne in exile," who is permanently resident in South Africa, becomes active. He visits Europe increasingly frequently and does not give up hope that his compatriots will call on him to fulfill his duty.

This was the background to the AWP national conference, held 26 December. Speaking at the conference, R. Alia spoke of the need to cooperate with the new political forces and of the transition to a market economy. He also explained the Politburo decision to remove Stalinist symbols (portraits, statues, names of streets and organizations, and so forth).

The opposition (the Democratic Party, the Republican Party) places the emphasis on human rights and freedoms, private ownership and private enterprise, and the market economy. "The era of Bolshevism and Leninism in Albania has ended," S. Berisha, leader of the Democrats, stated. "The attributes of that epoch have now been consigned to the museum."

The mass antigovernment actions probably reached their peak in February. In March, people hungry for bread and freedom were still trying to board ships in the ports of Vlore and Durres. The numbers leaving the AWP had increased. All political prisoners, the government assured us, had been released. Before the elections, a comparatively calm atmosphere was established in the country. An atmosphere of tense, anxious expectation.

Now the elections are behind us. They brought a new distribution of political forces which, to all appearances, is only temporary. The question of forming a government of national unity will probably arise. The struggle for Albania's future goes on.

Correspondents Report on Shkoder 'Tragedy'

LD0304182991 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1250 GMT 3 Apr 91

[By TASS special correspondents Anatoliy Bocharov and Valeriy Sevryukov]

[Text] Tirana, 3 Apr (TASS)—It has been officially confirmed here that as a result of the disorders which occurred in Shkoder on Tuesday three persons were killed and about 30 wounded. On that day several thousand supporters of the Democratic Party, which was the winner in the legislative elections in the region, tried to seize the building of the Albanian Workers' Party Town Committee by force and take power in the town into their hands. Units of the police special forces were used against the demonstrators for the purpose of stabilizing the situation.

Together with a Soviet television correspondent we managed to get into Shkoder in the afternoon. Other foreign journalists were not allowed in. The streets leading off the town's central square were crammed full of people. Our car made its way to the center of the events with great difficulty.

Here everything was reminiscent of a battle that had just ended. Tongues of flame would burst out here and there from the smoke-blackened window peepholes of the town committee building. In some parts of the building demonstrators were still active: various objects, pieces of furniture, and papers from the archives were raining down on the asphalt. Smoke rose from the shells of tracked armored carriers and several trucks on the square.

We were surrounded by a crowd of demonstrators simultaneously offering their versions of the events which had occurred here. According to them, only the authorities and the members of the police special unit who arrived on the scene from Tirana are to blame for the consequences of the tragedy. But they just would not explain the reasons for the militant vandalism of the crowd. One's attention was drawn to these demonstrators' blind hatred for the regime, for anything which they interpreted as communist.

A detachment of the special forces arrived shortly and restored order on the square in front of the town committee building. With submachine guns and in flak jackets and special helmets with plexiglass shields, they pushed the crowd back. We left Shkoder with the feeling that its inhabitants faced another night of unrest.

The events in Shkoder and the overall situation in the country after the legislative elections have become the subject of debate in the leadership of the country. Sessions of the Presidential Council and the Presidium of the People's Assembly have been held, as have meetings between the present leader of Albania Ramiz Alia and one of the leaders of the Democratic Party, Sali Berisha. The legality of the results of the elections, embodying the declared will of the people, was confirmed there.

The presidium of the People's Assembly has called on all political parties and public organizations of the country to help maintain civic peace, observe legality, and prevent further anti-constitutional acts. For the protection of the interests of the population of the country all legitimate means envisaged by the constitution will be used, notes an appeal by the Presidium of the People's Assembly to the people, distributed here.

The situation in Albania remains complex. The events in Shkoder testify that banking on rampant emotion will hardly help the country to move along the road of democratic transformations.

CPSU Greets Romanian Salvation Front Party

*PM0304110391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Mar 91 Second Edition p 4*

[CPSU Central Committee Secretariat Greetings Message to the Romanian National Salvation Front]

[Text] To Petre Roman, national leader of the National Salvation Front, and Ion Aurel Stoika, executive chairman of the National Salvation Front.

We welcome the creation of the National Salvation Front Party and we wish you success in your prestigious duties.

We are sure that cooperation between the CPSU and the National Salvation Front will promote the good-neighborly relations between the peoples of the Soviet Union and Romania.

[Signed] The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat.

West Europe

Bessmertnykh, Greek Ambassador Meet 25 March

*PM2703143191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
27 Mar 91 Union Edition p 5*

[TASS report: "Exchange of Opinions"]

[Text] On 25 March USSR Foreign Minister A.A. Bessmertnykh received I. Gounaris, Greek ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request.

There was an intense exchange of opinions on the prospects for the further development and deepening of traditionally friendly Soviet-Greek relations and on certain practical aspects of bilateral cooperation.

Questions connected with the USSR foreign minister's upcoming visit to Greece were also discussed.

Bessmertnykh Receives Spanish Leader's Message

*LD1903223291 Moscow TASS in English 2138 GMT
19 Mar 91*

[Text] Moscow March 20 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh on Tuesday met Spanish Ambassador to the Soviet Union Jose Cuenca, who conveyed a reply message from Spanish Prime Minister Felipe Gonzalez to President Mikhail Gorbachev.

They discussed the development of Soviet-Spanish relations, including trade and economic cooperation.

Petrovskiy Receives French Ambassador

*PM2703134591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
23 Mar 91 Union Edition p 4*

[TASS report under the general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 21 March V.F Petrovskiy, USSR deputy foreign minister, received B. Dufourcq, French ambassador to the USSR, at the latter's request.

Spanish Aid Consignment Dispatched to Moscow

*PM0104130091 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
27 Mar 91 First Edition p 4*

[PRAVDA correspondent V. Volkov report: "Solidarity Without Frontiers"]

[Text] Madrid, 26 Mar—Today 120 tonnes of food products, medicines, and other essential goods were sent to Moscow from the Spanish town of Barcelona. The campaign goes under the motto "Solidarity With Perestroyka" and has been running in the Catalonian capital for two and a half months.

The USSR Consulate General in Barcelona and the international fund named for Olof Palme were its organizers. Many Catalonian private and social organizations, large Spanish and foreign companies, such as "Puleva" [as transliterated], "Nestle," "Anekop" [as transliterated], "Gallina Blanca," and others participated in the collection of funds.

"This consignment of humanitarian aid," Ana Balletbo, the coordinator of the movement "Solidarity With Perestroyka," stated in a conversation with a PRAVDA correspondent, "is earmarked for the inhabitants of the Moscow area. We were able to carry out this project thanks to our collaboration with the Moscow Oblispolkom [oblast soviet executive committee] and the military airmen of the Moscow Military District, who provided an AN-124 airplane to transport the cargo. We hope that our modest efforts will be valued in the children's homes, hospitals, old folks' homes, and among the ordinary people of the Moscow area, who are so much in need of human solidarity today. This is not a demeaning 'handout' from the rich to the poor, as a few people are trying to make out in this country. During the hard years of the Civil War, Spain also received much aid from the Soviet people. It is our duty today to repay one good turn with another. Human solidarity knows no boundaries."

The inhabitants of Barcelona had already sent off one tonne of medicines several weeks ago. And the Spanish Red Cross has directed, in all, dozens of tonnes of medicinal compounds and children's food to the USSR. The collection of funds and goods within the framework of the "Solidarity With Perestroyka" movement is continuing.

German Aid Flights Reach Into Siberia

PM0304160991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 91 Second Edition p 1

[AZIYA-PRESS report: "Flight from Europe to Asia"]

[Text] The 100th planeload of humanitarian aid has arrived in the Soviet Union from Germany. Having taken off from near Frankfurt, the plane crossed the border between Europe and Asia and landed at Semipalatinsk Airport.

Another two Antheus [An-22] planes are being prepared to fly the same route. They will deliver a total of 150 tonnes of medicine, food, and medical equipment worth 650,000 deutsche marks. Of this, 60 tonnes are earmarked for residents of population centers in the region of the Semipalatinsk Nuclear Test Range, and the same amount again is for the victims of the earthquake in eastern Kazakhstan. Some 30 tonnes will be sent to the Aral Sea ecological disaster area.

The humanitarian flight has been prepared thanks to the joint efforts of "Civil Peace in Kazakhstan" and the independent German trade union "Arbeiterwohlfahrt" (Workers' Welfare).

Supreme Soviet

2 April Session Examines IZVESTIYA Coverage

PM0404121591 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 4 Apr 91 Union Edition pp 1, 2

[Kremlin report by parliamentary correspondents A. Stepovoy and S. Chugayev: "USSR Supreme Soviet: The USSR-FRG Treaty Ratified"]

[Text] The Union legislators worked in committees and permanent commissions 3 April.

The previous day the deputies held a joint sitting of the chambers, which was tense and eventful. As we already reported, it began by considering the question of ratifying the USSR-FRG Treaty. It was a closed sitting. It considered the treaties on the conditions governing the temporary stationing and planned withdrawal of Soviet troops from FRG territory and the agreement between the USSR Government and the FRG Government on certain interim measures. Reports on this question were delivered by F. Tabeyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee; USSR Deputy Foreign Minister Yu. Kvitsinskiy; M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff and USSR first deputy defense minister; and K. Katushev, USSR minister of foreign economic relations.

Following an active and keen debate, in which People's Deputies A. Kuliyev, I. Luchenok, V. Alksnis, I. Klochkov, N. Kostishin, A. Kudryavtsev, Yu. Komarov, V. Falin, L. Sharin, and V. Gubarev spoke, the documents were ratified.

The resolution adopted on this question also emphasizes the need to step up the USSR Supreme Soviet's monitoring of the implementation of the country's foreign policy.

At the evening sitting, which was again open, the deputies continued their discussion, which started a few days earlier, on the second reading of the draft Law on General Principles of Enterprise in the USSR.

Chairman A. Lukyanov reminded the session participants that the document has already been adopted as a whole, and amendments on three articles have been considered. The holdup occurred when it came to Article 4, for just one reason: At that time, the question of the use of hired labor gave rise to heated arguments. A. Lukyanov announced that he had consulted many specialists, and offered an alternative for the Union legislators' consideration. To avoid all ambiguities, the most controversial part of that article could read as follows: "Enterprise can be exercised within limits set by USSR and republic legislation: Without using hired labor, using..." and so forth. In other words, this article should establish a limit for all types of enterprise. No objections to this formulation were raised by either the Supreme Soviet Committee for Economic Reform, which had elaborated the draft law, or the deputies.

The "stumbling block" was thus overcome, but arguments on other articles, for example those concerning entrepreneurs' rights and their obligations, took up a lot more time. At long last, the Law on General Principles of Enterprise in the USSR was adopted. But passions, which were no joke, erupted again when the resolution on bringing it into force was being discussed.

The legislature's calm was disrupted by Deputy L. Sukhov. He proposed that the bringing into force of this law, which is of paramount importance for our economy's transition to market tracks, be postponed for one year. His argument in support of this proposal was that, in his opinion, the working class ought to first try out the yoke in which it is being harnessed. Deputy L. Sukhov went on to ask for, if possible, the last word at the next joint sitting and full live coverage of his speech on television. The subsequent statement that he will nonetheless depart "this bourgeois legislature" produced an ambivalent response among his colleagues.

Chairman A. Lukyanov asked the deputy not to do this. Who would then, he asked L. Sukhov, defend the socialist choice here? In an attempt to ease the tension which had developed in the hall, the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman resorted to his tried and tested weapon—humor. Addressing the deputies, he said: "If Sukhov were not here we would end up with a totalitarian legislature, because not all pluralisms would be taken into account..."

Responding to the situation, Deputy N. Engver proposed that third readings be introduced in the practice of the country's Supreme Soviet.

This was followed by proposals that the law's coming into force be postponed for a few months, and they produced a perfectly understandable reaction by Deputy N. Bobritskiy, representing this document's interests on behalf of the Committee for Economic Reform. He said that the Union legislature has already delayed the adoption of this law.

The resolution on bringing this law into force was not approved. It was sent back for further work.

The "showdown hour"—as it has already been dubbed—then took place within the Union legislature's walls. It began with the newspaper IZVESTIYA. As we heard from the chairman, remarks about IZVESTIYA had already been made at the morning (closed) sitting. Deputy A. Yezhelev was given the floor for a report on this question. He described in detail an explanation, received by the editorial office, of the reasons behind a vexing blunder in a report transmitted from Tbilisi by a correspondent who is not a full-time IZVESTIYA staffer, in which the South Ossetia Autonomous Oblast was described as former. This does not in any way reflect IZVESTIYA's position on this issue. In addition to the aforementioned remark, Deputy A. Yezhelev told his colleagues, the newspaper carried two other items prepared by IZVESTIYA staff members who described everything correctly. He said that the editorial office had asked him to tell deputies: The newspaper has published dozens of items on this problem, and IZVESTIYA's collective upholds positions which are in line with the Constitution. The editorial office offers its apologies for the vexing mistake.

One would have thought that explanations had been offered and that would have been that. But the floor was taken by a deputy (who unfortunately did not identify himself) who deemed it necessary to pursue the issue. He said that IZVESTIYA is still very frequently offering unobjective material. For example, when the newspaper published a report on our hearings about Comrade Yeltsin's 18 February speech, and despite the fact that the Supreme Soviet had condemned that speech, it summarized the statements by those who supported Yeltsin's speech without citing a single deputy who took the other side. Apart from a single sentence that deputies had sharply criticized Comrade Yeltsin, naming three deputies including myself. What does this mean—sharply criticized?!

From the editorial office. The esteemed deputy was evidently mistaken. That was the day when the fifth session opened, and the aforementioned question was not raised.

Now, the deputy at the microphone went on, let us look at the time when we discussed the question about the rally. Look at the way IZVESTIYA reported that. Comrade Ovchinnikova says: "Yes, the chains of soldiers deployed beforehand to prevent a peaceful march through the square are a disgrace for the authorities..." (He went on with a rather extensive quotation, taken completely out of context from I. Ovchinnikova's article "Halt the Insanity!", IZVESTIYA Issue No 75).

As for legislative correspondents Comrades Stepovoy and Chugayev, the deputy went on with his review of our newspaper's reports, they provided coverage of our discussion of this event. And what did they offer in this coverage? Comrade Sobchak's statement on behalf of the Interregional Group—and not a single other speech. True enough, a report with a completely different content appeared the very next day...

From the editorial office. Here we must offer a necessary explanation. Newspaper technology requires that any correspondents' reports due to appear in IZVESTIYA's evening edition must be transmitted to the editorial office not later than 1200 hours. Therefore, there is nothing "subversive" in the fact that one newspaper issue carried the speech by Deputy A. Sobchak, who took the floor at the very start of the morning sitting, and the next issue carried other speakers' statements.

A. Lukyanov wound up this discussion by saying: Let us for a change hear what the chief editor has to say. Maybe we can work out all the points "for" and "against" in a closed sitting. Maybe we should invite the entire editorial collegium to the Supreme Soviet.

Following this, the session resumed its consideration of the question of the composition of the Committee for Science and Technology, which was adjourned last week. Soviet of the Union Chairman I. Laptev had been instructed to look into the disagreements which had emerged. He explained in detail the principles governing the rotation of this committee's members. As regards the question raised by several deputies about reconfirming this committee's chairman, in I. Laptev's opinion this is a completely different question and it must be examined separately.

It seemed that the Supreme Soviet members were all ready to move to the confirmation of the renewed composition of the Committee for Science and Technology, when Deputy A. Krayko asked for the floor. He referred to the great burden of work carried by this committee's leader Yu. Ryzhov, a burden which, in his opinion, hampers the fruitful work by the parliament's aforementioned permanent body. Moreover, as Deputy A. Krayko informed the session, the committee's work is politicized to the limit. Extremely few people in our committee actually deal with matters associated with science. Many sittings turn into some kind of political show. This is why people have lost interest in the committee's work.

Who is being proposed, as usual, to join the committee, Deputy A. Krayko asked. And he attempted to answer his own question: Only members of the opposition. Could it be, he went on, that the committee has become the headquarters—actually financed by the Supreme Soviet—of an organization which is working to achieve this Supreme Soviet's dissolution? Is this permissible? No. And he drew the conclusion: The Union legislature must without fail examine the question of the committee's chairman.

This speech was, on the whole, supported by Deputy Kim Yen Un.

Whereas before the speeches by my colleagues Krayko and Kim I still had doubts whether the approach toward our committee was based on political stance, Deputy V. Gubarev said, now I am certain of it. Any organ which possesses political wisdom not only does not break its ties with the opposition but always tries to strengthen them. Only such an organ, he believes, is viable at all times. We ought to be pleased that the opposition is looking for work to do in the USSR Supreme Soviet. The experience of the entire world's civilization tells us: The opposition is the driving force of social development.

A. Lukyanov also agreed with him, saying: The more opinions that are expressed, the better the solution to problems.

The speech by Yu. Ryzhov, chairman of the Committee for Science and Technology, was extremely brief. The Supreme Soviet, he emphasized, is a political organ and therefore we must treat one another as politicians if we actually want to become politicians.

The debate was getting increasingly tense, it seemed as if emotions would at any moment spill beyond all imaginable limits, because one section of deputies took advantage of this opportunity to strike out at political dissidence within the legislature's walls, while another section tried to amplify its positions and consolidate the right to dissidence. Deputy V. Ivashko issued an extremely apt reminder that a well-timed announcement of a break by the chairman would be a manifestation of wisdom.

The proposal was adopted. The next joint sitting is scheduled for 4 April.

1 April Supreme Soviet Debates Reported

PM0304125191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 3 Apr 91 Union Edition p 2

[Report by legislative correspondents A. Stepovoy and S. Chugayev: "The Country's Financial Situation Is Close to Catastrophic"]

[Text] The 1 April morning sitting examined the draft law on the list of ministries and other organs of state management, and was addressed by USSR First Deputy Prime Minister V. Doguzhiyev. He offered deputies his vision of the legal act under discussion.

We are in a transitional period, V. Doguzhiyev stressed, and it has to be taken into account that we have still not completely reached the market. So it must be understood that in a transitional period some aspects of the old ways may now be abandoned, and others may be retained for a while.

The retention of ministries is part of the legacy of the past. The appearance of purely market organs is a new element: the state property fund, the Committee for the Support of Entrepreneurship, the Committee for the Support of Small Enterprises, and others.

V. Doguzhiyev confirmed the fact that, though the old structural system of management has been destroyed, a new one has not been created in the country. This probably happened in our country, he said, because we wanted to switch to the new economic relations too quickly. It is now necessary to implement a moderate policy on this question.

What principles form the basis of the draft law on the list of ministries? First, certain additional committees that will perform purely market functions are being created. Second, the sovereign rights and wishes of the republics are being taken into account in conditions of the formation of the new structure for the management of the national economy and executive power. So certain organs, ministries, and sectors have disappeared from the structure. For the present, while it is not possible to transfer entire sectors to the republics' charge, enterprises are being transferred. But the government, and V. Doguzhiyev confirmed this, intends to transfer up to 15 ministries to market structures in the course of 1991-1992. And here is yet another detail: Now there are 10 fewer ministries than there were before. In all, there will be 36 union ministries. This figure increased by one during the discussion of the draft law. The State Committee for Metallurgy proposed by the Cabinet was promoted to the rank of ministry. Why did this happen? V. Doguzhiyev himself provided the answer.

We used to proceed from the premise that this sector's supplies and work were normal. The present situation prompts a different decision. Deputies agreed with the government's arguments.

As we said in our previous report, a number of deputies from Central Asia and Azerbaijan pressed for mandatory representation of people from these republics in the government. Answering these demands, V. Doguzhiyev, clearly recalling that it was 1 April, said: If we decide that a particular post should be filled by a representative of a republic, we will certainly laugh at this later. It should be a question of involving representatives of the republics as much as possible in the government that is being formed.

There are now missions from all the republics in Moscow, and we must consider how to make them more plenipotentiary. Perhaps, the first deputy premier mused, we should increase their staffs so that the representative has at least the rank of deputy chairman of the republic Council of Ministers, has his own apparatus, and constantly takes part in the work of all government organs.

V. Doguzhiyev admitted that the criticism of the Committee for Purchases of Food Resources was correct. At first the government wanted to have such a committee within the Cabinet of Ministers, then it found itself with the rank of "attached to the Cabinet." So the decision to include this committee in the basic structure of organs of state management was correct.

Many deputies made considerable efforts on this day to expand the list of ministries and other central bodies of USSR state management, but, once they were put to the vote, the additional proposals did not meet with full support from colleagues. We think that they were reassured by the explanation made by A. Lukyanov and V. Doguzhiyev: After the signing of the Union Treaty it will be necessary to review many normative acts, laws, and resolutions, including the composition of ministries.

After quite a long debate the law was adopted, together with amendments and additions from the session participants. The legislators also approved a resolution on the procedure for introducing this document into effect.

At the evening sitting the Supreme Soviet heard a report from Deputy Prime Minister V. Shcherbakov on the situation with regard to the payment of compensation to citizens in connection with the increase in prices planned for 2 April. On the whole V. Shcherbakov described the situation regarding this question as normal: Work on compensation payments has been largely completed in all republics. But unsolved issues remain. It is important, he stressed, to ensure that everyone sticks to the maximum level of prices. A certain strain has already emerged here. Thus the Baltic republics have introduced for certain food goods prices higher than the maximum prices on the remaining territory of the USSR. They have also increased compensation payments. By 9 rubles [R] in Latvia, for instance... We will try to reach agreement with representatives of these republics on this in the next few days, but if this is not forthcoming, we will be forced to apply the measures envisaged by the union parliament.

There is some tension in Uzbekistan and Turkmenia. This tension also applies to Tajikistan and other regions, because these two republics have decided not to increase prices for bread, flour, and pasta but to introduce distribution norms. To find the money for compensation payments and avoid payments on meat and butter, they have increased the prices of these products more than envisaged by the maximum level. The union government is also intending to hold consultations with them before taking tougher action.

V. Shcherbakov admitted that the solution to revaluing insurance payments has been slightly delayed. These deposits will be revalued in the next few days, he assured deputies.

With regard to compensation payments to women who are on leave without pay looking after a child aged between 18 months and three years. Here the deputy premier recalled that minimum guarantees have been established at the USSR level: The states undertakes to provide partially paid leave for women looking after a child aged up to 18 months. She receives compensation of R60 plus R110 for the child. When she remains on leave with a child aged up to three years, this norm does not worsen her position (her length of service is preserved), but the state has not adopted a decision to extend the leave and the partial payment. However, republics and enterprises have this right.

The questions that remained unsolved relate to sources of finance. Quite a strained situation is taking shape with regard to social organizations. The government's position here is this: We fully compensate for expenditure on paying the management apparatus in enterprises employing disabled people, V. Shcherbakov confirmed.

The government does not intend to provide a money subsidy to professional officials of trade unions and the CPSU or to representatives of other parties and social movements. Creative unions also come into this category, since they enjoy total relief from taxes.

The "sorest" point, in the government's opinion, is the allocation of money to the support fund. The situation remains strained, because "net contributor" republics like Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia, are objecting to the sums they have been told to contribute. Mutual understanding seems to have been reached with Belorussia. The Ukraine confirms that the union government's calculations are correct, but says: The money that was supposed to go on subsidies has already been incorporated in the budget and prices. The situation in Russia is similar.

In this connection the government has agreed with the president that this question will be referred to the Federation Council. Because the country's financial situation, as V. Shcherbakov put it, is close to catastrophic. We have never received the money for all-Union purposes, and the pension fund and social insurance accounts have been blocked. Let us try once again to reach agreement. If this proves impossible, the deputy prime minister declared, then we will tell the Supreme Soviet to adopt a series of very tough measures against those who are not obeying agreements reached earlier.

At the end of the 1 April evening sitting deputies adopted a resolution on the situation in South Ossetia. In it the country's Supreme Soviet recommends that the USSR president introduce a state of emergency throughout the territory of South Ossetia using the forces of the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] internal troops.

Journalists who arrived for the 2 April morning plenary sitting of the chambers learned that they had nothing to do for at least two or three hours. The union legislators had decided to continue behind closed doors the discussion of the question of ratifying the treaties between the USSR and the FRG.

Political & Social

French Paper Interviews Shevardnadze

PM0404102491 Paris LE MONDE in French 4 Apr 91 pp 1,4

[Interview with former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze by Daniel Vernet—place and date not given]

[Text] [Vernet] You resigned, invoking "the threat of dictatorship." Is it a real or potential threat? And how do you think the situation has developed since then?

[Shevardnadze] The threat was real. Of course, that was not an easy decision to make and, since then, the situation has not improved.

[Vernet] Why?

[Shevardnadze] Because of social tensions and tensions among the nationalities, the economic crisis, the political confrontation, and the intensive activity of right-wing forces and reactionaries.

[Vernet] The democratic forces are also mobilizing....

[Shevardnadze] Yes, recently. There are positive changes among the democrats; they have reached the conclusion that they need to have a structure to oppose the rise of those who dream of the old order, a totalitarian regime.

[Vernet] Do you include some of the communists among the reactionary forces?

[Shevardnadze] There are such forces in the CPSU, in the state apparatus, and among the people. It is frequently stated that we need a firm hand. The difficult situation in the country provides fertile ground for the development of such ideas.

[Vernet] Do you think that at the end of the summer Mr. Gorbachev missed an opportunity to unite the democrats and reformist communists when he rejected the "500 days program?"

[Shevardnadze] There have been many missed opportunities, not only by Gorbachev but also by me and by everybody. This is not surprising in such a period. I have reached the conclusion that we should have spread perestroyka over a longer period with well-defined stages....

[Vernet] Or implemented it more slowly?

[Shevardnadze] Yes, but defining the stages clearly in a more specific way. As regards the market economy, the decision ought to have been made two or three years ago when the government enjoyed widespread confidence.

The same applies to relations between the nationalities and the new Union Treaty. All the proposals now being disputed would have been adopted without any problem if they had been put forward three years ago.

[Vernet] There is sometimes talk of a "centrist bloc." Can there be a "roundtable" among the various political forces, as there has been in some East European countries?

[Shevardnadze] These ideas of blocs are relative in our country. You can only talk of a centrist bloc if there are structures from the top to the grass roots. It is like the parliaments, which must be composed of parties. What happens in parliament does not always reflect the balance of forces in society. It is because of the lack of these structures. We must start from the fact that there are conservative forces in society, and some really reactionary forces, which would like to return to the old order, and there is a democratic movement; but there is no structure behind the democrats either.

The Union of the Democrats

[Vernet] Would you support Mr. Yeltsin's efforts if he tries to create the big democratic party of which he talks?

[Shevardnadze] I do not know. I will support Yeltsin or somebody else. But what I am sure about, is that the democrats must find a means of uniting. Will it be a platform, or a new party, or two parties? I cannot rule out any variation. If he is to lead them, that is a different matter. I do not know if Yeltsin wants to lead a party.

[Vernet] He has said that he wants to form it.

[Shevardnadze] Yes, but does he want to lead it? He left the Communist Party, and he has not said that he wants to lead a new party.

[Vernet] What do you think of the election of a Russian president by universal suffrage?

[Shevardnadze] In principle, it is reasonable. Who will be elected is a different matter. But it is another step in the right direction.

[Vernet] Should that be the case in all the republics?

[Shevardnadze] Everything is leaning toward direct elections, which is fairly unusual for us. In the next elections, we should directly elect the president of the Union, the president of Russia, and the others.

[Vernet] Surely a Russian president elected by universal suffrage would have greater legitimacy than a president of the Union chosen by a congress which is democratic to a greater or lesser extent?

[Shevardnadze] A president elected by universal suffrage will not become a dictator. The time will come for Gorbachev to be directly elected. I have no doubt about that. How long from now? Two years? At all events, I am sure that he will stand in the next elections.

[Vernet] Following the Tbilisi repression, you were sent to carry out an investigation. What are your conclusions? And what do you think of the fact that the same scenario was repeated in Vilnius last January?

[Shevardnadze] I would not call that the repetition of a scenario. They are different cases.

[Verenet] On both occasions was it not said that the military acted without referring to the central government?

[Shevardnadze] There are similarities from that viewpoint. With regard to Tbilisi, my main conclusion is that there was no dialogue between the political leadership and the social forces, including what is called the opposition. However, dialogue is necessary, otherwise you are drawn toward tragedy. I can say the same thing about Vilnius.

[Vernet] Is it really credible to say that on both occasions central government knew nothing about what was happening?

[Shevardnadze] With regard to events in Tbilisi, I bear witness to the fact that Gorbachev knew nothing about it, and neither did I.

[Vernet] Surely somebody here in Moscow gave orders?

[Shevardnadze] But what kind of orders? To strengthen the security measures? To protect individuals and property? To send Army units as reinforcements.... Provision had been made for all that. But, afterwards, everything was decided on the spot—and look at the result. With regard to events in Lithuania, you know that Gorbachev stated publicly that he knew nothing about them. I asked him the question in person and he assured me that he did not know. It is true that the defense minister also said he knew nothing about it. But there must be a parliamentary inquiry into all that to clarify what happened.

[Vernet] If the government knew nothing about what was being planned, does that not demonstrate its weakness?

[Shevardnadze] It is dangerous for it to be possible to use force without the country's authorities being informed. My remark about the possibility of dictatorship is based on this observation: suddenly, somebody in Moscow, let us say a city commandant, could give the order to fight! That is a very dangerous phenomenon and I think that the country's leadership and parliament must draw the necessary conclusions. It is a very serious lesson.

[Vernet] It is nonetheless a sign of weakness by the government....

[Shevardnadze] Weakness? I do not know. At all events, something is not working. To put it in blunter terms, such decisions should not be made without the leader's decision. If the local military leaders take such initiatives, this means that the laws are no longer working; we must know why.

The Situation in Georgia

[Vernet] What do you think of the situation in your Republic of Georgia, and the action of President Gamsakhurdia?

[Shevardnadze] I would not like to give my opinion on a leader; that is not my job, and I am afraid that my judgments are not entirely objective. I know that there are fairly complex problems there, like the conflict with the Ossetians. All I can say is that the Georgians and Ossetians will be wise enough to find a common language. They have lived side by side in friendship for decades. But it will probably take time.

[Vernet] Have you retired from Georgian politics or do you intend to play a role in them again?

[Shevardnadze] I have no such plans. There have been free elections, the people elected a Supreme Soviet which elected a president; that result must be respected.

[Vernet] Do you think that Georgia will be independent in the coming years?

[Shevardnadze] The new legislature has announced that it is leaving the Union. That decision exists. There is another element: Yeltsin and Gamsakhurdia have agreed to sign a treaty between Russia and Georgia. It is an agreement between two sovereign states, and this kind of agreement has the right to exist.

[Vernet] Is there not a risk of conflict between the agreements reached at grass-roots level among the republics and the new Union treaty proposed by Mr. Gorbachev?

[Shevardnadze] Yes. But there are some republics which do not want to sign the Union treaty. So-called "horizontal" links compensate to some extent for that refusal and create conditions for cooperation among the peoples, the republics, the economies, and cultures. These "horizontal" links have a future although the treaties which have been signed and which were put forward as fundamental are more like declarations of intent. But these are new relations among the republics and they should be developed.

[Vernet] To turn to your new speciality, foreign policy, how did you arrive at that interest? You had no particular preparation for it.

[Shevardnadze] It was six years ago. How did it happen? I received a telephone call from Gorbachev who made me the offer, and the next day I was installed in the Foreign Ministry. I did not have much experience of international policy but I had a great deal of experience of serious political work at republic level. I was also used to relations among the nationalities: There were difficulties at that time too.

[Vernet] It cannot have been easy for you to place your stamp on such a powerful apparatus as the foreign ministry?

[Shevardnadze] I succeeded because I relied on a very useful group of people. I tried to create the right conditions for creative work because I do not think you can run foreign policy without creativity.

[Vernet] Was that not the case previously?

[Shevardnadze] I do not think that creativity was lacking, but the state of mind was different. Perestroyka and the democratization process enabled me to use different forces and a different approach. But the foreign affairs corps was ready with its high intellectual potential. They are professionals, just as my predecessor was a real professional.

They helped me to overcome the problems. But the essential condition which enabled me to obtain some results was the perfect accord between Gorbachev and I. That was the most important thing. We had exactly the same ideas in the foreign policy sphere.

[Vernet] When you arrived at the Foreign Ministry, did you already have an idea of the new relations which you wanted to establish with the United States, the EC, and Eastern Europe?

[Shevardnadze] Perhaps, but it was a very general opinion. The war in Afghanistan was raging and I was bound to ask certain questions. What was the reason for this conflict? Why were people dying? Why did we send in our Army?

"Building a Rule-of-Law State"

In East Europe, I felt that there were important processes going on although the Polish events took place before perestroyka. And all that was taking place against the background of a direct confrontation between East and West. I naturally wondered whether that confrontation should be continued or whether we should seek other possibilities. I had not reached any conclusions, but I was anxiously wondering. There was all that against the background of a third country with a nuclear arsenal.... You may say that I was an amateur, but I was not a real dilettante.

[Vernet] When you decided to allow the "fraternal countries" to choose their own path, did you hope for a reformed socialism, or were you haunted by the failure of the socialist system?

[Shevardnadze] Until perestroyka, people had a different idea of the socialist system, although there were doubts too. Everybody had his analyses. After starting perestroyka and taking the path of democratization, we began to move gradually from a totalitarian regime to democratic institutions, and we constantly watched what our neighbors and friends were doing. Gorbachev and I were worried but, for better or for worse, we were changing. We had begun to build a rule-of-law state. We also saw that our friends were not changing. But we could not intervene because we had renounced that practice of diktat. But we respected those choices, although we saw that they were not the right ones.

We understood that we would lose all those people if they delayed their reforms, and they delayed a long time. I had no doubt about the fact that the changes were inevitable, but those countries remained immobile—"irrevocably our friends," as people said then.

[Vernet] They are still the USSR's friends, judging from Erich Honecker's move to Moscow....

[Shevardnadze] It is not just a matter of Honecker. He is a sick old man; we would have helped him even if he had been a monarchist.

[Vernet] Are you not afraid that the new world order looks very like a "pax americana," especially after the Gulf War?

[Shevardnadze] The Gulf is a very painful story—a tragedy. People died in Kuwait, Iraq, and elsewhere; but that is only one element in a general process; it is very important that the international community passed that test. It was a very harsh and difficult test.

[Vernet] Did you not have the impression that the Soviet Union was tempted to break that international solidarity in mid-February?

[Shevardnadze] The essential part of the USSR's behavior was our action in the Security Council. It was the Security Council which reflected the international community's opinion. There were no disagreements with France, the United States, Britain, and China, although China has its own individual stances. That is the important thing.

[Vernet] I was referring to the final Soviet proposals to try to avert the land offensive...

[Shevardnadze] That was only a detail. As always, there can be minor differences, but their significance must not be exaggerated, though I did not much support that action. But it was a mere detail. The main thing is what the Security Council did.

[Vernet] What lesson can be drawn from this?

[Shevardnadze] In the forefront, I would place the role and duties of the United Nations, with the Security Council as guarantor of peace. If we stand by this principle there will be no problems, no fear that the USSR, the United States, or another country could impose its own vision of the world.

[Vernet] Nevertheless, the fact remains that the United States did play the main role in the war, and it is likely to play a crucial role in the attempt to settle the Israeli-Arab conflict.

[Shevardnadze] Not long ago I took part in a debate with Brzezinski. According to him, the United States must perform its mission and settle the Middle East conflict. It cannot be denied: Following the Gulf crisis the United States is objectively in a situation in which it can, and must, do a great deal. But I pointed out that when the Security Council resolutions were adopted there were difficulties with the nonpermanent members. At that time people did not say that there were certain key countries and others that were not. We must adhere to this principle, while stressing the particular responsibility of the major powers. But if we start drawing distinctions between key countries and the rest, then it will not work. This is why I believe that we will build the new order on the basis of new equal-based relations between states, within an overall atmosphere of mutual respect, while taking account of the balance of interests.

I know that there is an "imperialist" attitude in some U.S. circles. But we must not be afraid of it. Reasonable politicians will realize that we can only build a united world on a collective basis.

[Vernet] Do you believe that the rise of the right wing forces in the USSR influences foreign policy? I am thinking, for example, of the difficulties over conventional disarmament...

[Shevardnadze] I believe that the obstacles that have emerged will be overcome. This is in the interests both of our country and of the military. This, because, if we make legal the transfer of divisions that has been discussed, the others too will have the right to move tanks, and then what will be left of the Paris agreement? As far as I know, there have already been some reasonable proposals, some compromise ideas. I have no doubt that a solution will be found. This is not the most important point. For five and a half years I had a great deal to do with disarmament efforts. With regard to medium-range missiles, with Shultz, everything was thought to be settled, and then suddenly, at the last moment, there were extra Pershings that appeared in Germany. I made a public protest...

[Vernet] Did you have difficulties with your military?

[Shevardnadze] Not with ours, but with the others. That happens in negotiations; its importance must not be exaggerated. What does worry me is the general situation in the USSR, the instability of the USSR, of Europe—but above all that of our own country. This is the main danger. If we do not succeed in stabilizing the situation, if a dictator emerges, or if our country moves toward chaos and anarchy, then Europeans will not be able to sleep nights. I do not know what will happen. This is what must be pondered.

[Vernet] What is the solution to this choice between dictatorship or chaos?

[Shevardnadze] Chaos leads to dictatorship. The hope is that all reasonable people—both conservatives and democrats—will temporarily set their differences aside and unite to salvage the country. It is not yet too late. It is late, but no too late. All is not yet lost. The interests of the country and the people must take priority. People are tired. I have told everyone, Yeltsin, Gorbachev, that we must forget insults, personal conflicts. And we must rally together to reform the economy, resolve the conflicts between nationalities, and help the people to understand that there are leaders capable of transcending psychological barriers for the sake of all.

[Vernet] You occupied some important posts in the old days. You were first secretary in Georgia, and I remember hearing you deliver speeches that were very eulogistic about Brezhnev. When did you realize that the system had to be transformed?

[Shevardnadze] Some day I will publish my speeches at party meetings; they will be ordinary public speeches. Very often my friends would tell me: "You must not talk that way; you must not emphasize negative aspects." I will publish them; I don't know when, but you will see that when I said nice things about Brezhnev, there may have been exaggerations, but I was sincere. This, because I took certain initiatives in Georgia. And Brezhnev did not prevent them. On the contrary, he helped me in some difficult situations—at that time there were conflicts in Georgia between the nationalities, malcontents. I managed to resolve that without causing casualties, though at the time it was easier to send in the tanks. Nothing like that happened, because I had this support.

I started perestroyka in Georgia. Experiments were made when necessary. Now there is talk of land leasing, there is talk of giving the land to the peasants, of establishing self-management, self-financing. All this was done in Georgia. At the time many people wanted to expel me from the party. I reached the conclusion that the system had to be changed substantially. When you create th conditions for people to work they can achieve miracles. I am convinced of it.

Then came glasnost and its tensions. Because of all that I could have been dismissed, because the party was believed to know everything that the people were thinking. Gorbachev witnessed all that. Sometimes he would come to see me, watch me. We traveled, talked, started perestroyka. This is the first time I have talked about it. Perhaps immodestly. But this struggle was started in Georgia. I remember when we gave the buses to the drivers: "There you are, it's yours. Earn as much as you want. Just give us a percentage, a kind of tax..." People in Moscow were outraged: "It's a return to capitalism." Next we leased out restaurants and land. That's how I came to the idea that everything had to be changed—through practical work. Gorbachev was of the same opinion. We have known each other for 30 years, since our time im the youth organizations here in Moscow. It is a long-standing friendship.

[Vernet] In Minsk Gorbachev recently described himself as a convinced communist. How would you describe yourself?

[Shevardnadze] I believe in the socialist ideals. The problem is how to achieve them. Through civil war, the class struggle, or by means of a law-based state, civilized relations between people and peoples? I concluded very late that this latter path was the only possible one.

Meetings of CPSU CC Commissions Reported

PM0304152991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 28 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Session of CPSU Central Committee Commissions"]

[Text] **On Renewing the Activity of Primary Party Organizations**

A routine session of the CPSU Central Committee Standing Commission on Renewing the Activity of Primary Party Organizations has been held under the chairmanship of O.S. Shenin, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The commission examined the question "On Urgent Measures To Strengthen the CPSU's Ranks." The report on this problem was delivered by A.I. Teplenichev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and secretary of the party committee of Novolipetskiy Metallurgical Combine.

It was pointed out at the commission that, in conditions of the increasing political confrontation being imposed on society by forces opposed to perestroyka, questions of strengthening the unity of the CPSU's ranks and enhancing organization and discipline among Communists are arising particularly acutely. The resolution of the combined plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission "On the Organizational-Political Strengthening of Party Organizations" is having a mobilizing effect in this area.

The state of the party's ranks and measures to develop the activeness and initiative of party organizations were examined in detail at the session. On the whole, total CPSU membership fell by 14.1 percent during 1990, chiefly in connection with people leaving or being expelled from the party. Analyzing these processes, the commission members noted the importance for stabilizing the situation of increasing attention to every communist and implementing effective measures to renew the life of party organizations. It is necessary to ensure that the democratic mechanisms enshrined in the CPSU Statutes and normative and methodological documents work at full strength.

Questions of admission to the CPSU were examined carefully. It was pointed out that here primary party organizations must show initiative and responsibility in making full use of the rights granted them in the CPSU Statutes. The chief thing today is to strengthen party influence and restore confidence in the party in every grass-roots production link and to enhance the role of primary, shop party organizations and party groups. The need for the speediest elaboration and adoption of a new CPSU Program was emphasized.

Specific recommendations for strengthening party ranks were elaborated with due regard for the political situation.

A statute on the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Renewing the Activity of Primary Party Organizations was approved at the session.

On Agrarian Policy

A session of the CPSU Central Committee Commission on Agrarian Policy was held 27 March under the chairmanship of Ye.S. Stroyev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. Questions connected with resolving the most urgent problem today—that of cardinally changing the socioeconomic position of the peasantry and strengthening the material base of the countryside—were examined comprehensively. The attention of party organizations was focused, above all, on improving the living and working conditions of the rural inhabitant and showing constant concern for his needs. It was deemed expedient to take a very active part in elaborating and realizing a program for the countryside's social transformation. It was urgently pointed out during an exchange of opinions that party committees must not lose the initiative in formulating and helping to resolve specific questions of the development of agrarian policy and the observance of parity in relations between the city and the countryside.

There was a useful exchange of opinions on progress in the country's land reform. The participants in the discussion reached a unanimous opinion on the need to promote in every possible way the process of forming a mixed economy. This process is directly linked with the switch to market relations in the countryside. The commission members consider it inadmissible to use the perestroyka of land relations to pit forms of ownership against each other or to stir up extremist aspirations for ambitious purposes. Local party organs were oriented toward supporting legislative acts for the reform of land relations and toward strengthening the role of party organizations in their practical implementation.

The attention of the communist leaders of the USSR State Planning Committee, the USSR State Committee for Material and Technical Supply, the USSR Ministry of Finance, and other departments was drawn to the need to strengthen control over ensuring equivalence in exchange between agriculture and the agro-industrial complex as a whole and the other spheres of the national economic complex, improving deliveries of material resources, and satisfying other needs of producers of foodstuffs.

Participating in the discussion of problems were A.F. Kolinichenko, first secretary of Orenburg RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Communist Party Obkom [Oblast Committee]; N.A. Volodin, first secretary of Orel RSFSR Communist Party Obkom; V.A. Mindolin, first secretary of Novosibirsk RSFSR Communist Party Obkom; A.A. Zelenovskiy, first secretary of Brest Belorussian Communist Party Obkom; Kh.E. Berdyyev, first secretary of Surkhan-Darya Uzbek Communist Party Obkom; V.Kh. Bambayev, president of the Association of Employers and Peasant Farms in Kalmykia; O.V. Vinogradov, second secretary of Kokchetav Kazakh Communist Party Obkom; S. Mirzayev, first deputy chairman of Fergana Oblast Soviet Executive Committee; V.G. Doroshenko, first secretary of Kazankovskiy Ukrainian Communist Party Raykom [Rayon Committee]; Yu.P. Garin, a farmer from Kostroma Oblast; V.I. Chernoivanov, USSR minister of agriculture and food; V.A. Starodubtsev, chairman of the USSR Peasants Union; I.I. Kukhar, chairman of the All-Union Collective Farms Council; N.A. Pugin, USSR minister of automotive and agricultural machine building; V.I. Fisinin, general director of the VPNO [expansion unknown] for the Production and Processing of Poultry Farming Produce and academician of the VASKhNIL [V.I. Lenin All-Union Academy of Agricultural Sciences]; Academician A.A. Nikonov, president of the VASKhNIL; Yu.A. Peskov, general director of the "Rostselmash" Production Association; V.I. Shtepo, member of the USSR Supreme Soviet; and others.

The commission drew up recommendations for party committees on the questions discussed.

PRAVDA Starts Column on New CPSU Program

PM0104150791 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
25 Mar 91 Second Edition p 1

[Unattributed article under new rubric "Toward the New CPSU Program: Proposals, Discussions, Alternatives": "Guidelines for Progress"]

[Text] Today we inaugurate a new rubric which, we hope, will attract the attention of Communists and all readers.

Perestroyka has reached a zenith and a critical point from where we can look ahead and clearly determine the main directions for the country's development and respond to the urgent questions: Who are we, where have we come from, where are we going? In this respect the elaboration of the new party program is of great importance. It will not emerge out of thin air. It should reflect all the valuable points elaborated by progressive social thinking. The 28th CPSU Congress statement "Toward Humane and Democratic Socialism" is the basis for the new program.

Its basic idea and the essence of the concept were set out in the 16 January 1991 speech by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the CPSU Program Drafting Commission. In issue No. 2 for 1991 the journal IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS published "The Draft. On the Concept of the New CPSU Program." The program is currently being finalized, but there are already points to discuss.

We invite PRAVDA readers to express their views on the entire range of issues connected with the preparation of the party program.

The profound revolutionary shifts taking place in the world, the country, and the party require the creation of a fundamentally new program based on theoretically elaborated and innovative approaches. The main, long-term aim of our development is clear—to liberate people, to overcome their alienation from property, power, and culture, and to move toward a society in which the "free development of each is a condition for the free development of all."

It is this idea—the fruit of the age-old development of mankind—that helps us to reveal the main criterion of social progress, to provide a realistic "multicolored" picture of modern civilization, and to assess the historic paths of development taken by our country and party.

In this connection the following key problems can be highlighted for discussion, elaboration, and reflection in the new program.

Any progress is impossible without analyzing the path that has been traveled—this is why we need to recognize and assess the socioeconomic shifts of the early years of the century, the historic conditions behind the emergence of the Marxist revolutionary party, and the Leninist vision of socialism.

The program will have to reflect the real experience of socialist building in all its contradictions, analyze the theoretical sources of socialist deformations, and reveal the roots of Stalinism, totalitarianism, and the authoritarian-bureaucratic system.

The program is called upon to reveal the historical necessity for perestroyka, its meaning and role, the results that have already been achieved, and the inevitable contradictions, and to clearly answer the question of what specific stage of social transformations we have reached. We need a scientifically balanced and truthful analysis of the objective and subjective preconditions underlying perestroyka, and of its stages, paths, and alternative approaches to overcoming emerging difficulties against a backdrop of a complex arrangement of political forces in society.

The priority task facing the country—and this should clearly be reflected in the party program—is to emerge from the economic and political crisis. In this connection we need to outline the main resources for improving the economy, to justify the choice of our economic development model, and to define ways of solving the food problem and saturating the consumer market with goods.

It is no less important to propose real measures to stabilize statehood, including the prevention of a collapse, the strengthening of power structures, the renewing of the union of sovereign republics, the protection of citizens' rights and interests, and the safeguarding of their security. The anticrisis program will apply to all social forces, parties, organizations, and citizens irrespective of their ideological and political leanings.

Also at the center of public attention is the question of where we are going and what the party means by humane, democratic socialism. It is obvious that the transition to a new society will be a prolonged historical period during which diverse forms of ownership should be implemented, a civic society formed, the union of sovereign socialist republics renewed, the democratic rule-of-law state strengthened, new impetus given to internationalism, spiritual and moral potential built up, and the priority of the individual implemented in practice.

Our country is part and parcel of modern civilization and, therefore, analysis of its development trends and the global problems facing mankind is of particular importance. We await your thoughts on socialism's place in the world community system on the threshold of the 21st century, on the causes of the crisis in the socialist movement, and on why the influence of communist ideology has weakened. We need also to define the prerequisites and conditions for the implementation of socialist choice in the country and the world, and to analyze the complex dialectics of the communist ideal and socialist reality. We are also interested in your comments on the development of the principles of new political thinking, which is aimed at preserving peace.

The fundamental question in the new program is: What shape is our party in at the present-day stage? There is an urgent need to qualitatively renew the party on a democratic basis, and to overcome its ideological, political, and organizational crisis. What are the ways out of this crisis? Can the party cling to its old quality, even though it has been renewed and modernized? Or will this inevitably lead it to the margins of social life? These problems are being extensively discussed by party organizations.

A society that is renewing itself dictates its demands to the party. It should become a party based on mass political movements for social progress; a party which rejects the undermining of state and economic organs; a party which seeks effective forms of collaboration with these organs and conducts political work using parliamentary methods in a new federation of republics; a party which is not a component of the state apparatus but is an autonomous [samodeyatelnyy] democratic organization based on the sovereignty of its members' individuality; and a party which combines the forms of flexible organization both vertically and horizontally.

The new program should also reflect the forms of the party's collaboration with other political forces under a multiparty system: cooperation and struggle, alliance and compromise. And in this area exchanges of opinion, analysis of experience, and questing for new approaches in theory and practice are very important.

And, finally, we propose discussing the question of how the party can now most effectively take account of the diversity of society's interests. The draft program must clearly define to whom the party is appealing, who can count on it, and the interests of which classes, social strata, communities, and groups it reflects in its activity. There is no one opinion about these problems, but there is no doubt that under present-day circumstances the party cannot exist as a mass-based organization unless it takes account of the interests of workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, various social, professional, and sociodemographic groups, and representatives of social movements and initiatives. Collective advice is also needed in order to find effective methods of party work among the masses, to help working people to recognize their interests, and to learn to uphold the principles of social justice and collective solidarity.

Some people say that at this economically difficult period this is not the time to be getting involved in an internal party debate. But how else, in the context of democracy and glasnost, can we get our political bearings and consolidate around priorities? And can there be any productive development of party theory, strategy, and tactics without disputes and exchanges of opinions?

Thus, the first phase of the discussion of the draft program is beginning. It will help us to define its main parameters. The discussion will receive new impetus in the second stage—after publication of the draft of this highly important all-party document, which will be submitted by the program commission.

Let's discuss this together in the newspaper. There may be alternatives to the draft program, and it should not just be our theoreticians who are involved in the discussion, but the broad masses of communists, nonparty people, and representatives of various political movements. The editorial office is interested in any valuable idea or businesslike proposal about the draft program. Because this is a program for our entire society's movement down the road of humanism and democracy—and this means that it can only be elaborated and implemented by common efforts.

Secretariat Analyzes Orenburg Party's Work

PM2703104191 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Mar 91 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report "From the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat:" "Oblast Committee Authority"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat has examined the question of "The Work of the Orenburg Party Oblast Committee [obkom] to Implement the Decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress."

The resolution notes that the Orenburg party organization, operating in a difficult situation, is exerting a constructive influence on the state of affairs in the oblast and is showing itself to be an influential force. In implementing the decisions of the 28th CPSU Congress, the oblast party committee (first secretary Comrade A.F. Kolinichenko) is acting purposefully and confidently, placing first the questions of the oblast's socioeconomic development, social and political stabilization, and, on that basis, strengthening of working people's and the population's confidence in party organizations. To that end they are using both proven methods of party work and new approaches dictated by the party congress decisions, the CPSU statutes, and the new situation. In their work the party obkom and its bureau rely on party structures and on the communists working in soviets, economic organs, and the media and try to be attuned to public opinion and react promptly to it. The obkom's stance on topical matters affecting people meets with broad support in the oblast.

At the same time, the resolution says, there is an increasingly visible need for more creative work by the party obkom and city committees [gorkom] and rayon committees [raykom]. It is important to consolidate the positive things that enable the oblast party organization to effectively influence various spheres of life in the oblast, at the same time they should act more vigorously in spheres that determine the future, that are priorities for party and country, for the fate of perestroyka. At the present stage this means the range of measures approved by the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies to overcome the critical socioeconomic and political situation and the tasks of protecting socialist gains, switching to market relations, and maintaining a calm, businesslike atmosphere in the region.

It was recommended that the Orenburg party obkom analyze the work that is being done to implement the 28th CPSU Congress guidelines on the basis of the decisions of the January (1991) joint plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission and adopt additional measures to improve and renew it. Enterprising activity by party organizations is held to be of paramount significance in the conditions of the critical state of society, the implementation of radical reforms, and increasing attacks on the people's socialist choice.

It is necessary to overcome the evident alienation of a number of party organizations from active involvement in economic and production activity and the solution of social tasks. In the conditions of the CPSU's abandonment of power functions, wider use must be made of measures of a political nature that stimulate labor collectives and management organs to adopt progressive approaches in production, take working people's social needs into account, and combine the interests of labor collective, oblast, republic, and country. Party organizations and communists must be more courageous in raising these questions, proposing specific measures to solve them, publicly expressing and defending their stance, and enhancing the importance of personal example. All these must be ever-present elements of their work. People's confidence can only be won by specific action.

The party obkom, gorkoms, and raykoms, in cooperation with communists working in management organs, must take a close look at labor collectives' preparations for the transition to market relations. They must endeavor to adopt timely practical measures to properly ensure social protection for the population, to create conditions for effective and adequately paid labor by every working person, to train and retrain cadres, and to solve other topical questions. Extensive explanatory work must be carried out regarding the rights and opportunities of labor collectives in the new management conditions. At the same time, it is important to persistently pursue the line of strengthening discipline and responsibility in all components, enhancing order and organization, and reviving moral incentives for honest, conscientious labor.

The party obkom, gorkoms, and raykoms should also decide on actions connected with the improvement of production relations in the countryside. Communists are to be geared to the more effective exploitation of the available kolkhoz and sovkhoz production potential, improvement of leasing and other forms of management, and support for those taking on small farms. All methods of party influence should be brought to bear on the organization of equivalent exchange between city and countryside and creation of conditions encouraging peasants to increase production of vegetables, potatoes, and other agricultural products in 1991.

The work of party committees in soviets should be regarded as a priority. Acting through the communists, they should seek to ensure that state power is fully and competently exercises at the local level and that executive organs' work is significantly improved. This should be the primary goal of the work of party groups in the soviets. Efforts must be made to actively influence the formation of deputies' positions and give all-round support to those whose activities meet the interests of working people and contribute to the solution of problems of local life.

There is an immediate need to launch preparations for the next elections, paying attention to the selection and training of candidates, particularly workers and peasants. The tendency to underestimate political work in electoral districts and precincts must be eliminated and a system created for effectively influencing voters. To this end the quest for and practical implementation of new forms and methods of party organizations' work in residential areas must be stepped up and significant improvements ensured in this area this year.

The party obkom, gorkoms, and raykoms have the task of more boldly mastering modern methods of agitation and propaganda and improving the theoretical and practical training of the propaganda and ideological aktiv and communists working in the media. Economically accountable lecture groups should be organized on a wide scale. Propaganda and lecture work should reliably cover questions of the history of the CPSU and the Soviet state and the socialist option and problems of the economic reform, the renewal of the Soviet Federation, and ethnic relations in the USSR. More active use must be made of press centers, sociological analysis bureaus and groups and dynamic ways of explaining topical problems of social development, party policy, and the facts of local life and topical items in central party publications should be briefly described in the local press. Oral propaganda, visual agitation, and media facilities should be used to create a system of information that reaches every labor collective and every family.

It is necessary to ensure that Communists and working people know and correctly understand the materials of the 28th CPSU Congress, the decisions of party Central Committee and local party committee plenums, and their positions on major questions. Those who revile the history of the CPSU and the socialist state must be exposed, and defenses of the bourgeois system, propaganda for immorality and moral dissoluteness, and attempts by opposition forces to manipulate public opinion must be vigorously opposed. To this end debates, scientific-practical conferences, and discussions need to be organized and high standards of communication and tolerance of dissenting views cultivated. The academic, pedagogical, and creative intelligentsia should be part of this.

The party obkom, gorkoms, and raykoms must make better use of the potential for strengthening links and collaboration with trade union, women's, and veterans' organizations and other public entities acting in a constructive spirit, constantly analyze the disposition of political forces in the oblast, and conduct a consistent policy of achieving civil accord on the basis of the rule of law and dialogue, while rebuffing efforts by destructive forces to destabilize the situation.

It is important to carry out a careful study of the processes taking place in the worker and peasant movement, react in practical terms to criticism concerning inadequate representation for workers and peasants in soviets and party and other public organizations' elected organs, and take the trouble to defend their political and economic rights if they are being infringed. Ways of exerting party influence on people employed in cooperatives and on farmers must be elaborated.

Attention must be focused on work with young people. It is necessary to help Communist Youth League [Komsomol] organizations to stop the drift toward deideologization of their activities, ensure that ideological and political links between party and Komsomol organizations are strengthened, and perform more frequent joint actions. Every effort must be made to counter attempts to halt Komsomol organizations' activities in labor and academic collectives and promote the entry of young men and women into the Komsomol ranks.

It was recommended that the party obkom should be more persistent in tackling the task of radically renewing primary party organizations' activities. It is important to go to every organization, look into the situation there, and teach communists how to work in the new conditions, facing up to the demands of conscious discipline and personal responsibility for the implementation of tasks set by the party. A resolute effort must be made to improve work on admitting people to the ranks of the CPSU and ensure that the strengthening of CPSU ranks is the paramount task of every primary party organization, party gorkoms and raykoms, and all communists. An atmosphere of party comradeship should be created in party organizations. Sensitivity and consideration for one another should be the norm of relationships in the party milieu.

Emphasis should be placed on generalizing and disseminating positive experience in primary party organizations' work, and more frequent aktiv training is required. Secretaries' councils are intended to be an effective means of improving the work of the party's primary components.

The resolution demands an enhancement of the role and responsibility of party gorkoms and raykoms in the economic, social, and political life of cities and rayons. Party committees must find effective ways of coordinating the efforts of party organizations and communists in the solution of local problems. At the same time, it is necessary to step up coordination and assistance for party organizations in mastering new methods of political work and in implementing the provisions of the party Statutes.

The party obkom must ensure that the content and style of its work correspond to the changing situation. It is necessary to step up analytical activity, engage more in the generalization of practice, and have a clear-cut plan of action for every area of party work. It is necessary to encourage practical work by commissions, which are supposed to be centers for the interpretation of processes taking place in party organizations and for the elaboration of practical recommendations. It is necessary to provide communists and the population with extensive information on the obkom's work and the decisions it takes. The party must ensure that obkom secretaries, department chiefs, and obkom and control commission members appear regularly in the press and on radio and television. Measures are to be implemented to organize profitable economic activities on the part of the obkom and other party committees that does not run counter to the interests of political work.

Cadre policy must be centered on systematic work with communists in leading posts in various spheres of activity, particularly economic. It is important to influence cadre placement actively by political methods. The party must look for leaders in the party ranks and in the public sphere and promote their development; regular training of party cadres and reserves must be organized.

The CPSU Central Committee Secretariat deems it necessary to further expand contacts and exchange of experience between party committees and to give them consultative and methodological assistance. The CPSU Central Committee Organizational Department has been instructed to study proposals relating to the organization of links and collaboration between union republic communist party central committees, republic committees, kray committees, and obkoms and the CPSU Central Committee and submit them for consideration by the Central Committee Secretariat.

Supreme Court Holds 'Routine Plenum'

LD0404024291 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 2230 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] In Moscow a routine plenum of the USSR Supreme Court has been held. In the reports and speeches made by participants in the plenum, serious concern was expressed over the further growth of crime in the country; last year, 1990, it increased by 13.2 percent. In the decision adopted on this issue it has been made clear that the judges, the leadership demanding observance of the law, and the guiding explanations of the USSR Supreme Court plenum are called upon to ensure the unswerving application of strict punitive measures for individuals who have committed serious crimes, have previous convictions, and persist in not wishing to work honestly. At the same time, in all appropriate cases punishments should be applied that do not involve deprivation of liberty for individuals who have committed less dangerous crimes and who are capable of reforming themselves without being isolated from society.

The plenum discussed the issue of applying legislation when disputed cases are examined by the courts where one of the parties is a cooperative operating in the sphere of production and services. Special attention was paid to the issue of defending the rights of individuals who have been excluded from membership of a cooperative without grounds. It was stressed that the activity of a cooperative can only be ended on the basis indicated in the law, in particular in the event of the cooperative repeatedly and flagrantly violating the demands of the legislation, in spite of warnings issued by the executive committee. It was thereby explained that one has to understand such violations.

The decision contains explanations on issues of applying legislation protecting the rights of consumers of the goods produced by cooperatives and those using their services.

The session of the plenum heard the personal explanations of Oleg Kalugin and the objections to the protest that Kuznetsov—Kalugin's lawyer—made. The plenum acknowledged that Kalugin's complaint is not liable to court examination since he was deprived of his military rank by a decision of the USSR Council of Ministers—the USSR supreme executive and assigning body of state power whose decisions, in keeping with the USSR Constitution, can only be appealed in the USSR Supreme Soviet or at a Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

USSR Procurator General Trubin, and USSR Deputy Justice Minister Danilov took part in the work of the plenum.

Economic

Government To Double Miners' Wages by 1992

Gorbachev Addresses Miners

PM0304211891 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 4 Apr 91 Second Edition pp 1-2

[D. Valovoy, G. Yastrebtsov report: "Agreement Reached: Second Day of Miners' Talks With the Country's Leaders"]

[Excerpts] After the routine evening recess, M.I. Shchadov, USSR minister of the coal industry, mounted the platform in the [Kremlin's] Sverdlovsk Hall (for the umpteenth time!) and began to read, point by point, the agreement reached after long and difficult debates by representatives of mining regions and enterprises. Because of the noise, exclamations, and rejoinders from the floor, I don't think anyone noticed USSR President M.S. Gorbachev appearing in the hall. Climbing the steps to the Presidium table, Mikhail Sergeyevich sat down silently next to the prime minister. [passage omitted]

At the end of a tense and difficult day, USSR President M.S. Gorbachev addressed those assembled in the Kremlin's Sverdlovsk Hall.

He noted that two days of intensive talks have produced positive results. The debate was useful, and deepened mutual understanding. The miners' economic demands have in the main been met. True, there was a group of people who tried, at the Kremlin meeting, to put political demands before the country's leaders. But the president noted, such questions can only be resolved by legitimate, constitutional means, and not at meetings or rallies. Otherwise we will never build a rule-of-law state.

In his speech to the miners M.S. Gorbachev dwelt on the situation in the country and characterized today's difficult economic situation. Unless we resolve the urgent problems of the basic sectors of the national economy, the president stressed, we will never overcome the crisis. The path to technical progress, increased labor productivity, and the saturation of the market with goods lies through the power industry and other leading sectors.

M.S. Gorbachev spoke of the work of the Cabinet of Ministers and all soviet and state structures on the emergency program to lead the country out of the crisis. The government will discuss this program in the near future.

I want to appeal to all the miners, the president said. The main thing now is not to get involved in squabbling. Let us get down to practical matters or else we will find ourselves in a very difficult situation. We are all in the same boat—let us row in the same direction.

Meeting Results Reported

LD0404140191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1000 GMT 4 Apr 91

[Report by commentator Valeriy Kiosa]

[Text] [Announcer] There are still very many questions about the meeting between miners, the USSR prime minister, and the USSR president. Our commentator Valeriy Kiosa is at the microphone.

[Kiosa] It is true that many questions on this issue continue to come to our editorial office. As you already know, the meeting lasted two days and ended late last night. What are the results of this meeting?

I would like to remind you that the miners' economic demands were discussed, and on each of these demands either a decision or an instruction to the USSR Cabinet of Ministers was adopted. So, on the main point of the economic demands, an increase in wages, the decision says: Additional payments will be established for every tonne of coal or shale provided that the plans adopted by enterprises for extracting and processing coal are fulfilled. The additional payments fund will be increased stage by stage compared to the corresponding period last year: in April-June by 25 percent in July-September 1991 by 50 percent, in October-December by 75 percent so that in January-March next year the increase in wages will double. This concerns the main demand about which many of the speakers talked at this meeting.

A decision was also adopted on supplementing the list of factories and professions that give rights to retire irrespective of age on the condition that one has been employed by these factories for not less than 25 years. A total of 11 professions have been added to this list.

There were many demands for compensation given conditions created by increased retail prices for goods and services. As a result of talks between the miners collectives' representatives and the government, this decision was adopted. The following compensations will be paid: 105 rubles [R] to those engaged in underground work; R100 to those engaged in opencast mining work; R80 to those working on surface pits and opencast collieries and also at enterprises related to this business—I mean technological transport, mining rescuers, etc. At the same time, payments into the budget have been decreased by the amount of compensation.

One more very important thing: Miners were insisting on their right to manage a proportion of their output independently. A USSR Cabinet of Ministers instruction is in front of me now. It says: Enterprises of the coal mining industry will be allowed to sell up to seven percent of power generating coal and up to five percent of coking coal from the overall volume of the coal, which is actually extracted, at contractual prices on domestic and foreign markets. I should mention that this instruction did not provoke a common agreement. Some representatives of miners' collectives were insisting on a higher percentage. However, the prime minister stressed that this is the maximum the government can allow without putting our basic industries on starvation rations.

I should mention that about 10 decisions and instructions were signed. All of them were handed out to the representatives of miners' collectives who went back to their collectives. I think that literally in the next few hours they should appear. I heard yesterday that their flights were scheduled for three, four, and five o'clock.

Finally, according to Prime Minister Pavlov's statement, the government is not going to prosecute the participants in the strike either criminally or administratively.

These are the economic results of the meeting between USSR Prime Minister Pavlov, the country's president, and the representatives of miners' collectives.

Miners Comment on Meeting

LD0304213391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Report by correspondent S. Suntsov, from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] The meeting between the government and the miners of all the country's coal regions continued this morning. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev took part in the meeting in the second half of the day. He delivered a speech to the miners. At the moment we have no more details of the meeting between the USSR president and the miners, but our correspondent reports on how the exchange of opinions between the government and the miners has been proceeding.

[Begin recording] [Suntsov] At the very beginning the USSR prime minister reported that during the night experts had worked out a draft decision. It is proposed to discuss it. Together with Mikhail Shchadov, USSR minister of the coal industry, the empowered representatives of the miners retired to rooms to finally come up with a decision and then to sign it.

Meanwhile, speeches by the miners continued in the Sverdlovskiy Hall. During an acute debate various opinions on how to solve the problems of the industry and improve the miners' lives were voiced.

How do you assess the conference in Moscow?

[V.A. Filenko] I think this has been a very constructive dialogue. It won't mean the end of the talks; that hasn't happened. A big rally has gathered here now. At the moment we are having a rally [word indistinct] and we haven't been able to find a common language.

[K.G. Fesenko] The only way out of this situation is for us to continue working, and not to strike—I'm talking about on a republican level—but to start a dialogue with our republic. The republic's sovereignty is now much more constructively directed toward solving the situation, saving the industry, and saving the situation in the country as a whole.

[Suntsov] Reports are coming in from the Kuzbass that the mines taking part in the strike are not happy with the way the conference is going and with the demands put to the government. What do you think?

[A.A. Sergeyvich, deputy chairman of the executive bureau of the USSR Independent Miners' Union in Kuzbass] This conference is not tackling the problems in principle. For example, wage increases and a solution to a number of economic issues are merely setting the miners against workers in other industries. Of course, offering enterprises the right to market their output for their own needs and giving consent through talks to a general tariff agreement, which was adopted by the second miners' congress, is a step forward, but without radical economic changes, and without advancing along the path of political and economic reforms, which have been backed up by legislation by the supreme soviets, this agreement will hardly be realized, and this will not change our lives. The main objective of these reforms must be to face the individual, both as a producer and a consumer. Any other way would rather be a return to the old economic and political dictatorship. [end recording]

Cabinet Adopts Wage Package

LD0404140591 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1337 GMT 4 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow, 4 April (TASS)—The USSR Cabinet of Ministers today adopted a series of decrees and other documents on the results of the talks with miners' representatives which envisage raising the wages and improving the labor conditions of workers in the industry.

In particular, the government has established the norms for raising the miners' wages depending on their fulfilment of production plans. For the industry as a whole, the wages fund is to increase by 30 percent from last year's level in 1991. It is also planned that the size of compensation in connection with the rise in retail prices is to be raised for the miners doing the most complex and dangerous jobs.

Representatives of several mining professions have been given the right to retire regardless of age if they have worked in that job for 25 years.

In response to the miners' demands to increase freedom in price formation for the industry's output, coal industry enterprises are to be allowed to sell up to seven percent of power-generating coal and up to five percent of coking coal from the overall volume of output at contractual prices on the domestic and foreign markets.

Material resources are to be allocated to the Ministry for the Coal Industry for building housing and developing the social sphere in mining towns and settlements.

The Cabinet of Ministers has deemed it necessary to conclude a tariff agreement for the coal industry in 1991 which should regulate the procedure for the indexation of miners' incomes.

More Ukrainian Mines Go on Strike

LD0304165191 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak in Russian 1442 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Report by correspondent Gennadiy Kondaurov]

[Text] The number of striking mines in the Ukraine has increased today. According to the Coal Committee of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, 53 mines in the republic are on strike today, and there has been a particular increase in the number of striking mines in Donetsk Oblast. If you count the mines in which not all the sectors are working, with some working and some on strike, the number has to be increased by another 50 percent. Losses in coal extraction for the first two days of April have been more than 300,000 tons. The Ukraine is currently losing more coal every day than was the case during March.

It has to be said that the strike is also having an impact on the economic plight of the mines themselves. The Oktyabryaskaya. Chelyuskintsy, Petrovskaya, Atrudovskaya, Yuzhnodonbasskaya mines no. 1 and 3, and many others are closed to bankruptcy. At the Sotsialisticheskiy Donbass mine all kindergartens were actually closed down yesterday because the mine cannot pay for their upkeep as it has no money in the bank.

It has to be said that the miners are now mainly putting forward political demands. These demands include the resignation of the president and government and the depoliticization of the state apparatus, radio, television, the Army, KGB, and militia. I have just been talking to many miners at the Bazhanov and Gorkiy mines, and they have been saying that political demands are the most important thing for them now, because their economic demands are not being met and they cannot be met until such time as political changes take place within the country. It has to be said that these demands have been supported by the Labor Collective Council of the Donetskugol Association, one of the largest in the Ukraine, which has sent its representatives to Moscow for talks with the Union government. The situation is now also getting inflamed by the price rises. The miners are very heatedly discussing the changes taking place. The point is that with the price increases, the shelves in the shops have become completely empty, there are no goods and the food situation is very difficult, which is causing indignation among the miners. When I talked to the Gorkiy miners about this, they were very outspoken about these government measures and said that the goods that were stockpiled in depots for several months—the government did not allow them to be put on sale, allegedly in expectation of the price rises, and also in connection with the fact that the new prices had not come in, but the wholesale prices were high—these goods are no longer in the depots, but they are not in the shops either. The situation is altogether very difficult and I think that the sociopolitical situation in the Donbass is going to deteriorate in the next few days.

45 Kuzbass Coal Enterprises Idle

LD0404112891 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 4 Apr 91

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The talks that have been taking place for two days between the government and the miners' representatives have still not had any effect on the situation in the country's coal mining areas where the strikes are continuing. This morning, 45 coal mining enterprises were already idle in the Kuzbass: Yesterday there were 49. Rallies and meetings are being held at those mines that are operating and the probability exists of yet other production facilities stopping.

Over the last few days metallurgical works have only received 24,000 tonnes of coking coal from the Kuzbass, instead of 117,000 tonnes. One of the reasons for the exacerbation of the situation is the growth in prices accompanied by empty shops.

Price Increases 'May Trigger' 'Wave of Strikes'

LD0304173991 Moscow TASS in English 1710 GMT 3 Apr 91

[By TASS commentator Vladimir Isachenkov]

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—Tuesday's sweeping price increases in the Soviet Union are bound to heighten social tension and may trigger off another powerful wave of strikes.

In the past few days, many factories in various parts of the country were hit by brief warning stoppages as the shopfloor demanded pay rises. On Tuesday, for instance, this was done by the staff of a mechanical engineering works in Bryansk, in the European part of the Russian Republic.

Prices went up 60 per cent on average. But hikes for some products were much higher.

Ivan Gorbachev, a deputy chief of the government pricing agency, revealed on Tuesday that prices on consumer goods jumped up 175 per cent overall and those on foodstuffs zoomed by 240 per cent.

The population are to be compensated for 85 per cent of the increases and government spokesmen contend that the number of people living near or below poverty line should not grow significantly. However, the total already comes to 80 million, or a quarter of the populace.

Miners' strikes, continuing since March 1 in a whole number of coal-mining areas and threatening to leave the iron-making and machine-building industries without raw materials, is a strong catalyst for further industrial action.

Combined with the threat of closure for many factories, the steep price hikes can provoke major social conflicts in practically every industry.

Even if the cabinet and miners, negotiating since Tuesday, reach a compromise and the strikers' economic demands are met, the national leadership will have to grapple with an unavoidable chain reaction in other industries.

However, the federal budget simply has no funds to meet further demands. Finance Minister Vladimir Orlov said in a memorandum sent to parliament on Tuesday that the budget deficit in the first quarter of the year amounted to 31.1 billion roubles, as compared with the 26.7 billion target for the entire year.

The catastrophic state of the budget is due to many republics, primarily Russia, having broken an earlier accord and retained a considerable share of the profits they were supposed to send to Moscow.

Most observers agree that the only sensible way out is for talks with strikers to involve the federal governments and republican governments.

In particular, it would be much easier to stop the miners' strikes with the help of the Russian cabinet, which has an invaluable advantage over the federal government, namely grassroots popularity.

However, Moscow and the republics still are unable to work out a reasonable compromise, by agreeing to share new budget expenditures and speed up privatisation markedly.

If central authorities continue attempting to resolve social conflicts on their own, while republican leaders keep sitting on the fence in the hope that the centre will finally collapse and they will then turn out the winners, all society will be the loser.

A fresh wave of strikes will inexorably result in the complete breakdown of the national economy with unpredictable consequences.

Gosplan Deputy on Measures To Ease Price Rises

LD0404143391 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1308 GMT 4 Apr 91

[Telephone interview with (Vladimir Grigoryevich Gribov), USSR State Planning Committee, Gosplan, deputy chairman, by correspondent Ilya Skigin; date not given; from the "Mayak Panorama" program—recorded]

[Text] [Skigin] (Vladimir Grigoryevich), you know we at the Mayak Radio studios are currently receiving numerous messages and reports from different parts of the country about the fact that it is going to cost people much more to eat in automats, rest homes, and cafeterias. Is Gosplan going to take any steps to compensate for this?

[(Gribov)] I have to tell you this. Today, acting on the USSR Soviet Cabinet of Ministers' instructions the USSR Gosplan, the USSR Ministry of Finance, and the USSR State Committee for Statistics adopted a decision in accordance with which enterprises and organizations are given the right to make expenditures to compensate their workers in part for the increase in the cost of food at cafeterias, buffets, and automats, out of the profits that remain at their disposal after taxes are paid. This is an additional form of compensation over and above those that have been envisaged in the well-known decision of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers in connection with the reform of retail prices.

[Skigin] And will this be taken into account when resources are given out to enterprises for the payment of wages? And if the answer is yes, when will the enterprises and organizations find out about this?

[(Gribov)] I have to tell you that if that is how things are, then there is no point in such a measure. The fact is that these enterprise exepnditures will be made over and above the sums used to pay for wages. The banks will not count this expenditure as part of the resources which the bank's enterprises and establishments receive for the payment of wages and for other expenses connected with consumption. We expect the USSR State Bank to issue the appropriate instructions to the whole country's banking system during the next 24 hours. Enterprises will be advised during the next 24 hours.

[Skigin] Thank you very much, Vladimir Grigoryevich, for your explanation.

Officials Answer Questions on Price Rises

LD0304085991 Moscow All-Union First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 1600 GMT 2 Apr 91

[Text] Price reform and compensation were the focus of attention at a news conference in Moscow today. Nikolay Ivanovich Cheshenko, deputy chairman of the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems, and Ivan Ivanovich Gorbachev, deputy chairman of the State Committee on Prices, answered journalists' questions.

[Begin recording] [Cheshenko] In all republics measures are being implemented in accordance with the president's decree and the Cabinet of Ministers' decision on price reform and the social protection of the population. The republics are making their own decisions, based on these minimal levels and the maximum levels of prices and the minimal levels of compensation. As an example I can tell you that in Belorussia and Russia the maximum payment of new benefits and compensation to families with children has already been increased—the ceiling has not so much been raised as virtually abolished.

A few other republics are also paying higher benefits. In Moldova for example, both those working and pensioners are paid 65 rubles equally. Minimum guarantees in our country, you remember, were 60 rubles for those working and 65 rubles for pensioners. Other decisions are also being made in the republics regarding child benefit in compensation for dearer prices, and various other matters are being decided on in the regions today. The situation is not without difficulties and not without problems. For pensioners some 90 percent has been paid to everyone. For students it will be a bit later. Matters are slightly more difficult as regards those working. This concerns enterprises which sometimes experience a shortage of funds for paying compensation. Questions in connection with these enterprises are still being examined both by the republics and by Union bodies.

[Gorbachev] In the country as a whole, the prices which had been determined by the relevant regulations and also by the decision of the Cabinet of Ministers generally went into effect today. Today all prices had been adjusted accordingly in all republics, with the following exceptions:

Uzbekistan went about it in a slightly different way. First of all, whereas we raised maximum prices for the meat group—beef—seven rubles, maximum prices in Uzbekistan were somewhere in the region of 12 rubles. At the same time Uzbekistan left the level of prices for bread and bakery goods unchanged, thus, as it were, introducing compensation through a redistribution of funds.

The picture is somewhat different in the Baltic republics. These republics introduced price changes slightly earlier than we did. These prices are somewhat diffeent, however—above all the foodstuffs. They are mainly notable for erring on the higher side.

One more feature, as a matter of information concerns Georgia. As I was leaving I also received the relevant decision of the Moscow Soviet which, as is known, for a number of goods—in particular, eggs, meat, and other food—had higher prices: they had been approved under the guise of contract prices on the basis of agreements with collective and state farms, and so on. We also looked closely at this matter together with them, discussed it, and came to the conclusion that they are abolishing prices for all foodstuffs that previously applied and were approved by the Moscow Soviet and Moscow city executive committee, which they themselves approved.

As a whole, according to our information, the sitaution which exists in the region is not giving rise to undue concern. [end recording]

Orlov Interviewed on Prices, Tax Cuts

PM0304102391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2

[Interview with USSR Finance Minister V. Orlov by O. Losoto and A. Chernyak; place and date of interview not given: "Prices Reform and Taxes"]

[Text] [PRAVDA] As of today, however sad it may be, new prices are in operation. Yes, they will be a blow to our pockets. But the government has taken steps to mitigate the blow. A number of substantial changes have been made to existing legislation on taxes levied from enterprises, associations, organizations, and citizens. This is connected with the need to pay the population substantial sums in monetary compensation in connection with the increase in prices and also with the creation of conditions in enterprises' financial situation such that they have the funds to pay compensation. Incidentally, many have already received compensation. Vladimir Yefimovich, today for the majority of the country's enterprises the taxation rate on profit is 45 percent. Has it been reduced?

[Orlov] Yes, it has been reduced. And now these enterprises will pay a tax of no more than 35 percent of the taxable profit.

[PRAVDA] And to whom does this reduction not extend?

[Orlov] The reduction in the rate of taxation on profit does not extend to those enterprises for which the existing law stipulates special rates of taxation—banks, insurance organizations, enterprises belonging to consumer cooperatives and public and religious organizations, joint ventures where over 30 percent of the assets in the capital fund comes from foreign investors, and a number of others.

[PRAVDA] What has caused this?

[Orlov] If we are speaking of consumer cooperatives, public organizations, and joint ventures, then the rates of tax on profit which exist for them at present (30 or 35 percent) are the minimum of the tax commitments which are essential now for enterprises to take part in forming the state's revenue. The retention of existing taxation rates for these enterprises is explained also by the fact that existing legislation provides for a substantial number of various benefits thanks to which the actual level of taxable profit is considerably lower than for state enterprises. It is also taken into account that the process of the liberalization of price formation at enterprises and in organizations which have no relation to the state form of ownership will be implemented more rapidly and they have more opportunities for adapting to the new conditions of labor remuneration.

As for banks and insurance organizations, the formation of their profit from the interest on credit and services rendered is a process regulated mainly by the organizations themselves and therefore putting them on an equal footing with the material production sphere would be economically unfair. For a certain proportion of enterprises the size of taxation may in accordance with the existing law be established directly in the republics and locally. These are municipal enterprises, production cooperatives, agricultural enterprises, consumer services organizations, and a number of others. Finally, when necessary, individual enterprises can be granted benefits in the form of a reduction in the tax rate or even complete exemption from payment.

Inasmuch as compensation for the increase in prices inevitably increases expenditure on wages, the standardized size now envisaged for the monthly wage for the basic personnel of enterprises included in the prime cost of output (or work or services) is increased from 400 to 480 rubles [R] per worker. That to a certain extent guarantees the payment of compensation sums without particular damage to the profit left at the enterprises' disposal.

[PRAVDA] Vladimir Yefimovich, what changes affect taxation of the fund for the remuneration of the labor of kolkhoz [collective farm] members?

[Orlov] So far the tax-exempt part of this fund has been calculated on the basis of R100 a month per kolkhoz member working on the farm, but now this sum is increased to R160.

[PRAVDA] Perhaps the largest number of telephone calls we have had have been from readers interested in the new procedure and rates of taxation from citizens' personal incomes...

[Orlov] In paying the population guaranteed monetary compensation, the state must pay it in full and consequently the compensation sums should not form part of the income subject to income tax. Therefore the sums of monetary compensation paid before the increase in prices, that is on an anticipatory basis, are issued for individual pay slips without levying a tax from citizens.

Subsequently the guaranteed compensation sums will be part of the new wage packet and in this connection income tax rates should be established in such a way that working people in all cases receive compensation payments in full. In this connection I should like to recall that until now there has been no tax on wages if they have been less than R100 a month and if the wage was in excess of R100 then the entire wage was considered to be taxable income. Under the new conditions the procedure for determining tax-exempt wages and its size both change. For the first time for the main mass of working people with wages of up to and including R1,000 a month a truly tax-exempt minimum is being set. That means that within the framework of this wage taxable income does not include the first R160. For instance, with a wage of R300, tax will be deducted only from R140, with a wage of R900 tax will be deducted from R740, and with a wage of R1,000 from R840.

For wages in excess of R1,000 a tax reckoned from R,1000 will be taken as a basis and then rates will progressively increase according to five wage groups envisaged in the new tax scale. The maximum taxation rate is also being reduced. So far from that part of the wage which is in excess of R3,000 a month the tax rate has been set at 60 percent, now it will be reduced to 50 percent. Thus working people are not only ensured the full reimbursement of the guaranteed sums of compensation for the increase in retail prices but at the same time an additional reduction in the size of taxation is envisaged. For instance, with an income of R180 the previous tax was R18.6, while the new tax is R2.6. If with an income of R320, the former tax was R36, the new tax is R20.8.

[PRAVDA] Vladimir Yefimovich, income tax rates vary greatly depending on the categories of payers. What changes have affected this law?

[Orlov] The changes are very substantial. Indeed, so far the size of tax rates depending on the categories of payers has differed considerably. There were separate tax rates for workers and employees, for the authors of scientific, literary, and art works, for people engaged in individual labor activity, and for people receiving other incomes. For example, with an annual income of R14,400 a worker or employee as a whole paid a total of R2,234.4 a year in income tax. With the same annual income a home worker paid R6,374.4 while a citizen renting out an apartment or other property paid R7,616.4. But now, whatever the payers' category to which a citizen belongs, for the year as a whole he will pay the same sum in tax—R2,030.4. Under the conditions of the development of market relations and the encouragement of business in various spheres of activity this change should be regarded as an important transitional stage toward the future universal income tax system.

The procedure for paying benefits when taxing sums of material aid to citizens and their size are also changing. So far, if you do not count material aid rendered by special government decisions and in that connection completely exempt from tax, all other sums of material aid rendered by enterprises, institutions, and organizations were exempt from tax if these sums were less than R500 a year. When the sum of material aid was more, the entire amount in excess of R500 was subject to taxation as part of the wage for that month when the sum was paid. Now, inasmuch as citizens, in addition to the sums of guaranteed monetary compensation, may also receive so-called social aid in monetary form and in kind on the basis of the decisions of republican and local organs and enterprises and the size of tax-exempt material aid of all types is increased from R500 to R1,000 a year. In line with income tax, changes are also being made to the rates of taxation on bachelors and on single citizens of the USSR and those with small families. It is planned to exempt wages of under R160 from payment of this tax and to reduce the rates of tax from wages in excess of R160.

[PRAVDA] What will Soviet people receive as a result of the income tax reduction?

[Orlov] The reduction in income tax is in fact aimed at improving citizens' material welfare. Ultimately the country's population will received about R10 billion more. But that money will have purchasing power only on one condition—that the national economy produces above-plan consumer goods worth at least that sum.

Gorbachev Economic Adviser Interviewed

914A0579A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 15 Mar 91 p 1

[Interview with Professor Oleg Ozherelyev by V. Zenkovich; place and date not given: "The President of the USSR Gets a New Assistant"]

[Text] **Professor Oleg Ivanovich Ozherelyev, doctor of economic sciences, has been appointed new assistant to the president of the USSR for economic questions.**

He was dean of the Leningrad University Economics Department at the time he was summoned to the CPSU Central Committee Science Department, where he prepared much diverse analytical material and many studies for the general secretary. This was how they became acquainted.

Oleg Ivanovich is 49 years old. He comes from Lipetsk Oblast and is married, and his son is a student in his fourth year in Moscow State University's Economics Department.

[Zenkovich] Oleg Ivanovich, are you in favor of the market?

[Ozherelyev] Undoubtedly.

[Zenkovich] And what will you advise the president?

[Ozherelyev] Mikhail Sergeyevich made up his mind long since, in my opinion, on the essentials. He has clearly proclaimed a path toward the market and advocated the equality of all forms of ownership, the attraction of foreign capital, and conversion. Thus the strategic development of our state's development has already been chosen.

There could in the immediate future only be a rethinking of certain tactical questions of the transition to market relations, and this is connected primarily with the changes occurring in our country: the increased independence of the republics, the intensification of the economic crisis, and the growing confrontation of political forces in society.

[Zenkovich] If it is not a secret, what assignment did Mikhail Sergeyevich give you first?

[Ozherelyev] The president intends meeting as quickly as possible with leading economists of the country. In this connection he has asked me to prepare certain material for this meeting and economic studies.

[Zenkovich] Is the head of our state intending to talk only with supporters of the market?

[Ozherelyev] Not at all, he is interested in all constructive approaches to economic development.

[Zenkovich] What do you think, what needs to be done in the economy in the immediate future?

[Ozherelyev] Primarily we need to accelerate the denationalization of the economy, continue the pricing reform, devise a system of measures that would make it possible to improve the country's finances, make more rapid and efficient use of the market economy mechanism, and more actively implement changes in structural policy and foreign economic relations.

Great attention should be paid also to S&T progress under market conditions. A special link in the chain of immediate measures is conversion. It is being implemented extremely unsatisfactorily, in my view. The powerful potential of the country's military-industrial complex is not being used in full as yet, unfortunately, for the needs of society. A more decisive policy in the sphere of reallocation of forces from the military to the civilian sectors is essential here, and, what is most important, this must be done intelligently.

[Zenkovich] Oleg Ivanovich, you are well known in the scientific world as the author of many works and books. In coauthorship with V.A. Medvedev, L.I. Abalkin, and other prominent economists you wrote the textbook "Political Economy," which Soviet students use today. Will your present position—it will be exacting being an assistant to the president of the USSR—not be detrimental to your scientific activity? Will you have time for science?

[Ozherelyev] There was not enough before either. But in the past, now even more, my work was of an exploratory, creative nature. From the viewpoint of "pure science" we recently completed work on a new, two-volume, instructional aid in political economy. The present position will help me on the one hand to better understand economic processes and, on the other, to somehow realize ideas that have built up in the past.

Agricultural

Gorbachev Orders Acceleration of Land Reform

LD0304193391 Moscow Central Television First Program Network in Russian 1800 GMT 3 Apr 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev has sent a telegram to the presidents and chairman of the Supreme Soviets of Union republics, chairmen of the Supreme Soviets of autonomous republics, to the Councils of Ministers of Union and autonomous republics, to kray and oblast soviets of people's deputies, to executive committees of kray and oblast soviets of people's deputies, to soviets of people's deputies of autonomous oblasts and okrugs, and to executive committees of autonomous oblast and okrug soviets of people's deputies.

The telegram says: In accordance with the decree adopted by the USSR President on 5 January 1991, a land fund has been created in the country comprising an overall area of about three million hectares for providing the population with plots of land. Information from local areas testifies that the allocation of land in many regions of the country is taking place in an unsatisfactory way. I order the acceleration of the land reform and the satisfaction, to the maximum, of the inquiries of those interested.

At the same time, taking into account the large unsatisfied demand for land, I regard it as necessary that the appropriate soviet and economic bodies, collective and state farms, and other land users should allocate additional land for the population so that as early as this spring, people might be able to cultivate it and obtain a harvest.

The bodies of soviet power, and above all, rural rayon executive committees, should act resolutely with regard to those officials who are tarrying over carrying out the land reform and are obstructing providing plots of land for the population.

Russian Agrarian Union Statement to Congress

914B0133A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 29 Mar 91 First Edition p 1

[Statement of the Russian Agrarian Union Presidium and Agrarian Specialist Deputies of the USSR and the RSFSR to the Third Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies]

[Text] Esteemed Comrade Deputies!

We are obliged to appeal to you because of the deteriorating situation in the republic's agro-industrial complex, which has been brought about by the intensifying political and economic crisis and the exacerbation of the contradictions between the Governments of the USSR and the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic].

The legislative instruments adopted by the Second Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies on agrarian reform and the revival of the Russian countryside are not being fulfilled.

The instructions to the RSFSR Council of Ministers concerning the adoption of a package of ordinances pertaining to the realization of a whole number of legislative instruments have not been fulfilled, including the channeling of 15 percent of the republic's national revenue into the development of the countryside. Equivalent exchange between agricultural and industrial products has not been secured.

The change in prices in capital construction is leading to the actual winding down of social and production programs. The construction and modernization of many extremely necessary facilities planned earlier are coming to a halt on account of the lack of resources. Material and technical supply is deteriorating, and the cost of resources and services is rising unchecked.

The economic mechanism introduced in the republic's agro-industrial complex will increase the number of unprofitable farms from one to 30 percent, lead to a sharp reduction in social production, and undermine the material well-being of workers and collective farm members and the rural population.

Together with the whole people we are acutely experiencing the entire gravity of the adversities which have descended on our Motherland and we see that the policy of the priority development of the countryside and stabilization of the food market proclaimed by parliament and the special Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies is not being realized in practice. The ruination and impoverishment of the countryside continue.

The appeal of the Russian Agrarian Union Council to the parliament, government and peoples of the republic and to Comrade B.N. Yeltsin, chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, personally, on the most important problems of the development of the agro-industrial complex has been ignored, despite the fact that the seriousness of the problems demands their immediate solution.

A firm foundation for securing this year's harvest has not been created in many regions for a variety of reasons. The situation currently taking shape in the countryside is jeopardizing the current spring sowing and the production of the necessary amount of foodstuffs for the population.

We have no recourse other than to ask the Third (special) Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies to once again return to problems of the countryside and demand of the leadership of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers accountability for the crisis situation which has been created of late and the adoption of measures to prevent the impending catastrophe.

[Signed] Members of the Russian Agrarian Union Presidium and agrarian specialist people's deputies of the USSR and the RSFSR:

R.B. Asayev, I.M. Aksenov, Yu.F. Bugakov, A.Ye. Vorontsov, I.A. Golov, G.G. Golovenko, V.Ya. Gorin, V.I. Gorlova, V.I. Zhiganov, V.M. Zatserkovnyy, L.N. Kushnarev, A.D. Mikhaylov, Ye.F. Novikov, B.P. Okonechnikov, I.M. Paplevchenkov, I.S. Skvortsov, M.V. Spiridonov, V.A. Starodubtsev, B.Ye. Yulin.

Military

Shlyaga Report to All-Army Party Conference

PM0404074591 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Mar 91 First Edition pp 1, 2

[Unattributed report on speech by Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga, chief of the USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate and USSR first deputy defense minister, at the First All-Army Party Conference in Moscow 29 March: "To Rally the Party Ranks"]

[Text] The First All-Army Party Conference will conclude the process of the transformation of Army and Navy party structures, which is being implemented now as part of the partywide policy of separating the functions of state and party organs. Gaining the status of a unified organization, the Armed Forces Communists are taking on an immeasurably greater responsibility for exercising effective party influence on everything associated with the maintenance of the USSR Armed Forces in a condition guaranteeing our socialist state's reliable security.

Delivering the conference report, Colonel General N.I. Shlyaga, chief of the USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate, emphasized:

Broad and, I would say, especially important powers have been vested in conference delegates. We will have to, for the first time, elect an All-Army Party Committee that, in the context of the creation of renewed military-political bodies by virtue of the USSR president's decree, will take over the entire leadership of party organizations. But the main outcome of our two-day forum must be the elaboration of a concept of and basic guidelines for the party work and practical activity of Army Communists given our new society, the CPSU, and Army.

Each event and each phenomenon has its own starting point. Today's political moment, providing the background to the process of shaping a new model of party and political organs in the Armed Forces, can de described not only as fateful but also as abounding with contradictions and drama. It can be stated with utmost responsibility that there is neither panic nor any desire to revert to the past in the ranks of Communists, of all Army and Navy servicemen, workers, and employees. The party report and election meetings and conferences, which have only just ended and were distinguished by their considered and mature approach, have confirmed the high standard of military collectives' political stability and the servicemen's commitment to the socialist choice and their duty to the people.

I would not like the conference delegates and guests to accuse me of using cliches, but this is the truth. It is a truth confirmed by the conscientious military labor by hundreds of thousands of officers, warrant officers, ensigns, soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and NCO's. By their readiness to hasten to help people in emergency situations. People, 83 percent of whom voted for the USSR at the 17 March referendum. And finally, by the Armed Forces' retention of the role of a stabilizing state institution, by their loyalty to the fatherland and their oath.

But we cannot overlook the fact that the Army and Navy and their party organizations are now in the center of a tangled knot of the most complex internal and external factors.

Over the last few years they have changed from an object of universal concern, being the main guarantor of the state's defense and international security, into a target for overt political claims by people straining for power for the sake of personal ambitions. Political and ideological supremacy in the Armed Forces is being claimed by sundry parties and movements declaring themselves in opposition to the CPSU.

Legislative acts at odds with the USSR Constitution's provisions on questions of military building are still being promulgated at republican and local levels. The Army and Navy lack a firm legal basis for their functions in the new conditions due to delays in the adoption of the USSR laws on defense, on universal military duty and military service, on the status of servicemen, and others.

We cannot but be alarmed by the growing activeness of the CPSU's ideological and political adversaries in their work to shape an unambiguously negative attitude toward the Armed Forces in society. Now we are at a point where normal and healthy criticism of shortcomings has switched to the plane of—I do not think I would be wrong in saying this—a coordinated anti-Army campaign. The sacred subject of patriotism and the motherland's defense is being defiled, and phenomena engendered by contemporary national separatism are being insinuated into the Army.

The Army card is played whenever destructive forces try to justify their actions in implanting their own totalitarian regimes. Even the grandeur of our people's and their Army's feat in the Great Patriotic War is vilified and subjected to vicious ideological attacks in pursuit of these objectives. And this is happening at a time when we preparing to celebrate in 1991-1995 the 50th anniversaries of outstanding events in that tragic and simultaneously heroic stage of our history.

In the very near future, Col. Gen. N.I. Shlyaga noted, we will evidently have to expect a galvanization of actions against the CPSU by our political opponents. They note with unconcealed alarm its increasingly organized nature and see a danger in the growth of the party's prestige in the country and among the people, which does not suit them at all. A corresponding reaction will, in all probability, ensue from the results of the referendum which are clearly not part of the destructive forces' plans. Steps in this direction have already been taken by holding events in support of Yeltsin in several cities, events which were nothing but open incitement to resist the Union organs of power, an attempt to discredit the country's top leadership and the Communist Party.

The majority of Soviet people have gradually started figuring out who is who. But the delayed transition of the CPSU and other healthy forces in society to active work to explain the political adventurists' real objectives still prevents the creation of conditions for the deepening of this process.

We cannot take a simplistic view of the situation. Some people in the Armed Forces have lost their bearings. We have also seen the emergence of political "turncoats" who have swollen the ranks of so-called democratic movements and have become initiators of and accomplices in frenzied anti-Army actions.

The reason is that many party organizations and many Communists either at the helm of large strategic formations, combined units, and units or working in military-political and party organs have failed to mentally restructure themselves and have not changed the habits acquired during the period of—if I might use the expression—hothouse conditions of work.

Today's military-political situation in the world is seriously raising the standards of demandingness as regards work by Communists and party organizations in the Armed Forces.

Yes, international security has been considerably strengthened thanks to the new political thinking. But the process of detente has yet to become irreversible. And it must be noted with great regret that some mass media display unrestrained enthusiasm about the supposedly stable fair weather on the political horizon.

But today's realities are such, the speaker emphasized, that the building and training of U.S. and NATO Armed Forces are still pursued in line with the tenets of the doctrine of "direct confrontation" with the Soviet Union. The West retains the offensive nature of its military plans and the corresponding structures of groupings of troops and naval forces at the probable theaters of operations, it is steadily implementing its basic military-technical programs. Just think of the wave of euphoria which rolled over a series of countries, primarily the United States, after the end of the Persian Gulf war. That included eulogies of the West's military equipment and weapons and of NATO's military strategy and tactics, as well as confidence that the United States alone can be the brain and nerve center of the "new world order."

The question of a military danger for our country still remains on the agenda. Moreover, its solution is rendered considerably more complex by the termination of the Warsaw Pact military organization's functions and ultimately by the need to build defensive groupings within the USSR's 1939 borders. This, in turn, also means vast sums of money and resources, labor by construction industry workers and the entire personnel, and hardships and privations for people.

Much in today's life of the Army and Navy and their party organizations is determined by the implementation of a military reform whose concept was elaborated with due consideration for all factors of the USSR's internal and external position. Despite all the attempts to discredit it, the reform is under way. The transformation of political organs and their party structures is one of its important aspects.

We have a sound basis for giving a fresh boost to party work.

In the course of shaping the new party structures, we have retained the overall structure of Army and Navy party organizations which prevailed for many years and today comprises about 23,000 party groups, almost 31,000 organizations enjoying the rights of shop organizations, 17,000 enjoying the rights of primary organizations, and 37,000 primary party organizations. They are headed by more than 4,000 party committees, more than 80 percent of which have fulltime secretaries. More than 400 party committees have been created from scratch—at brigade link level and above, as well as at military education establishments and a series of military administration institutions and organs.

The results of the report and election meetings and conferences just ending testify that the Armed Forces party organizations remain loyal to the socialist choice and are prepared to prove by deeds and that they are still needed, to dedicate all their strength to the interests of the people and the state. Openness and a critical and businesslike approach were typical of the overwhelming majority of meetings and conferences. Special concern was expressed about the worsening shortcomings as regards supplies for the troops, the infringement of the political and civil rights of servicemen and members of their families in the Baltics, the Transcaucasus, and Moldova, and the ongoing erosion of the principles of military building.

People expressed anguish for the country's future when speaking about the need to capture the initiative in bringing perestroyka back to its original tracks. Many asked bluntly: Why is it that the changes occurring in society are accompanied by exacerbation of the numerous problems which aggravate people's daily life? How could it happen that transformations in the political system have resulted in the formation of what is already a bloc of forces pursuing an antipeople, anticonstitutional line? What is the reason behind the war of laws and bloody interethnic clashes in the rule-of-law state which is being built? And finally, is the attitude toward the most complex problems of the country's defense not a little too perfunctory?

Army and Navy Communists backed the conclusion of the joint CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission January plenum that the social crisis in the country has reached a point beyond which destructive social tremors are possible. At the same time, they expressed confidence in the ability of the supreme organs of state power to prevent an unpredictable development of events.

The sociopolitical processes operating in society and the Army present the Armed Forces party organization with a package of really major practical tasks.

Let us recall the words of our party's founder V.I. Lenin. "The party," he emphasized, "is the conscientious and advanced stratum of the class, its vanguard. This vanguard's strength is 10 times and even 100 times greater than the sum of its numbers. Is this possible? Can the strength of 100 be greater than the strength of 1,000? It can, and it does when those 100 are organized." History has completely proved the correctness of these words.

Having described the prevailing completely new ideological situation, the speaker noted that the party does not exercise a monopoly on the shaping of public awareness. People have their own perception of the processes that are occurring, while failures along the path of perestroyka often result in rejection of the official state ideology, in political infantilism. And this, let us say it openly, is also typical of some Communists.

But we cannot fail to recognize the emergence of fresh shoots in the party organizations' ideological and political education work. They take the form of individualization, of shifting the center of gravity to specific personnel categories. Somewhat greater attention is given to ensuring the durability of individuals' social awareness and political stance, to protecting servicemen from frenzied anticommunism, nationalism, and abstract pacifism. There are numerous examples of this approach in the [Strategic] Rocket Forces, the Moscow, Belorussian, and Far East Military Districts, the Moscow Air Defense District, the Central Group of Forces, and the Baltic Fleet.

But an analysis of party work at a series of combined units and units in Leningrad, North Caucasus, Odessa, Turkestan, and some other military districts testifies that there has a been a noticeable decline of political activeness standards among a sizeable proportion of Communists. Many primary party organizations have yet to actually become tone setters and centers of ideological and political education work in soldiers' collectives, they have yet to cast off the defensive mood, they are not always masters of the moral and psychological situation at local level.

Today it is perfectly obvious, the speaker emphasized, that, to bring the standards and effectiveness of ideological work in Army and Navy party organizations up to contemporary demands, it is necessary to meet several fundamental conditions.

First. To ensure that party committees and bureaus and all primary party organizations properly grasp the idea of the need for Communists' ideological tempering as the main condition for preserving the entire party's combat ability. They must be practically convinced of the priority of ideological principles in their activity as an imperative demand by the times, they must be perfectly aware of the importance of people's spiritual qualities when it comes to solving all tasks at the present stage of the historical development of our state and its Armed Forces. Lenin's formula about the need to struggle for each Communist and the masses has been and still remains topical for us.

Second. We ought to boost and, if you like, hone the active methods of ideological work, to learn the most effective forms and methods of political struggle. And this must be done primarily within our own party family, among Communists. It is here that the pluralism of views and interests must be cast into unity of wills and actions.

Third. Life is reminding us anew that the party's strength lies in its ties with the masses, in the masses' understanding and support. But this support will be forthcoming only when people's lives and their daily concerns and worries become the focus of attention in the party's work, when they become its supreme goal and value.

Fourth. It is extremely important to give priority in all our ideological work to the inculcation of patriotic and internationalist qualities among Communists and nonparty people.

Nothing has a more powerful effect on the Army today than the denigration of these ideas in social awareness. On the one hand, a sizeable proportion of troops and naval forces is to be found in regions of unbridled nationalism and is subjected daily to the effect of phenomena associated with this. They include accusations of occupation, moral and ideological violence, and outright discrimination. On the other hand, distortions in interethnic relations have not bypassed the soldiers' collectives. For two years now there has been a sharp outburst of evasion of military service and desertion on separatist grounds.

Unless work on the rallying of the multinational soldiers' collectives is restructured, control over the situation may be lost altogether. It also seems necessary to reanimate the activity of commissions and groups for interethnic relations set up under party committees.

Fifth. We have to seriously rethink the position and role of the ideological cadres and aktiv in newly created party structures and to fine-tune the system for their training. Many of them lack sufficiently deep theoretical knowledge and ideological practice. This art must be learned, starting with full-time ideological workers and aktiv members. It must be learned at study courses and in real-life struggle against our ideological and political adversaries.

The report analyzed in detail the activity of mass media in the interests of the ideological rallying of Communists and the entire personnel.

Our party's history, Col. Gen. N.I. Shlyaga went on to say, eloquently testifies that unity of actions is possible only in conditions when the party itself is monolithic not only organizationally but ideologically as well. Only such a party can expect to be a political leader.

Proceeding from this premise, the situation prevailing in the CPSU and the Armed Forces party organizations demands that most thorough attention be given to the problems of their organizational and political strengthening. This is necessitated, first, by the actions of our political adversaries which are aimed at shaking and eroding the CPSU's organizational and political foundations both from outside and within the party. Second, the newly shaped structure of CPSU organizations within the Armed Forces demands the fine-tuning and constant improvement of the mechanism of collaboration and mutual relations, it demands new approaches toward and views of the content of organizational party work.

A series of measures, aimed at improving party organizations' activity, were implemented during the transition to new political structures in the Army and Navy: The principles of their building were brought up to date; horizontal structures were launched in the form of party clubs and councils of party organization secretaries; party bureau secretaries, party committees, and party conference delegates are elected in direct and, as a rule, multi-candidate elections.

At the same time the processes associated with the CPSU's renewal and the reform of political and party structures have brought some confusion in the views of individual Communists and the activity of entire party organizations. Some party organizations have developed a distorted perception of autonomy, democratization of relations, and pluralism of opinions; questions of reinforcing the party ranks have been left to just drift along. A decline of internal party discipline is noticeable in many organizations and elected organs. Another worrying fact is that the process of destroying grassroot party structures is now under way in many large strategic formations. This has happened in the Siberian Military District, the Black Sea and Northern Fleets, and in military construction units under central jurisdiction. This is a very dangerous process, and let no one underestimate it.

Col. Gen. N.I. Shlyaga drew delegates' attention to questions of party membership and the purity of party ranks. More than 52,000 persons were admitted to the CPSU last year and this year, including more than 35,000 following the 28th CPSU Congress. More than one-third of this total are officers and about 45 percent are officer cadets. In other words, the party nucleus is growing stronger among the leading category of servicemen who carry on their shoulders the brunt of army concerns.

The report defined the key avenues of work for rallying party organizations and ensuring unity of their actions.

First. Today all CPSU organizations, starting with primary organizations, participate in the elaboration of party policy and are autonomous in organizing their own internal life and activity. This is why it is necessary for them to overcome as soon as possible the inertia of the period of reorganization and formation and make their presence fully felt as a renewed and effective political force consolidating Communists and all servicemen and leading them toward the solution of complex tasks. The theoretical and practical platform for this ought to be provided by the 28th party congress decisions and primarily its resolution "On the Basic Guidelines of the Party's Military Policy at the Contemporary Stage," the Political Statement by the joint CPSU Central Committee and Central Control Commission January plenum, and the new CPSU Program which is currently being elaborated.

Second. While advocating further democratization of the Army's sociopolitical life, the party organizations themselves must become a model of internal party democratism. They must resolutely raise the standards of mutual relations in party collectives and build up Communists' confidence by involving them in the elaboration and fulfillment of party decisions.

Third. It is necessary to carefully analyze the composition of our party ranks, clarify the deployment of Communists, get a grip on the situation, and take measures to ensure that each party organizations rigidly adheres to the CPSU Statute's demands. Briefly speaking, while further developing the process of party life's democratization, it is necessary to ensure that fulfillment of party decisions and instructions is mandatory, to enhance Communists' responsibility to their party comrades for their deeds and actions, to strengthen party discipline to the utmost.

The strengthening of Communists' unity and cohesion must become the subject of special concern. We must aim at ensuring that each party member is involved in active and purposeful work and fittingly rebuffs attacks on the party and the Army by antisocialist forces.

Fourth. Many Communists make justified remarks about the work style of elected party organs and their secretaries. Today's party committees are completely new organs. They are really autonomous democratic organs enjoying broad powers and building their work on the principles of collectiveness which rule out subjectivism and autocracy, they are organs operating in conditions of glasnost. As the CPSU Statute emphasizes, they are the party's fundamental structural links. Hence their important and responsible role in the Armed Forces' life.

Much will also depend on the way the new party organs master the methods of political leadership. In practical terms this means that the CPSU's entire policy must be pursued via Communists, using methods of persuasion, relying on democratic principles, taking public opinion into account, and enhancing the role of the CPSU's primary organizations. It is important to abandon the inspection methods of work and concentrate efforts on offering specific assistance to aktivs at local level.

The party has always asserted its authority among the masses by means of practical deeds. This is entirely typical of Army party organizations as well. Now they are working in new conditions. Their main method involves ensuring that Communists set an example and use the force of persuasion, their knowledge of the masses, and the skill to lead them.

I cannot fail to mention that some party collectives are making a major political mistake by concentrating exclusively on their own internal problems, thus playing into the hand of the very forces which are trying to muffle their voice in the troops' life.

The chief of the Main Military-Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces dwelt on the paramount tasks of party organizations in spheres of vital importance for units and ships like one-man command, cadre policy, combat readiness, combat alert duty, service and combat training, and further strengthening of military discipline and order according to regulations. It was emphasized that party organizations cannot remain indifferent to the problems of protecting people's life and health, eliminating non-regulation relations, evasion of military service, and many other questions which perturb our entire society today. Everything associated with the social and legal protection of servicemen and members of their families needs close monitoring and concern by the party.

Enhancing the role of democratic institutions in the Armed Forces is a matter of great importance for party organizations. Communists recommended for election on elected organs of officers' assemblies, women's councils, and permanent commissions and groups can and must help in organizing cooperation and collaboration with them. More than 9,000 servicemen are deputies to supreme and local soviets of people's deputies. The overwhelming majority of them are Communists. There is much that is valuable in the work of party committees with Communist deputies. It is also necessary to realize that some of them allow ideological and organizational wavering, come under the influence of oppositionist political movements, and cast their votes in favor of decisions which are harmful to the interests of servicemen and the prestige and combat ability of the Armed Forces. We must not forget Lenin's thought that "the party is at liberty to kick out any of its members who take advantage of the party umbrella to preach antiparty views."

Having analyzed the topical problems of the party organizations' influence on the pursuit of youth policy in the Armed Forces and of the Komsomol's [All-Union V.I. Lenin Communist Youth League] activity, the speaker went on to say: The USSR Armed Forces party organization is a component of the CPSU. This defines its position and mutual relations with party organizations and structures at local level. Additional opportunities are now available to strengthen these relations. More than 4,000 Army Communists have been delegated to elected CPSU organs at local level, and 28 leaders of union republic communist party central committees and of kray and oblast party committees have been elected to leadership organs of Army party structures. This, I think, will be not just a formal representation but a sound basis for collaboration in the common interest.

Control commissions are being created in the Armed Forces party organization, just as they are in the entire party. In contrast with previously operating party commissions under political organs, the control commissions are autonomous party organs accountable only to the party conferences which have elected them. They must ensure the protection of Communists' rights and dignity and must show concern for the strengthening of party discipline and the enhancement of primary party organizations' militancy and activeness.

There is tremendous interest in the ongoing transformations of Army party organizations. The latest report and election campaign generated more interest than ever before in the CPSU Central Committee, in union republic communist party central committees, and in oblast, kray, city, and rayon party committees. This attention can be perceived also today, manifested by the fact that Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and leaders of state organs are participating in the work of the First All-Army Party Conference.

Concluding his report, Col. Gen. N.I. Shlyaga emphasized: The Army and Navy Communists are aware of the present moment's crucial nature. They are clearly aware that too much is at stake today—the future of the state and its Armed Forces. We have been directly affected by everything that has affected the country. And together with it, we will overcome the difficulties in performing our main task—to ensure the peaceful labor of the people and the security of the socialist fatherland which we serve.

Shlyaga Interviewed on Conference

LD0304172291 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1200 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] At the CPSU Central Committee press center there was a news conference on the results of the first all-Army party conference and the reform of the military-political and party structures of the USSR armed forces. Our correspondent speaks to Colonel General Nikolay Ivanovich Shlyaga, head of the main military-political directorate of the USSR Armed Forces and USSR first deputy foreign minister.

[Correspondent] The first all-Army party conference which has taken place has carried out the alteration of the military structure of the CPSU, that is to say, has carried out the division of the party and state functions. In this way, the party committees have left the plitical section. Does this signify the process of democratization in the Army?

[Shlyaga] I would say that it is true to call this is a process of democratization. Certain comrades are inclined to pass this off as reducing party influence in the Soviet Armed Forces. This is not exact. I would like to say that a strong structure has been created and the party organizations will carry out the education of communists and will provide a personal example in tackling all the tasks facing the Army and the Navy. The coordination between the military-political bodies has also been created now, and the party committees, then, in the course of the campaign of hearing reports and electing new officials, a number of those working in the political-military bodies have been elected to the party committees. In this instance it is a matter of resolving joint tasks regarding the social and legal protection of servicemen in the Army and Navy. I think that the experience of leadership and party organization that has been acquired in our political bodies will be of relevance to the all-Army party committees.

[Correspondent] Nikolay Ivanovich, this experience has already been built up and the mechanism will be enriched even further in the course of its work.

[Shlyaga] Of course this is a new matter. This is the first time that independent structures have been created, starting from party committees for regiments right up to all-Army party committee. We did not possess the mechanism for interaction in implementing this, but I think that those who work in the military-political bodies and the leaders of the army party committees will try to work out a mechanism. We are both part of the general structure of our country's armed forces, we are tackling common tasks and we are subordinate to a single leadership.

Chernavin Reviews Current Military Issues

PM0304114991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Apr 91 First Edition p 1-3

[Speech by Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy, under general heading: "Serving the Fatherland; All-Army Party Conference Delegates' Speeches"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy:

The very fact that the All-Army party conference is being held while political passions in our country are running at fever pitch is a significant event. We are fully aware that the million-strong party organization of the Army and Navy is today one of the decisive factors not just as regards the cohesion of the Armed Forces personnel, but also our state's internal stability and external security.

As a Communist and commander in chief I can say with full justification that the Navy was, is, and will remain devoted to its people, the union government, and the country's President.

Then the speaker dwelt on some topical problems. Describing the question of the depolitization of the Armed Forces not just as theoretically unfounded, but also harmful in practical terms, he emphasized that the army cannot stand aside from politics. However, some people would undoubtedly benefit from this, and certain destructive forces are striving for it.

The problem of the strengthening of our party's ranks is an acute one. Today our adversaries, overt and covert enemies of the CPSU, and the press of a certain bias are, with enviable constancy and malice, pushing the question of communists' resigning from the party and reducing its numerical strength. The most brazen ones are calling for more, for banning the CPSU, for putting it on trial, for reprisals against communists.

It must be noted that the quantitative composition of the CPSU is a very important and significant indicator. However, its qualitative composition, the quality of its members and their devotion to our common cause in conditions of hardened anticommunism is the paramount indicator.

Clearly, this is a period in the life of our party when getting rid of incidental fellow travelers can only benefit its prestige. As for the Navy, I am able to report to the conference that resignations of communists from the CPSU have decreased and the influx of new members into the CPSU has increased. People are beginning to see the light.

Touching on questions pertaining to young people's world outlook standards, Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin proposed that work with young people in the forces should be viewed as an especially important sphere of military communists' activity. Today we communists, people of mature years and with a certain amount of life experience and tempering, sometimes find it difficult to understand the complex processes of life. But how much more difficult it must be for our young people, when "democrats" are trying to din into their heads, literally at every step, that we have no history, that our 78-year path has been a tragic mistake, that it is a road to nowhere. Against this backdrop it is difficult to overestimate the importance of our young men's patriotic education, which must become a priority avenue in primary party organizations.

Today there is a dismal situation in industry, and this has affected us instantly and not in some remote way, but directly. The equipment we are getting today is of a poorer quality than before. It is not so well finished, there are more imperfections, more defects, and it is less reliable.

Today the USSR Supreme Soviet is rashly adopting a law exempting students from service—there is no justification for this—when tomorrow the combat readiness of some naval vessels will be reduced because thousands of the most capable and best trained young cadres will be leaving the Navy...

The paramount tasks of maintaining our country's defense potential are having to be resolved in a complex situation, and this makes it necessary for us communists to take a new look at many issues in our life and to find more fruitful ways of working. One thing remains unchanged—the armed defense of our Motherland. It must be ensured. To this there is no alternative.

General on Defense Expenditure, Market Economy

LD0304125391 Moscow TASS in English 1207 GMT 4 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy]

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—"The maintenance of the Soviet Armed Forces seems inordinately expensive only by domestic standards," General Vladimir Arkhipov, deputy defence minister, chief of logistics of the Armed Forces, told TASS. He said that the real combat readiness of troops of every state should be judged by an international yardstick. This applies not only to fighter-planes, missiles and submarines but also to financing, believes Arkhipov.

Arkhipov said that the USSR defence expenditure amounts to 6 billion roubles, while U.S. expenditure runs to 300 billion dollars.

If we take the commercial rate of the rouble against the dollar, the USSR defence expenditure appears to be one-fifth of that of the United States.

Dwelling on the plan for the Soviet Armed Forces being governed by the principles of a market economy, Arkhipov emphasised that it envisages a change in the principle of distribution and use of appropriations for defence. He said that wider rights in commercial activity that is not detrimental to the country's defence potential will be granted to enterprises, institutions, research organisations, military training establishments, as well as units of the USSR Defence Ministry.

Arkhipov said that centralised guidance by the entire principles of military construction is the sole real guarantee or the country's defences. "It is very important that the state basis for the development and supply of the Armed Forces should not be undermined during perestroyka," he said.

Regarding the negative consequences for the army of a transition to market relations Arkhipov said that less than 70 per cent of agreements on the manufacture and supply of logistical and other equipment have been concluded for reasons not depending on the Defence Ministry. High contractual prices are also an obstacle to the placing of military orders with enterprises.

Baltic Republics

IZVESTIYA Reports USSR-Estonia Talks

PM0304155991 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
30 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[Item in roundup of IZVESTIYA, TASS, INTERFAX, POSTFACTUM, URAL-AKTSEPT, REUTERS, and UPI reports: "Moscow-Tallinn: First Round"]

[Text] A meeting of members of the USSR and Estonian delegations formed to discuss a package of political, social, and economic questions was held in Moscow Thursday.

Julo Nugis, head of the Estonian delegation, declared that the delegations' powers and the sides' positions were defined more exactly at the meeting. He said that the Soviet side proceeds from the provisions of the existing USSR Constitution and views the possibility of achieving Estonia's independence only on the basis of the Union Law on Secession from the USSR. At the same time the Estonian Supreme Soviet has empowered the republic's delegation to discuss only questions of the restoration of Estonia's independence.

The next round of the dialogue will take place in Tallinn 15 April. The objects of the talks and also a calendar plan of the meetings will be determined there, BALTFAX has reported.

USSR Deputy Defense Minister on Riga Talks

LD0304132491 Riga Domestic Service in Russian
1610 GMT 26 Mar 91

[Report including recorded interview with USSR Deputy Defense Minister General Valentin I. Varennikov by unidentified announcer in Riga; date not given; from the "Army Meridian" program]

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Last week in Latvia there was a fairly important event. Gen. Varennikov arrived in Riga. He is one of the numerous deputy defense ministers, and perhaps the best known. His name is mentioned now both in connection with Afghanistan, and even more frequently with various bloody events. He went after the tragedies to Tbilisi, to Baku and Vilnius, and now has come to Riga. Valentin Ivanovich came here as a member of the official commission created by a Gorbachev decree to negotiate with the Republic of Latvia Government. [passage omitted]

[Begin recording] [Announcer] Do you not recognize the legality of the Government of Latvia?

[Varennikov] I recognize everything written down in the Constitution of the Soviet Union and I will recognize... Have you already had comments like this?

[Announcer] We had one general of the Baltic Military District who said that the government was illegal. But if you are here for negotiations, then that means that you recognize the legality of this government?

[Varennikov] I recognize everything written in the Constitution of the Soviet Union.

[Announcer] I see. [passage omitted] Is there any hope that a treaty between the Government of Latvia and the USSR Government will be concluded on the legal status of the USSR Armed Forces?

[Varennikov] I think that there is hope that all the current problems between the Union and the republic will be examined and solved. This is my feeling.

[Announcer] You said that negotiations are possible in the event the status quo is restored. What did you mean?

[Varennikov] I mean that one may talk seriously about solving all the problems only in the event that we start with the laws which everyone uses in the Soviet Union.

[Announcer] In other words the laws adopted by the Government of the Republic of Latvia should be removed.

[Varennikov] Well, naturally, of course.

[Announcer] Only (?under those conditions)?

[Varennikov] Yes. Of course.

[Announcer] On the status. You said in general...

[Varennikov] On the status of the Armed Forces?

[Announcer] Yes, and is it possible on a treaty basis?

[Varennikov] You know, there will be talks about the Armed Forces only in the overall examination of the defense of our state. In the name of the security of our country as a whole we will examine the troops stationed in the Baltics, including in Latvia.

[Announcer] The question of troops staying here must be examined regardless of whether Latvia leaves the Soviet Union or not.

[Varennikov] Naturally, in the interests of the defense of the USSR.

[Announcer] Tell me, is there any hope in the near future of raising the question of a demilitarized Baltic region?

[Varennikov] I don't know. At present we have so many problems that any new initiatives will probably simply hinder solving the urgent tasks which we must tackle today. We must calm the people, strengthen confidence in the future, and after that take a look at further steps. Human hopes always lift on to a higher pedestal.

[Announcer] You were in Tbilisi and Baku and Vilnius. [words indistinct] You have said why it was that previously no one paid any attention to the fact that armored carriers drove through the streets, columns of vehicles carried out exercises, but now everyone immediately gets excited and interested. Well perhaps this happens because people are afraid that the Army may again interfere.

[Varennikov] No, that is not the reason.

[Announcer] Then why?

[Varennikov] It is because there are such short-sighted extremist-minded politicians who are stirring up the atmosphere. That is why. In our country soldiers, transporters, and tanks have always travelled, are traveling, and will continue to travel. No one ever said a thing about it. And I am convinced that in the future they will not talk about it.

[Announcer] But there had not been such events before.

[Varennikov] The events also, they... Those people who do not hold honor or the fate of our people dear, it is they who are organizing all these little affairs. So this is not the right place to look. It is not the armed forces which are guilty of this. It is the extremists who do not hold dear the honor of our state and our people.

[Announcer] Valentin Ivanovich [words indistinct] when you end your work here, I hope that you will give an assessment of the outcome.

[Varennikov] Certainly, of course. We will meet from time to time.

[Announcer] You and I or you and the press?

[Varennikov] The press and I. The media should show everything in a good way, in a good way, and not create situations where the listener or viewer could invent something negative out of it. Have we finished, Madame?

[Announcer] Yes, Valentin Ivanovich, thank you. [end recording]

As you see, it is fairly difficult to judge from that interview the fate of the negotiations, the subject matter. [passage omitted]

Present at the talks on the military side, apart from the Moscow guest there were also some generals of the Baltic District: Gen. Kuzmin, commander of the troops; Gen. (Lipilovskiy); and Gen. Vodopyanov. On the other side Ilmars Bisers; Janis Baskers, director of the Department of Public Security; and other officials.

To start with, the area where the negotiations took place took on a specific nature—Liepaja port and the House of Officers. If a new building is erected the former Latvian Society building will be transferred to the disposal of the republic. The military agrees to release it. The construction of the new building will cost millions. Part of the money will be allocated by the Defense Ministry and the rest by the republic. That will be a far from cheap pleasure for us. Liepaja, the former rich commercial port [words indistinct]. Now it is mainly a sphere of military activity. On the same day Gen. Varennikov left for Liepaja to assess on location the possibility of slightly squeezing the military in order to expand the commercial port. These were the most specific and brief themes of the negotiations. Then they dealt with the most vital thing—the secession of Latvia from the Soviet Union. Gen. Varennikov's viewpoint is that in principle this is possible, but a decision on this matter must be made for some reason by the USSR Congress of People's Deputies. The secession period will take at least five years, and in order to talk about this topic at all, the Latvian legislature must lift all the anti-constitutional—by which I understand nonunion—laws and declarations, proclaim itself part of the inviolable fraternity, and stop acting for itself. And another thing the general said—a referendum must be held on this theme. I do not fully understand what sort of referendum is intended, evidently a union one where Kirgiziya, for example, will allow Latvia to secede. In any event both sides stressed this: Whether or not Latvia secedes, the Soviet Army forces in Latvia will remain. This is a strategic interest of the Soviet Union. This all means one thing. We are not threatened with unemployment. Clearly "Army Meridian" will be a permanent program.

The government of the republic must know the numbers of the armed forces, the number of servicemen in Latvia, their movements, information about exercises, and so forth. We have never made a secret about our actions, said Gen. Varennikov. Then they all recalled at length and in detail in what year which exercises were held, who saw columns of vehicles where and when, who saw armored carriers. As for the question of how many militarymen will be in Latvia, it drowned in a multiplicity of conditions, and they did not return to it.

Then Valentin Ivanovich expressed a series of complaints about the fact that in Latvia the press uses the term "occupation" when speaking of the Army. Certain destructive forces in particular are whipping things up, he declared. An occupation army in Latvia is a juridical and political nonsense [previous word in English]. The essence of the Ilmars Bisers' retort amounted to the fact that he personally has never spoken of an occupation army.

Apart from the House of Officers, there are other buildings in Riga which are occupied by the military, for example the [word indistinct] (?Senkevics) Castle, on No. 2. Pils Street. Could they be handed over to the republic? Col. Gen. Kuzmin's response was brief and categorical. He even slammed his palm. We will not give this building to you. It is extremely necessary for us. It contains the Baltic Military District Troops History Museum. [passage omitted]

Attitude at Vilnius-Moscow Talks 'Constructive'

LD0304170391 Moscow TASS in English 1629 GMT 3 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondent Aleksandras Budris]

[Text] Moscow April 3 TASS—Working groups from the official Soviet and Lithuanian delegations for bilateral talks met in the Baltic republic's Moscow mission today and the leader of the Soviet group later described the meeting as "a step towards negotiations".

Speaking in a TASS interview after the more than three-hour meeting, Soviet Justice Minister Sergey Lushchikov noted the constructive attitude taken there by both sides.

He said the groups, including representatives of various ministries and government agencies, discussed legal and procedural details for the future negotiations.

According to Lushchikov, they sought to identify "sore points in advance in order to be able to avoid pitfalls" during the full-scale talks.

He confirmed that the Soviet and Lithuanian delegations are to meet in the Kremlin on Thursday to discuss the negotiations' agenda, their goals and underlying principles.

The delegations are led respectively by Deputy Federal Prime Minister Vitaliy Doguzhiyev and Lithuanian Vice-President Ceslovas Stankiavicius.

Lushchikov stressed that the meeting will not necessarily signify the official start of talks.

Yet, he did not rule out that it may develop into something bigger than originally intended and thus "grow into" the actual start of formal negotiations.

4 April Meeting Detailed

LD0404105791 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 4 Apr 91

[Report by correspondent Roma Pakeniene in Moscow, including recorded remarks by Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Council; place, date not given]

[Text] Another event today which is of great importance to us is right now taking place in Moscow. At the moment an official meeting between the USSR and Republic of Lithuania interstate delegations is taking place in the Kremlin. Here is correspondent Roma Pakeniene on the phone from Moscow with more details about it:

[Pakeniene] As agreed, yesterday at the sitting of work groups the meeting between the Lithuanian and Soviet state negotiation delegations began at 1100 in the Kremlin.

Ceslovas Stankevicius, deputy chairman of the Republic of Lithuania, is head of the Lithuanian negotiators this time. All the needed plenipotentiary powers were given to him by Vytautas Landsbergis, head of the delegation. Nine members of the 11 members of the Lithuanian delegation are taking part in the fourth official meeting of the negotiating parties; Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council, and Gediminas Vagnorius, prime minister, did not go to Moscow.

The Soviet side is represented by a delegation for the solution of political, economic, and social issues, and was confirmed by President Gorbachev. The delegation is led by Vitaliy Doguzhiev, deputy prime minister.

So far it is not yet known if the meeting will mean the start of negotiations. Pranas Kuris, a member of the Lithuanian delegation, said that first of all, the parties must agree on the status of the meeting—in other words if this is a regular prenegotiation meeting, or if it is the start of negotiations. Most probably this has already become clear—however, we will learn about it only after the official meeting has been concluded.

During the work groups' session yesterday, the stance of the Soviet side became clear on this question. According to their point of view, today's meeting could (?develop) into negotiations.

I asked Ceslovas Stankevicius, before leaving for the Kremlin, about the possible start of negotiations:

[Stankevicius] The meeting has been prepared as an official meeting between the delegations; the agenda, nevertheless, includes discussion of the status of the meeting. Therefore it is difficult to tell at the moment how this meeting should be treated. This depends on the Soviet side, as it is the Soviet Union that left this issue undefined. Three matters are needed: clearly defined negotiating parties; the aim of the talks; and plenipotentiary powers. We have all this. There are therefore no obstacles from our side to starting negotiations. It seems that there are some obstacles on the Soviet side. However, we do not yet know about them at the moment. Perhaps this will become clear today.

Spokesman on 'Endangered' Talks

AU0304130291 Budapest NEPSZAVA in Hungarian 28 Mar 91 p 3

["Sz. Cs."-signed interview with Audrius Azubalis, a Lithuanian Government spokesman; by telephone from Vilnius, date not given: "Astonishment in Lithuania—Nevertheless, Vilnius Is Ready for the Talks"]

[Text] The talks between Vilnius and Moscow have been endangered because the two sides are both unwilling to make further compromises. This is why neither a legislative nor a governmental negotiating delegation is expected to travel to Moscow this week—answered Audrius Azubalis to a NEPSZAVA question.

[NEPSZAVA] What sort of further compromises would the Lithuanians require to sit at the negotiating table?

[Azubalis] Primarily, this depends not on the Lithuanians but on Mikhail Gorbachev. As far as we are concerned, the only important prerequisite for the negotiations is that Moscow immediately withdraw its threatening military forces, and its special Interior Ministry forces from Lithuania. This is a completely natural demand in my view, because minor military provocations occur daily in Vilnius, and we cannot start negotiations in such an atmosphere. Incidentally, a number of lower level delegations have visited Moscow, but returned home empty-handed. Therefore, it is out of the question for our president or prime minister to travel to Moscow.

[NEPSZAVA] Following the referendum, Gorbachev made two statements about the Baltics. What is your opinion about this?

[Azubalis] At first, Gorbachev announced categorically that the result of the referendum was also compulsory for the republics that had not taken part in the referendum. Republics that consider themselves to be part of the Soviet Union should consider this as relevant for them. Later, Gorbachev announced to DER SPIEGEL, that the Baltics can also choose the way of the other Central European countries. We were astonished at this, because it meant that the Kremlin indirectly acknowledged: They had not considered the former socialist countries as simple allies.

[NEPSZAVA] The Soviet Union is a union of republics united by their free will. It is also possible to leave the Soviet Union freely. Why does Lithuania not choose the way that also seems more justified by law?

[Azubalis] Look, there is no need to open discussions about the free will even during history lessons today. Everybody knows, how the Baltics, among others, joined the Soviet Union. However, a previous constitutional amendment law makes it very slow, or can even make it impossible to leave the union. The five year transitional period is a good occasion to settle the accounts, because it is not only the union that can make demands. According to many people, Lithuania would be left on her own after leaving the Soviet Union, and would not be able to cope. I am convinced that the politics of foreign countries would change overnight if Moscow acknowledged our independence. However, in order to achieve this, we should hold talks at last, and we are ready for that. I have already mentioned our only condition to you.

Lithuanian Security Chief Views January Events

PM0404075591 Moscow MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI in Russian No 11, 17 Mar 91 p 11

[Interview with Danas Arlauskas, deputy general director of the Lithuanian State Security Department, by Grant Gukasov in Vilnius; date not given: "'There Is No Democracy Without a Security Service'"]

[Text] Vilnius—"There is no democracy without a security service"—that is the view of Danas Arlauskas, deputy general director of Lithuania's State Security Department.

MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI provides the following information: Danas Arlauskas is aged 35 and he graduated from the Kaunas radio technical institute and the KGB's Dzerzhinskiy Higher School. His military rank is captain. He is married, has two children, and is Lithuanian.

[Gukasov] The State Security Department was created after the declaration of Lithuania's independence. For what purpose?

[Arlauskas] I am convinced that an intelligence service must be an instrument for the stabilization of society. Many conflicts arise out of ignorance. Our department has neither investigative nor punitive functions. Its task is to collect, classify, and analyze the most diverse legal and unofficial information on anything which may cause social unrest in the republic. We convey our conclusions and suggestions to the government and legislature; decisionmaking is their job.

[Gukasov] What information did you give the Lithuanian Government on the eve of the January events? Did you foresee that they would develop in the way that they did?

[Arlauskas] We reported on the large-scale destabilization of the domestic political situation in Lithuania back in October last year. Everything began at the Lithuanian Communist Party-CPSU headquarters, where they began formulating the corresponding plan of measures, actively stepped up contacts with the CPSU Central Committee and the military, and government communications apparatuses began operating flat out. Propaganda indoctrination of the center began: There were letters, telegrams, statements from labor collectives, and resolutions from all sorts of committees. Gorbachev was inundated with them. And at the same time there was a stream of official disinformation from the country's leadership on the situation in Lithuania. The Vilnius city committee assembled the leaders of union enterprises and party organization secretaries and openly instructed them to organize various petitions. KGB agents were activated. The Ministry of Internal Affairs began conducting various types of sociological surveys and each major plant was given its own permanent guardian at the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee.

Did Gorbachev know in advance about the actions of the Lithuanian Communist Party-CPSU Central Committee in Vilnius? No. He was told that popular indignation was coming to a head. Thus the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee leadership and the military left themselves room for maneuver. If successful, and they had no doubts on that score, the country's leadership would have no choice but to welcome the fait accompli. Unfortunately, the popular discontent did not materialize and the whole venture flopped.

[Gukasov] How are relations with your former organization shaping up?

[Arlauskas] At the moment there is no open confrontation. There were some meetings with leaders of subunits but we have not yet managed to find a common language. The fact is that the USSR KGB organization on Lithuanian territory was no longer necessary to the center itself, it had lost the center's trust for the simple reason that quite a few of its staffers had switched to our department, bringing with them their knowledge of the structure, tasks, methods, means, and other secrets of that powerful department.

RSFSR

Khasbulatov Addresses 1 Apr Congress on Treaty

LD0204162791 Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian 2208 GMT 1 Apr 91

[Report delivered by Ruslan Imranovich Khasbulatov, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Supreme Soviet first deputy chairman, followed by questions and answers, at the Extraordinary Third Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies session in the Kremlin, Moscow on 1 April; from "The Diary of the Extraordinary Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies" program—recorded]

[Exerpt] [Khasbulatov] Esteemed chairman; Esteemed Comrade People's Deputies:

The draft Union treaty is undoubtedly of enormous importance. The great complexity of drafting such a document is heightened even further by the fact that the question of the Union treaty is inextricably tied up with the problem of the signing of a Union treaty, with the problem of elaborating that Union treaty, the draft of which was published in the press a few weeks ago. How will the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] sign it? As we know, there is a whole series of views here on this. I hope that the authoritative congress commission which you formed at the extraordinary second congress to deal with this task, among others, will be able to present you with a constructive idea. No less important is the connection between the Union treaty question and the future RSFSR constitution, since the latter will evidently be difficult to adopt without first resolving both the question of the Union treaty and that of the Union treaty. I would therefore like to report to you, esteemed comrade deputies, that, when at the Supreme Soviet we were summing up the results of the extraordinary second congress, well, the idea was put forward that we should not be in a hurry to elaborate and adopt a new constitution as an integral fundamental document, since our life develops in a dynamic and multifaceted way and, as we all know, it brings with it rapid changes not only in the economic picture but also in the political situation. That idea was supported by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, and it is my impression that it was likewise supported by the Supreme Soviet itself. Our treaty should serve as an example for multiethnic republics and point the way to peaceful political settlement of ethnic frictions and ominously growing conflicts. It is worth recalling that Lenin's dying words concerned thoughts about the nationalities question, about the fate of a wrong decision in relation in Georgia and the problem of granting autonomous status, which came to replace the original correct Bolshevik idea of the free development of all peoples and nationalities in multi-ethnic Russia.

It needs to be said that the draft text now before us is distinguished by advantages over its predecessors, of which there have been 20. In other words, this is the 21st draft. One can see here the results of painstaking and—the main thing—of exceptionally fruitful work. And we need to note, first and foremost, our indebtedness to the commissions of the Soviet of Nationalities of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet and their leaders.

In my view, the draft before us is wholly acceptable for us to approve that it has been finalized to some extent. Even so, the version in question contains some provisions and wording requiring quite serious amendment and clarification. Incidentally, I shall mention that we had the idea of publishing this document, as with the Union treaty, but I decided to play it safe on this question, and so I sent it for Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov and experts from the RSFSR Supreme Soviet to formulate their conclusions. And I asked them for their thoughts. Many of these thoughts are wholly in tune with my own ideas. Along with the materials received from the Soviet of Nationalities, I also have in my possession the conclusions I have received from the USSR Supreme Soviet.

So what is it that we want first and foremost from this treaty? Since the time of the formation of the USSR, the Russian Federation has been seen as a model of a structure based on a nation-state republic and nation-territory autonomous entities in the form of oblasts and okrugs. In other words, there exist two types of autonomy, differing in essence. As distinct from the USSR and from the Transcaucasian federation which existed until 1936, the RSFSR was not defined as a treaty-based federation. The autonomous entities included within it based their relation with the Russian federal structure not on treaty principles but on constitutional and juridical principles. These are two qualitatively different features, when a state is formed on a treaty basis as opposed to a constitutional and legal basis.

In the history of the federative construction of the RSFSR, there is but one single case of a treaty being concluded with a subject which subsequently joined the RSFSR: namely the case of Bashkiriya in 1918. That is, a treaty between the Central All-Russian Central Executive Committee and the government of bourgeois Bashkiriya. The draft Union treaty, however, puts to the forefront the idea of a treaty-based federation, a treaty-based state. This idea was in fact developed in the draft constitution which I myself subjected to harsh criticism, in general, and which many people have in fact interpreted in a quite different way. To some extent, this idea lies at the basis of the Union treaty we are discussing here.

Attitudes to the idea of a treaty-based federation, as applied to the RSFSR, of course, differ. Given the fact that nearly all the autonomous formations have changed their status and have established their state sovereignty, a situation wholly new from the qualitative point of view has arisen in the sphere of the national-state structure of the RSFSR. At the same time, the vertical inter- relationship between the Union republic and the republic—that is, the former autonomous formation—has still not been defined. The proposed Union treaty, therefore, could evidently be the document to define and, above all, stabilize the status of subjects of the RSFSR, the guarantee of their state sovereignty and independence, demarcating the powers between the federation and its members. Herein is undoubtedly the constructive and exceptionally useful role which the draft Union treaty submitted for your consideration is called upon to play. It is designed to restructure relations within the RSFSR, and to transform a federation built on the principles of national territorial autonomy into a treaty-constitutional federation—not wholly treaty-based, but a treaty-constitutional federation with subjects both different in nature and designation: first, republic states, the previous autonomous formations, autonomous republics; second, autonomous oblasts and okrugs; and third, administrative oblasts and krays. The total number of subjects with which treaties may be concluded, if one follows precise logic and if the treaty is adopted as a basis, is 86 entities: 16 republics, five autonomous oblasts—a number of which have turned themselves into republics—and 10 autonomous okrugs, three of which are claiming the status either of republics or of autonomous oblasts, six krays and 49 administrative oblasts.

The draft Union treaty is subtitled "Treaty on Demarcation of Competence Between the Federal Bodies of Power and Subjects of the RSFSR." The parties to the treaty are, consequently, diverse categories of entities. On the one hand, the federal bodies of power, and on the other, republics, states, autonomous oblasts and okrugs, administrative oblasts and krays. Including among the subjects of the treaty such levels of administrative-territorial division as oblasts and krays has the aim, of course, of giving them maximum equal rights with the republics and other autonomous formations in terms of socioeconomic development.

At the same time, however, it is also clear that granting by treaty equal rights to all territorial entities of the Russian Federation cannot in practice, in real life, that is, guarantee them an equal part in the affairs of the RSFSR as a unified state; insofar as the following conditions, at least, are necessary in order to attain such equal participation: namely, first, equal powers in all spheres of state construction, not only socio-economic construction; second, all other subjects of the federation should share equal obligations with the republics and equal responsibility for the state of affairs in the RSFSR—apart from the socio- economic sphere, I repeat; and third, equal representation in the bodies of powers and administration and other federal institutions and structures.

The most difficult in this connection is the problem of guaranteeing the rights of subjects of the federation. The fact is that the natural patterns of state construction inevitably predetermine the development of the processes of integration not only along horizontal lines, but also coordination along vertical lines, first and foremost within the context of a unified law- governed system, which is currently manifesting a very strong tendency toward disintegration.

For the RSFSR, making the former autonomous areas sovereign bodies, the problem of ensuring compatibility of Russian, that is, federal, and republican legal systems, including at the level of constitutional settlements, has become much more complcated. But you know that.

The draft Union treaty sees two different issues as one; the first is the delineation of what is within the authority of the federation and of its entities, and the second is the delineation of competencies between the individual forms of federal bodies, on the one hand, and the individual forms of bodies of the entities of the federation, on the other. That is Article 2 of the draft. Although these issues are interconnected, they are different in principle, because competencies are among the attributes of a state body, but powers, articles of authority, are characteristics of a state, stipulated by state sovereignty. The transfer of relations within the federation to a treaty basis in place of a constitutional settlement of them does not reduce but in certain specific instances exacerbates the problem of normalization of the activity of state institutions, and creates a threat of supremacy of acts of the RSFSR over those of its territories, even if this is to be delimited in a certain way by the restrictions on the sphere of powers. In fact, such a situation has already emerged in a specific way, before our very eyes, for example, in connection with the referendum.

It says in Article 4 of the draft treaty that all entities of the RSFSR, within the framework of the powers defined by this treaty, are possessors of state power on their territory. Power is a socio-political category; it is always and in all cases a product of the sovereignty of the people. The people themselves are first and foremost the bearer of it. State bodies, which act as the bearers and expression of this power, are products of the people, and the people express their sovereignty through them; this is, for example, something that we are so unwilling to implement here today. The artificial restriction on the full-blooded power of the people by way of attaching only the possession of state power to entities of the RSFSR seems methodologically unsound and really uncharacteristic of a state organization. The idea of full-blooded power of the people and of their representative bodies on the relevant territory of an entity under the federation fits better with state sovereignty and self-government. But again, within the framework of specific competencies. Evidently this issue also remains the most complex one in the draft Union treaty which has been submitted. For that reason, it is important to precisely register here the legal competence at various levels of sovereignty—a Union republic, a republic, and so on.

Entities of the Russian Federation, Article 7 of the draft treaty declares, are equal concerning the fundamental political and economic rights, but meanwhile they may differ in the scope of delegated powers. It is not entirely clear from this provision what one is to understand under fundamental rights. The very classification into political and economic rights leaves open the issues of the social, cultural, humanitarian and administrative-political spheres. In providing for the possibility of differentiation of the scope of powers delegated by entities of the federation, the draft indicates only the form of a supplement to the treaty, but at present does not include the principles and mechanisms for settling the question of delegation of powers. We obviously need to urgently fill in this blank spot.

Further, the competencies of the RSFSR and of its entities are subdivided into the federation's own spheres of authority and combined spheres of authority. The issues which come under joint competence are expected to be resolved with mutual agreement between entities that have an interest, with subsequent notification of the other entities. Well, you will agree that the vagueness of this formulation and the necessity for a constant pursuit of mutual agreement creates conditions in advance for the emergence of fresh contradictions.

All entities of the RSFSR are granted the right of legislative initiative and financial independence, and they can establish economic ties with other states and international organizations within the limits of their competence, or as instructed in federal bodies of the RSFSR.

Paragraph 16 of the draft envisions the possibility of the formation of regional and interregional economic and cultural associations and unions. It would seem that the emergence of these could also be assessed in all sorts of ways, or ambiguously, at any rate—on the one hand, as a combination of regional tasks on the basis of a problem and aim in common facing a region, the Urals, for example, or Eastern Siberia, the non-blacksoil zone, the North Caucasus. On the other hand, this might lead to the formation of cloistered regional quasi-state structures. These regional Union structures can be viewed, not without foundation, as an instrument for the weakening of the foundations of the RSFSR's federalist structure, one which in crisis conditions is capable of destroying the integrality of the federation. And we should not forget that the RSFSR as a state is an integral thing; we cannot preserve the RSFSR without its unity and integrity.

In fact this is happening, for example, in another country, in Canada, Quebec. I have been much involved with this country, and have studied it; and the uncertain influence of regional agreements and unions is also demonstrated by the practice of modern Yugoslavia, you probably know the news, the central press carries a lot of news about that country. That is, the transition of the RSFSR to a treaty-based federation cannot be divorced from the real sociopolitical situation and the situation in the sphere of the national-state structure. The declaration by almost all of the former autonomous republics of their state sovereignty, the rejection of the status of autonomy, and the transformation of a number of autonomous oblasts and okrugs into republics and autonomous oblasts has qualitatively changed many traditional notions about the right to be an entity of the RSFSR. At the same time, one should hardly flatter oneself about this, since even the expansion of the element of federative rights of an entity does not, objectively, make former autonomous areas equal with the RSFSR, nor can it. The RSFSR continues to be a federation of entities which are not actually equal, and this is a fact, with preservation of a certain hierarchy within it. The treaty-based legal capacity of republics, oblasts, krays, and okrugs as entities of the RSFSR cannot be limitless, and that, too, is an absolute fact, by virtue both of the dissimilarities of their constitutional status and of the logic of preservation of the state unity and integrity of the Russian Federation.

Thus far it not been possible in the treaty to provide for mechanisms and structures for the implementation of the powers of the RSFSR, for harmonization of the interests which contradict those of its entities, and for representation of these entities in federal institutions of power and administration. For example, the Constitution, in accordance with which we are present here, encroached to a large extent even upon the rights of former autonomous areas. For example, previously the chairmen of supreme soviets in autonomous republics were by dint of their post deputy chairmen of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet. Of course, this role may perhaps have been just for show, like the very role of chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, by the way, but at the same time, you will agree that such a tie-up, such a linkage, to a large extent fostered the strengthening of ties between autonomous areas and the Russian whole, the Russian center. For that reason, I think that this absolutely must be envisaged in the draft for the new constitution in some form, we must definitely confer with our republics and restore in some form this generally not-bad institution, loss of which has now deprived us to a large degree of the opportunity to have efficient links with the autonomous republics. And there are many more specific examples which make it possible for us to switch not to a treaty-based RSFSR republic, but rather to a constitutional treaty-based system of mutual relations, taking into full account the interests of the independence of the republics, with complete respect for their declarations.

I must say that the draft treaty which you have does resolve these tasks to a considerable extent.

I have particularly dwelt on the methodological profundities and contradictions, perhaps, of this document, but I have to tell you that despite the remarks I have made, I unconditionally join with those who positively assess the draft treaty which has been submitted, and I consider that we could endorse this treaty, and that on this issue it would be possible to adopt a comparatively small decision, to endorse this draft treaty, for example, let us put it that way, and let us say, to do further work on it over a month, taking into account the remarks which have come in, and to start the procedures for its signing. Why? Because realities ae always realities, they may be good or bad, but they are realities. If we drag our feet on this Union treaty, will this not lead to the disintegration of our Russian state? It will lead to this, if, first, state power is not properly reinforced and made orderly, if the foundation of our state, that is, the soviets, is not strengthened together with the issue which we are discussing today. It is not by chance that we have distributed this big draft to you, a draft law on local soviets and local self-government, not by chance. This issue is most directly related to what the congress is struggling with, although one day one we proposed quite a comprehensive formulation and one which I think suited everyone, which, regrettably, you rejected. So we need to resolve this issue at the same time. Incidentally, to avoid repeating myself, this draft law on local self-government may look bad to you at the moment, but I have a request for you—you will agree, we completed it, if not by 15 March, then at least by today—and so I would beseech you all to study this matter thoroughly and give us your remarks soon.

Furthermore, unless the internal integrity of the treaty [words indistinct] in the RSFSR as a unified state is ensured, it is unlikely to be expedient to multiply treaty relations within the country between subjects of the RSFSR, most unlikely. Nor is the idea of concluding a multitude of various intersecting treaties between the subjects of the RSFSR, therefore, the best way of removing the contradictions. It is best here, all the same, to proceed by way of a treaty constitutional basis, to proceed by way of gradual constitutional amendments. We did in fact choose this method, on the spur of the moment, at the Supreme Soviet. You may have observed, for instance, that in the spring and winter period of work, we introduced these same elements into every law submitted, namely a constitutional and legislative amendment, and the formation of new relations between the RSFSR as a whole and the subjects, the oblasts, krays and above all the republics.

Third, and most important, in my view, is the market, esteemed Comrade People's Deputies. We must rapidly and decisively bring about the transfer of the economy to market relations. Otherwise, it is not only processes of disintegration and divergence that will develop. It is economic instability and collapse, and the social apathy precisely related to the failure to resolve social problems, which are making the republics and oblasts try to isolate themselves, they are not doing this just for fun. This is why very rapid and confident progress to market relations is the only thing capable of linking our oblasts and our republics and of making them more integrated and unified, and of linking all our regions economically into a single whole: name what we will call the RSFSR.

We have missed one historic opportunity for bringing all the republics closer together. We must not let the last chance slip. Indeed, only a decisive reform of our economy can save our country from both destruction and from famine, and above all from disintegration. I would advise the opponents of such ideas to take a look even at Marx, to re-read him, for instance, if they have not time to read anything else except for Yeltsin's address, especially the parts with unhappy expressions, there is repetition and so forth. [as heard]

This is, esteemed Comrade Deputies, what I wanted to say on the subject of the Union treaty. It seems to me that the most correct solution would therefore be for us, together with the Chamber of Nationalities, to recommend approval, in the main, of this draft, to give ourselves a month for revision, taking into account all your comments; and to start with the subjects of the RSFSR the procedure of signing—or more accurately, to recommend beginning the procedure of signing the treaty, taking into account all the comments which are already starting to come in. Discussion has already started in the supreme soviets of the republics and oblasts. I have already had a number of comments from the oblasts and republics today.

This is the first part of the issue. Permit me now, esteemed Comrade People's Deputies, to report on the referendum as has been written down. As you are aware, the Russian referendum has taken place. First of all, I should like to tell you that this referendum, as a whole, passed off quite successfully on the territory of the RSFSR. First of all, I should like to tell you that this referendum, as a whole, passed off quite successfully on the territory of the RSFSR. And in our unanimous opinion—I mean in my own personal opinion and that of Vasily Ivanovich Kazakov—its success was chiefly ensured by the fact that we managed to unite two referenda in this referendum: the Russian Federation referendum and the all-Union referendum. For those who are taking comfort in illusions about the very good conduct of the Russian referendum, I should nevertheless like to say that the majority of the large republics which in many respects boils down to the questions which were not put at the referendum. And only we—I assure you, and thanks to Boris Nikolayevich's great influence, and the great deal of work that I did with our deputies— managed to preserve unchanged the wording of the USSR Supreme Soviet, respecting the will of the USSR Supreme Soviet and really genuinely, not just in words but in fact demonstrating our will to sign a union treaty, and our desire to get away from such methods of confrontation.

Second, in accordance with the deputies' will, two Russian variants for this referendum were put forward. The first RSFSR question was the following: Do you want to preserve the RSFSR as a unified multinational state, forming part of a renewed Union? You will agree, it is very difficult to suggest a more elegant and skilled wording, perfect in its logic, for our fellow citizens and for those concerned about the unity of our state.

I shall now report to you on the results of the second referendum. Incidentally, everything has now been blamed upon the autonomous republics, on the grounds that they opposed holding the referendum. Well now, Boris Nikolayevich can witness that we talked to Comrade Shaymiyev [Tatar Supreme Soviet chairman], who was even surprised that we removed that question.

I'll tell you why we dropped this question. Soon after, on representations from deputies, these two questions—and you know that our law on referendums allows you, esteemed people's deputies, to put forward referendum questions, as long as there is a certain number—one can say, I agree, in part, with Deputy Isakov that there are many gaps in the law on referendums. No doubt much needs to be changed. But the law is the law. And if it is the law, the law should operate. Soon accusations started that, first, the required number of signatures was lacking. Second, that there had been some sort of interference from the Presidium. Thirdly, these formal breaches really did emerge. In the one instance, deputies say and write that they want a unified Russian state. In another instance, they forget the unified element, and write that they support a multiethnic RSFSR. To be quite frank about the legal grounds—the legal grounds for dropping this first referendum [as heard] were fully lacking. But inasmuch as the propriety of these formulations was put in doubt, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet and I, once again, carried out a great deal of work with the deputies who were insisting on the referendum. Moreover, we indeed also started to do a certain amount of work among the autonomous republics, in order that [changes thought], moreover, it started to be interpreted quite differently and to be given a different meaning: That your declaration on state sovereignty would then disappear, and so on and so forth. And although the question was, in our view, very elegant and politically proper, and in line with the interests of the unity of the RSFSR, and aroused no doubts, I asked Svetlana Petrovna Goryacheva to check it through. She did indeed discover a number of inaccuracies there. And we persuaded the deputies, and dropped the question from the referendum. As far as the propriety of the second question was concerned, we had no doubts, although repeated questions were asked and attempts were also made to drop this second question too.

Now, what specific figures could I quote for you? First, you will know the official statistics and the conclusion of the Central Electoral Commission from PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA and other newspapers. But at the same time, in assessing the results of the nationwide poll held on 17 March as a whole, it needs to be pointed out that the citizens of Russia demonstrated a high, a very high degree of responsibility for the destiny both of the USSR and the RSFSR. Suffice it to say that over three-quarters of the citizens entitled to vote expressed their views on the questions asked in the referendum. A total of 71.34 percent of those who voted backed the preservation of the USSR as a renewed federation of equal sovereign republics. Despite opposition from a number of republican republics in the USSR and RSFSR, and not just republican, but in even greater measure from the kray and oblast bodies of power, our republican referendum passed off with a high turnout and to great effect. The referendum asked the questions: Do you consider it necessary to introduce the office of RSFSR president, elected by a vote of the whole people?

In the RSFSR as a whole, almost 70 percent backed the introduction of the post of president - to be more precise, 69.85 percent of the citizens who took part in the vote; 28 percent voted against. Of the citizens registered as entitled to vote in the referendum, 52.4 percent replied affirmatively to the question. Thus, whatever system is used for calculating the results of the republican referendum, the majority of Russians backed the idea of introducing the post of RSFSR president

In order to avoid all sorts of questions and false rumors, I should also like to draw your attention to the fact that the system we adopted, involving counting and computation, and the exclusion of votes, was exactly the same as that adopted by the USSR Supreme Soviet, which organized our all-Union referendum. Thus I find it strange when I hear of disputes taking place and people voicing certain doubts about the correctness or otherwise of the Russian referendum, and yet no one has even expressed any doubt about what the situation with the Union referendum is. If you asked the same questions about the Union referendum, I would not want to say what we would come up with. So, for the sake of the stabilization of our society, I recommend that neither the one matter nor the other be raised. You should know that when we raise one question, the question of the destiny of the USSR also arises in equal degree.

The results were summed up by the commission, you know, the Central Electoral Commission, headed by Comrade Kazakov. It was not by chance that we decided on Kazakov—you know, you can guess, why I say "not by chance." It is difficult, probably, to accuse him of engaging in any kind of—well I do not want to put it like this—any kind of artificial, yes, let us be blunt, any kind of artificial juggling, any artificial distortion of the facts just to suit other forces.

Well that is how it was, esteemed Comrades. What was it that ensured the success of this—I repeat—joining together, this combination, of these two referenda? And I just do not understand, I even find it hard to understand why the secretary of the Russian Communist Party Central Committee was unable to appreciate this very serious and politically wise step on the part of the presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the Supreme Soviet itself and the organizers of all these very complex and very difficult decisions which we were faced with.

If you want to know about my personal approach, I expected—taking into account the fact that it was no secret to me that there might be some opposition and non-participation in a number of regions—this was roughly the result I expected. It seemed to me that in favor of a Union referendum—we even argued about this with Vasiliy Ivanovich Kazakov two weeks before the referendum, and he will not permit me to express it in any other way—I guessed that about 80 percent would be in favour of preserving the USSR, and that about 60 percent of those who voted would be in favor of introducing the office of president, bearing in mind these factors. As you see, I was wrong, and the hopes of the Russian people are very close to those many deputies who said that we in Russia also need a pretty serious authority. And it is needed, esteemed Comrades, precisely in order to achieve those objectives on which you have been speaking: to put the economy right, to make a reality of those power structures which are required to put right, to protect our—yourselves and mine—duties of deputies, and for the opportunity for each of us and any of our fellow citizens to work normally.

That is why it is natural that it seems to me personally that in one way or another we would have had to examine this issue, and the least we would have to do would, of course, be to adopt a corresponding decision which would provide instructions to prepare a whole number of packages of draft laws connected with introducing the office of president. Or perhaps adopt an article of some kind on the basis of which the Supreme Soviet would be able to develop this whole package, without dragging it out or putting it off for another day. This question is just as urgent as is the need to implement the profound processes of reform in our country.

The third question, esteemed Comrades, or the third aspect of the issue which you have included, is that of the union treaty. Esteemed Comrades, the history of this, the start of the movement of this Union treaty—for me, at least—began at the first congress. If you remember, I had been newly elected deputy chairman—I had been chairman and was immediately sent to the commission which is next door to here, and which sat under the chairmanship of Comrade Nishanov and defined the contours and the shape of this new Union treaty.

To be frank, this gave rise to a great many domestic questions. In fact, the first union treaty was proclaimed by the constitution of 1926. This was followed by that rather good constitution of 1936. What the political regime was like is another matter, but the constitution at that time was not a bad one. And no worse than the one which was adopted at the end of the 1970's.

Well, one way or another, this process has begun, and I am not sure that this discussion, these arguments, and the long drawn-out squabbles over the union treaty, and over our Union treaty, too, have helped the stabilization of this society. I am not sure that they have. Most probably, a path to constitutional changes would have been a more correct one—changes to the USSR Constitution, changes to the constitutions of the union republics, changes to the constitutions of the autonomous republics, and so on. But since it has begun, it has to be continued.

Many voices were raised, especially at the last congress and at the Supreme Soviet, saying that everybody is participating in a very active way, but we are not participating. I would like to say to you, esteemed Comrades, that this is simply not so. This usually happens with different kinds of people. Some people are unaware of something, and when they do not know they want to know. Whereas others, when they do not know, see some merit in their ignorance. So those who do not know what we have been doing, developing and participating in the process of the new union treaty, it is those people who usually make accusations and reproaches that we have not been participating, that we do not know about this, that and the other. I have to say that the history of the development of this question may be divided into two stages. This was approximately up to the middle of September, when it was only representatives, mainly leaders, of the Union republics who took part in the work.

At that time we were faced with an agonizing task: how to devise a new union treaty which would retain all 15 republics, either in the form of a commonwealth or in some other form. That was the problem at that first stage. Subsequently the central administration cooled to this idea of a Union treaty, to a certain extent anyway. Then there was a new period of activity, which began in November. That was the time when we were working most fruitfully in the Supreme Soviet on the draft economic laws, culminating, in my vuiew, in the adoption of very sound and correct laws which gave effect to the declaration on the state sovereignty of the RSFSR.

From this period one is reminded of the law which was adopted by the Supreme Soviet on 26 April 1990, in accordance with which it is not only union republics but also autonomous republics that are components of the USSR. We began working together. Many leaders of autonomous republics were brought into the renewed Federation Council—i.e. the Federation Council was renewed earlier than our Union itself. The renewed Federation Council then began working on a new basis. The task became considerably more complicated, of course, not because people made it more complicated, but because republics with different levels of [word indistinct] began participating. In the first place, some republics had different ideas about what sort of new Union treaty was really wanted. Therefore, some of them were quite happy just to sign it. Very often—I must be frank with you—they had no idea about the basic issues at stake.

Second, the discussions were complicated by objective factors. One of the participants, the RSFSR, is a huge republic. Parts of it have their own representatives on the Federation Council, whereas the Ukraine and Kazakhstan have only one each, and so on. Therefore, we—I mean, the leaders of the Supreme Soviet—began hearing reproaches not only from the Union republics, not only from the Union, the central administration, but also from our own representatives on the Federation Council. So, the primary task, the first task, as we see it, is the Union treaty. It is exceptionally important.

But even more important is the manner in which this Union treaty will be signed. You will remember that, at the last congress, you, the esteemed members of the congress, set up what I regard as a very authoritative commission. If I am not mistaken, it had 120 members. Well, we never once managed to get all 120 together. Eighty was as many as we could manage. We held three plenary sessions. I have to tell you that—well, our exchanges of views and courtesies are always accompanied by—you know the atmosphere, how very serious and nervous, and so on, it is. But in just one and a half to two hours of joint work, all the members of the commission elected by you, I think, got to the nub of things and realised just how historically important was the mission entrusted to us, and we tried to convey our ideas to the congress.

However, prior to this, as you know, a group of our representatives, including some representing our formerly autonomous entities, did some very thorough work at the Morozovka meetings convened by Comrade Nishanov, to whom we should be grateful. They submitted very many interesting proposals on this draft Union treaty. Our thinking on this was as follows. We had already agreed, at the highest level, that we would not table our own, alternative drafts for discussion. Therefore, the reproaches we have heard, that we did not table our own ideas, did not make our own suggestions, are invalid. We had given a ;binding undertaking. So we worked on the president's draft, which, as a result of each meeting, really did develop in the right direction and become an improved text. That's the first thing.

Second, we took the proposed draft and the things which had been agreed with the other Union republics, as a basis. By following a path of fundamental destruction, by trying to set up a new deputation and to propose a new draft to everybody else, we would hold things up, I think. I think everybody realizes that this would have held up the process. It would have led, not to unification and agreement, but to destruction. Therefore, we followed a path which led to a definite improvement in the actual text, as we see it.

That is the first thing. Second, we proposed—you have the draft of a short decision or declaration. No doubt you see its imperfections and shortcomings. But the important thing is that it is a compromise. Our republics took part in it, and it was adopted after receiving the support of the majority of our members on the commission. Therefore, it is recommended that you sign it, along precisely those lines. In other words, a single state commission, made up of delegations from our republics, is to be set up. This single state delegation will directly sign the treaty, worded, as it is, in this quite meaningful, if complicated, way. If we do this, we will not of course embarrass those republics which have announced that they want to sign this treaty independently and directly.

I do not want to talk to you in detail about the things we have made better or worse, which you can see for yourselves. But I should like to tell you that there is another aspect whcih we still, of course, have to discuss with the central administration and the union republics. The possibility remains of very serious contradictions in the future because of the vagueness of the joint powers of the Union republics, on the one hand, and the central administration, on the other. This sometimes seems very straightforward. At the first congress we proclaimed and adopted a declaration on state sovereignty. And we vested specific functions within the jurisdiction of the central administration. Take machine-building. Our head of government told you yesterday that almost 75 percent of machine-building is linked to military-industrial production. Consequently the point is to define the jurisdictions under which individual enterprises are to be placed. Or take communications. Last time we were adopting a decision—I do not quite remember the details—Minister Bulgak reported that fixed assets of the communications services worth 18 billion rubles belong to the RSFSR. Some deputies say: How is that possible? It is not our sovereignty, it is the union's, and we should hand this over. Thus, our declaration of state sovereignty being interpreted by some people from an even worse viewpoint than was the case before we adopted it. If some deputies had their way, we should already be prepared to give away to the Union the small proportion that belongs to us.

So the point is that these joint jurisdictions have to be very precisely delimited. Otherwise, the ink will hardly have dried under the new Union treaty when contradictions will emerge again, they could emerge and very seriously complicate things. But, one way or another, it seems to me that, if you adopt the version proposed by us, we could use this decision to get going very quickly and close this chapter with a Union treaty. It is my personal view that a very long period of discussion and interpretation, different interpretations and delay on this will only lead to undermining our very statehood and the very principles of statehood, and naturally this will happen in the war of laws.

Look how our congress began. If the jurisdiction of the RSFSR in the sphere of law enforcement had been clearly defined—what bodies come udner whom: the Union or the RSFSR?—could such a situation have arisen, I ask you? Now ask yourselves who stands to gain from delays in signing the treaty. Surely not us? Of course not! And the Supreme Soviet leadership never had any desire to delay this. It was never a question of whether it was to exist or not. We always supported it. But what sort of Union treaty was it to be? What were the spheres of jurisdiction and powers to be? It seems to me that you should have a full idea of these matters and support the Supreme Soviet and its leadership on these matters, so that we can fully implement the provisions contained in our fine RSFSR declaration of state sovereignty, and the really good declarations of our republics, with whom, I am more than certain, we shall agree all the issues which sometimes worry them and which they think we somehow do not consider or simply ignore. Thank you,. That is all I have to say.

[Yeltsin] Hold it a minute, Ruslan Imranovich. Just a minute, Ruslan Imranovich. The decision has not been passed yet.

The decision has now been passed. Go ahead, please. Begin with a written question, please.

[Khasbulatov] People's deputy Kobzev asks: In your view, is it, in principle, possible for Russia to belong to a union in which the center is controlled by the communists, a center in which we have absolutely no confidence? Is it possible to create a federal union in such conditions?

Well, in the first place, it is not correct to say that we have absolutely no confidence in it. I myself am a Communist. So far it has never occured to me that I should leave the party, although I think you are quite well aware that my ideological positions have little in common with the leadership of the Russian Communist Party or Marxism and Marxist ideas, which I am altogether doubtful about. [applause]

As regards the Communist [Party], as regards the center, any organization must have some sort of organizational basis. Is that not so? Any party needs one. It is only the democrats, as a rule—beginning with Roman times, the times of ancient Rome - who do not have any organization. That is a peculiarity of democracy. [applause and laughter] But a normal organization must have a center, authority and, probably, power. The only thing is that it should not fight against lawfully elected state authority. But at the moment we see that certain comrades—many comrades, perhaps—based at Staraya Ploshchad [headquarters of CPSU Central Committee] are steering a course not only for confrontation but for war with the lawfully elected state authority, as embodied by the Supreme Soviet. This is something we cannot tolerate. The ideas expressed by the chairman of the Supreme Soviet are in my view wonderful ones. At the end of the day, let us not fight against our own people.

Therefore, I consider that we can also join a Union which has a communist center, that we can negotiate and sign treaties with it, provided of course that war is not to be waged against the state authorities.

[Yeltsin] Just a minute.

[Khasbulatov] Actually there is another question here. In such circumstances is it possible to create a federal union? Here I see yet another question. The point is that we in the RSFSR are, to all intents and purposes, heading quite fast toward a confederation. The suggestion is that this confederation should join a federation—the union federation. I ask you, especially the theoreticians, not to forget these contradictions. This is a very dangerous thing. If, first, we do not strengthen the political foundations of our state power and, second, do not reshape our economy very substantially, the RSFSR will be balkanized. [passage omitted] Incidentally, I believe that we should—after all, I do not agree with everything Boris Nikolayevich says either. But what I would like to say, esteemed comrades, is this. If I did not agree with the fundamental positions of the chairman of the Supreme Soviet, I would say so and resign. [applause]

[Yeltsin] Thank you, Ruslan Imranovich.

[Khasbulatov] I have ...

[Yeltsin] Ruslan Imranovich ...

[Khasbulatov] It is that I have different ideas about such concepts as honor, conscience, and fairness. [applause]

[Yeltsin] Thank you, Thank you very much. [applause]

Pavlov Meets With Deputies at Congress 2 Apr

LD0204230491 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1800 GMT 2 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow, 2 Apr (TASS)—Today USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov had a meeting with a large group of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] people's deputies who are working in agriculture and at a number of Russian industrial enterprises directly related to it. An exchange of opinions took place on a wide range of issues relating to the improvement of the provision of food for the republic's population. People's deputies raised specific problems of organizing the work of the agro-industrial complex during the spring-summer period. Attention was called to the extremely poor delivery of grain feed to poultry farms. It was also noted that many enterprises, monopolists in the production of agricultural machinery, are raising prices without good reason, and this has a negative effect on the economy of farms.

The prime minister spoke about the measures recently adopted by the USSR Cabinet of Ministers on the development of agrarian sectors of the republican and national economy, and answered questions of people's deputies. It was decided that instructions will be given on all problems touched upon at the meeting, and their fulfilment will be supervised. At the same time the need was stressed for clear and orderly work of the Union and Russian Governments in tackling agrarian problems.

Ivan Silayev, chairman of the RSFSR Council of Ministers, and members of the USSR and RSFSR Governments took part in the discussion of the issues that were raised.

Reportage on 3 Apr Congress of People's Deputies

Moscow TV Reports Proceedings

LD0304205191

Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian at 1858 GMT on 3 April begins carrying its scheduled program of recorded highlights from the Congress of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, People's Deputies proceedings in the Kremlin on 3 April.

Khasbulatov, deputy president of the RSFSR, is in the chair. He asks deputies to register. There is a quorum. Khasbulatov gives the floor to Ivan Fedorovich Shilov, USSR deputy interior minister, but Shilov does not appear. Khasbulatov instead gives the floor to Nikolay Semenovich Trubin, USSR procurator-general.

Trubin begins his address, recalling the POSTFAKTUM report in January that RSFSR People's Deputy Artem Tarasov claimed that Gorbachev had concluded a secret document with Japan for the sale of the Kuril Islands to Japan. On 1 February, the president's press service denied this claim and said it was a political provocation. The POSTFAKTUM agency provided the assurance that Tarasov's words had been faithfully reported. The USSR Procurator's Office earlier sought the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's agreement to waive Tarasov's immunity as a people's deputy so that proceedings could be instituted against him for impugning the USSR president's honor. Now Trubin wants the congress to waive Tarasov's immunity.

Trubin says that his application is not at variance with the sovereignty of the Russian legislature. The law on protecting the USSR president's honor is an all-Union one, he reminds deputies.

Deputy Muravyev asks for some kind of material evidence of what Tarasov said in actual fact, for instance a tape recording of his words. He stresses that there is a difference between normal slander and juridical slander.

At 1917 GMT, Deputy Gurevich asks Trubin if he knows that on 28 March there was an attempt to provoke a clash between Moscow's citizens and detachments of the special-purpose militia.

Trubin says this was not a question but an answer. Questions need to be formulated correctly. A deputy says that Tarasov has indeed denied the POSTFAKTUM agency report. Therefore, where is the evidence for any proceedings against Tarasov?

Deputy Andronov from Vladimir Oblast brings to the minister's attention an article in a recent edition of KOMMERSANT that the return of the Kurile islands for japanese money was discussed during the recent visit by a Japanese official.

Trubin says that at the present time no charges have been brought against Tarasov. A woman deputy says that Tarasov has already apologized three times to the president. Trubin says pluralism of opinion is not punishable, only slander.

Deputy Tikhomirov recalls that an RSFSR law has already been passed that there can be no change to RSFSR territory without a referendum.

Deputy Kazarov supports the USSR procurator's presentations and says Tarasov should be made to answer for his slander. Another deputy says today's proceedings at the congress should be shown in full on television.

A deputy says that guarantees should be given that no agreement will be struck for the return of the Kurils to Japan for money. If no guarantees are given, then the action against Tarasov should be dropped.

Khasbulatov takes vote on whether to conclude this issue. The vote is adopted and the procurator is asked to sit down.

A vote is taken on whether there should be a 30-minute time allocated to discussion of the issue. This is agreed.

Deputy Volchinskiy says it is all a game. Trubin did not really need to come to the congress in order to take proceedings against Tarasov.

Deputy Lukin says any action against Tarasov should be dropped, and Deputy Kalashnikov says he favors a vote on the issue. Deputy Oleynik from Moscow says that Tarasov did not in fact claim that a deal had been struck. He merely said there was the intention to strike a deal. He also says Trubin is exceeding his powers and it is in fact a matter for the Russian procurator, if there had been a need. Deputy Balakovskiy, Deputy Podoprigora, and Deputy Potapov also speak on the issue.

A female deputy agrees with the speeches by Oleynik and Podoprigora and attacks Irubin for telling lies. Deputy Shakhray said that following Tarasov's apology one would have expected magnanimity from Gorbachev. Therefore he urges deputies not to agree to trubirs request. He is appended.

Deputy Kamachatov urges strict adherence to the RSFSR's laws, and Deputy Gritsenko urges that Trubin's request should be carefully considered and a yes or no given.

Khasbulatov takes a vote on whether Trubin's request should be met. The request is not adopted. The voting is 280 for, 458 against and 113 abstaining. Khasbulatov then takes a vote on whether congress should process to item five on the agenda. The vote is adopted, and the debate will continue to the text of the draft resolution of the congress.

Deputy Chudnov complains of the time wasted at the congress. He is ashamed before his voters, he says.

A speaker at the rostrum is shown beginning to report on yesterday's sitting of the drafting commission, but his speech is cut short.

The evening session's proceedings are then shown. Khasbulatov is still in the chair. He says there are 20 pages of amendments to consider. He asks who is now in favor of considering miscellaneous points. Deputy Mazayev says that draft decisions are being distributed to deputies.

At 2019 GMT Russian Internal Affairs Minister Viktor Barannikov takes the floor:

"Esteemed people's deputies, esteemed Presidium: A request has been made by the Secretariat of the Congress to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, signed by 56 people's deputies; its contents is such: We request that the minister of internal affairs should report in brief on the crime situation in the RSFSR, the cadre policy of the ministry in its new composition, and the situation resulting from the changes in the structure of the law enforcement organs in the city of Moscow and Moscow Oblast.

"To date an unprecedented and critical crime situation has developed in the republic. You know this well, because the Ministry of Internal Affairs regularly provides information and all its statistics on the situation of fighting crime. The local law enforcement organs are also providing information to the deputies corps as well as the population on the crime-fighting situation.

"It has not been possible to contain the sharp growth in crime, which started since 1988 in spite of the measures taken by the internal affairs' bodies and the law enforcement organs as a whole. During the past year 1,839,000 crimes were committed in Russia. During this year crime shows an average growth of 20 percent. The nature of crime itself is changing rapidly. It is acquiring first of all a clearly defined orientation for assault and acquisition by illegal means. The consolidation of the criminal world is under way. The usual capital crime is coalescing with the economic and the organized crime. Young people are being lured into the criminal world on the one side, and officials on the other. Especially worrying is the growth of negative tendencies in the economic sphere. During the period of great shortages the number of various economic violations—bribe-taking, embezzlement, profiteering—has been growing. The process of creating new economic structures and changing industrial relations and their connections are being used by the criminals for their own material gains, which increases the economic instability even further.

"Therefore, this request from the deputies made to the RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs was not accidental. The time limit does not allow me to talk in more detail about what was done and about the results of the work of the Internal Affairs bodies. Therefore, I shall briefly answer the main questions which were put to me. Taking into consideration the situation and the existing conditions, a decision was made by the RSFSR Council of Ministers on 2 October; in accordance with this decision the radical reorganization of the structure of the Ministry of Internal Affairs has taken place. This work is being completed at the republican, kray, oblast, and rayon levels. Instead of a number of various small subunits, the appropriate services were established—the criminal militia, public security, investigation, and a number of other units. Three main tasks were entrusted to these bodies for their practical implementation: protecting the individual, fighting economic crime, and preventing organized crime activities.

"By the better use of forces and means we were able to reduce the growth level of street crime from 67 percent in 1989 to 4 percent last year; 56,000 more crimes were solved; 151,000 crimes were uncovered in the economic sphere—this means embezzlements and violations. In the past year and during this year, 689 organized criminal groups were broken up in cooperation with other law enforcement organs.

"Considering such a situation, special operation investigation bureaus are being created in internal affairs ministries and departments for going further in this direction and with the aim of enforcing this line. Security for a large number of social and political events has been provided. And by the way, I should say that not a single incident has been allowed to happen during all these events, including the period of the referendum.

"As to the cadre policy, professionalism lies at the basis of its demands on employees. The system of political bodies has been abolished in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and a service for working with the personnel has been set up.

"Counting on the fact that forming a professional nucleus would have a positive effect, a decision has been adopted above all on improving the material provisions of the personnel and the technical equipment of the bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. A speedy adoption of a law on Russian militia, which at present is being examined by the republic's Supreme Soviet, would facilitate this task.

"We pay special attention to the governing link of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Directorate of Internal Affairs.

"At present reappointment of the leaders is being discussed in order that the service be headed by professionals who are ready and capable of organizing militia affairs. However, not everything depends on the ministry. Unfortunately, not always do we come across due understanding and support in local bodies of power. Some soviets confirmed leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Directorate of Internal Affairs without the consent of the Russian Department of Internal Affairs. At the same time we did not receive the needed reaction to a Ministry of Internal Affairs proposal to replace a number of leaders who did not cope with their work.

"We deem it necessary to make legislative changes in the current practice of appointment and release from posts of leaders of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Directorate of Internal Affairs, and to give an initiative in raising and tackling this issue to the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs with the agreement of the soviets.

"Lack of a decision on distribution of functions between the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] and the RSFSR MVD creates certain difficulties. Educational establishments, material and technical supply subunits, and medical establishments have not been transferred to the jurisdiction of the republic's MVD. The question of internal troops has not been settled in a proper manner. A decision on setting up a Main Directorate of the USSR MVD for Moscow and Moscow Oblast was a surprise to us. The appropriate legal and political assessment of it has been given here at the congress, and I think that in the near future there will be a return to this issue and it will be examined. We have sent all necessary material to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and we have sent our views to the USSR Committee for Constitutional Supervision.

"Without declining the responsibility, I would like to use the opportunity given to me and to draw your attention to a number of problems beyond the competence of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

"If we want perceptible progress in combating crime—and I think eveyone here in this hall wants this—we need in an accelerated way to tackle first and foremost legal reform and without delay to make the essential priority alterations to the legislative base.

"It is vitally important to determine society's firm intentions in combatting crime. The traditional forms are at present not working. Many people's volunteer squads have virtually ceased to exist. The workers' detachments for assisting the militia have not been developed. However, a new mechanism is needed for the participation of the public in the fight against crime, and it needs to be created not by a directive from above—which has been done before—but indeed from below. That is to say, it needs to be done by initiative from below, and in this respect the role of local soviets and the corps of deputies is immense.

"In concluding my short address, comrades, I should like to express the thought that all the forces of society and all state institutions should at the present time pay particular attention to the problem of combating crime. This can be given effect within the framework of an all-Russian state program for combatting crime. Such a program has been drawn up. It is now with the Council of Ministers and the Supreme Soviet, and I think that its adoption will yield definite results in intensifying the fight against crime and in strengthening law and order and legality in the Russian Federation.

"Thank you for you attention."

Some questions are put to Barannikov from the floor by deputies. A deputy asks Barannikov why he did not meet a Moscow city soviet request that Maj. Gen. Komissarov be appointed head of the Moscow directorate of the MVD. Another deputy echoes this complaint against Barannikov. Barannikov says Moscow does not in practice come under the RSFSR MVD.

Ivan Fedorovich Shilov, USSR Deputy Interior Minister, is given the floor by Khasbulatov. Shilov has been asked, he says, about enforcing the law on 28 March in Moscow. He says that it is normal practice throughout the world to protect legislatures against undue pressure, and that was the purpose of the presence of the law enforcement forces in central Moscow on that day. He recalls that there had been neither tanks or APCs, only ordinary army trucks. He recalls that there had been provocative calls by certain people to mass on Red Square. He says that there had been no grave consequences on that day. The Interior Ministry personnel and the soldiers present on the day did everything possible to ensure law and order.

Shilov answers various questions by deputies. He says that the law enforcement measures on 28th March had been agreed between the USSR and the RSFSR Interior Ministries. Shilov repeats that there were no armored vehicles present except trucks for the transportation of personnel. In answer to a deputy's remarks he says he has no intention of resigning. Khasbulatov thanks Shilov, then moves on to miscellaneous points.

Deputy Izilbayeva speaks of the sad plight of Soviet women and Russian women in particular. She speaks of high mortality among mothers. The patient woman's heart is no longer able to be paitent. She thinks congress commissions should prepare for the women's congress to be held in a year.

At 2054 GMT Khasbulatov says the working day has ended. He thanks the deputies for their cooperation and at that point the program ends.

Reaction to Trubin Speech

LD0304110191 Moscow Central Television Second Program Network in Russian 0915 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Report by Yuriy Rostov on the Congress of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic People's Deputies in Moscow on 3 April]

[Excerpt] [Rostov] Today, to begin with, the congress deputies were somewhat distracted from their titanic labors of approving, or rather, examining 250 amendments to a five page decision on the situation in Russia. The first person to take the floor today was USSR Procurator General Trubin. He asked the congress for its consent to start criminal proceedings against Artem Tarasov. As you know, Deputy Artem Tarasov made a statement in the press to the effect that Gorbachev was planning to lease or sell the Kuriles to Japan. You will now see what the deputies' first reactions were:

[Unidentified deputy] Does it seem to you that one does not get prosecuted for making suppositions? At a time when Nevzorov and Alksnis make direct accusations against the president, insulting the president's honor and dignity, you do not prosecute them? [applause]

[Second unidentified deputy] We are insulted in the press and wherever else you like. Not a single official organ has ever apologized to us in any way. And SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA publishes various things daily about us and you could have long ago prosecuted it. [applause] One more question, I want to ask you again. I pursue very attentively Alksnis' and Petrushenko's speeches and, you know, I thought they should have been delt with a long time ago but they are still sitting in the Supreme Soviet.

[Rostov] we cite precisely these excerpts of the speeches because they show how, from the political point of view, the deputies received the procurator general's speech. There were also many remarks about the legal aspects here. Deputies pointed out that there were errors in the way in which the request was formulated and that it should have been the procurator general of Russia and not of the union who should have addressed the congress and that the information concerning the discussion on selling or leasing the islands is confirmed—no matter how surprising that is—even by what the Soviet Union's Foreign Minister Bessmertnykh had to say. He recently stressed that the question of where precisely the borders between the USSR and Japan were going to be situated depended on many factors. [passage omitted]

Reportage on 4 Apr Congress of People's Deputies

Deputies Adopt Yeltsin Report

LD0404104191 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0930 GMT 4 Apr 91

[By TASS legislative corresondent Lyudmila Aleksandrova]

[Text] Moscow, 4 Apr (TASS)—After two days of intense debate, the Russian Congress of People's Deputies today adopted a decision on the report by Boris Yeltsin, head of the Russian legislature, "On the Political and Socioeconomic Situation in the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] and Measures for a Way Out of the Crisis."

The document, which was adopted, gives a fairly critical appraisal of the work of the Russian Supreme Soviet and the Russian Government, and it points out that they "have not fully utilized the powers granted to them to stabilize the political and socio-economic situation in the RSFSR." At the same time, however, it points out that the crisis in the largst republic of the Union is merely a part of the deep crisis in the USSR as a whole.

The Government of Russia is instructed to work out a program for stabilizing the economy and making the transition to market relations, and to submit it for consideration by the legislature within a month. The resolution includes an extensive section on ways of pulling the Russian countryside out of crisis, and on the further implementation of land reform.

A number of substantial amendments to the orginal draft of the resolution were submitted in the course of discussion. In particular, a point calling for a proposal to the legislature and the president of the USSR, as well as to the legislatures of Union republics, for the formation of a "coalition Union government of popular trust and national accord" was thrown out. And a point concerning the departization of law enforcement bodies, and of the state apparatus and state enterprises, establishments, and organizations, failed to win the necessary number of votes to be endorsed.

Immediately following the adoption of the resolution, Boris Yeltsin, the head of Russia's legislature, asked the deputies to grant him what are in effect presidential powers. Otherwise, he said, it will be scarcely possible to implement the resolution.

A one-hour break has been announced at the congress to allow representatives of various groupings to determine their attitude to Yeltsin's request.

Yeltsin Requests Additional Powers

LD0404135291 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 4 Apr 91

[Speech by Boris N. Yeltsin, Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, president, to the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies in the Kremlin on 4 April—recorded]

[Text] Respected people's deputies, the Extraordinary Third RSFSR Congress of People's Deputies has only just...[changes thought] In spite of difficult discussions and not everyone being satisfied with this decree, an extremely important decree has been adopted all the same. Everyone knows with what difficulty and ambiguity the idea of this congress matured, and what atmosphere formed around it. Not everyone was sure that we would be able to adopt really major decisions, the significance of which would exceed the limits of the political attitudes of the Supreme Soviet leadership.

The decree that has been adopted demands urgent and decisive actions. Only in this way can we influence the most difficult situation that has taken shape in Russia. It has worsened even further during the time that the congress has been working because of the reform of retail prices.

First and foremost, this has led to people's dissatisfaction and the political situation has been aggravated. After yesterday's meeting between the miners and Pavlov, chairman of the USSR Cabinet of Ministers, the miners stopped work at even more mines since no practical solutions were adopted. That is to say, this large-scale strike is spreading. Social tension in various regions of the Russian Federation and the country as a whole is growing quickly.

The situation is compounded by the fact that Union authority is losing its flexibility and is not reacting appropriately to events and a veritable paralysis of power is approaching. All this may place in doubt the possibility of fulfilling the very serious decisions that have just been adopted. It is not just a question of having nothing to do or to account for at the next congress. The main thing is the danger of again wasting time and permitting a fresh spiral of deterioration in the life of our electors.

At this congress we must adopt measures that will prevent such a development of events. For this it is necessary to adopt the decision, and I beg you as RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman to embark on this and take this step, to adopt a decision on redistributing the powers of the republic's supreme bodies of power.

For the purpose of ensuring conditions for implementing the Congress of People's Deputies decisions directed at overcoming the economic crisis, maintaining civic peace, restoring public order, resolving and ending social conflicts, and strengthening national cooperation, the Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Supreme Soviet chairman should be instructed to immediately carry out emergency and other measures to bring society out of the crisis situation, to protect the economic sovereignty of the RSFSR, to ensure the transition to a market economy, to reorganize and strengthen the systems of administration and law and order, to end and prevent strikes and in this vein to redistribute the powers of the supreme bodies of power. That is, powers should be given by the congress, until such time as an RSFSR president is elected, as follows:

The Supreme Soviet should have the right to issue laws on questions relegated to the competence of the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies apart from the adoption of the constitution and the election of state bodies' leaders defined by the RSFSR Constitution, with such laws to be subsequently submitted for ratification by the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies.

The RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman should be entitled to issue orders which will be mandatory on RSFSR territory. Decisions of the Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Supreme Soviet chairman envisaging the introduction of measures of an extraordinary nature in separate territories of the RSFSR may be submitted for approval by the highest bodies of state power of the republic that make up the RSFSR and with soviets of people's deputies of the appropriate territories.

The abovementioned plenipotentiary powers of the Supreme Soviet, the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and the Supreme Soviet chairman may not be used to dissolve legally elected bodies of state power or to change the national state structure of the RSFSR. The Congress of People's Deputies retains the right to change or revoke any decision adopted by the Supreme Soviet, the Soviet Presidium [as heard] or the RSFSR Supreme Soviet chairman.

I want to offer some clarifications. By adopting this resolution we will not exceed the RSFSR Constitution since we will not increase the aggregate plenipotentiary powers of the bodies of power of the Russian Federation. What is involved is a redistribution of plenipotentiary powers, the transfer of a portion of the plenipotentiary powers of the Congress of People's Deputies to the Supreme Soviet.

The reason for this is that in the existing situation special urgency in political and various other activities is needed. It is impermissible that such an opportunity for response should only occur during the congress' work. Here is the second thing: All democratic checks and balances, which allow the legality of the actions of each supreme body of power to be guaranteed, are preserved. Supreme competence belongs to the Congress of People's Deputies which can be convened when necessary.

The redistribution of powers is of a temporary nature and it automatically ceases to be effective after the election of an RSFSR president. Today it is vitally necessary to adopt the decision that has been proposed. This will be an endorsement of the confidence expressed by the third congress in the bodies elected by it. Otherwise the fulfillment of the congress' decisions will be jeopardized. Thank you.

'Stormy', Mixed Response

LD0404150691 Moscow TASS in English 1426 GMT 4 Apr 91

[By TASS correspondents Lyudmila Aleksandrova and Yuriy Kozmin]

[Text] Moscow April 4 TASS—Russian parliament Chairman Boris Yeltsin's request for interim powers similar to those enjoyed by an executive president, made at the etraordinary Congress of Russian People's Deputies today, drew a stormy but mixed response from deputies.

Deputies expressed, as a rule, sharply polarised views. Adopting a resolution on Yeltsin's speech "will deepen the crisis in Russia and make opposition between autonomous republics and the Russian leadership, the Russian Federation and the centre even more bitter," believes Aleksandr Veshnyakov, deputy chairman of one of the two chambers of the Russian parliament and an author of a political statement by six deputies who sharply criticised Yeltsin's policy. He thinks that Yeltsin will lead the republic to the "dictatorship of the Democratic Russia Movement".

Viktor Stepanov, chairman of parliament in the Karelian Autonomous Republic, described Yeltsin's initiative as "legally wild and illiterate". He told "TASS that

Yeltsin's proposal envisaged serious changes in the Constitution and affected questions related to powers enjoyed by the autonomous republics which are part of Russia.

The adoption of this decision will "bring about dyarchy and expedite the disintegration of the Russian Federation," Stepanov believes. He described Yeltsin's move as an "irresponsible step".

Sergey Krasavchenko, member of the Russian parliament Presidium, thinks differently. He described Yeltsin's initiative as "an act of a courageous man, who has assumed great responsibility". He thinks "it would be much simpler to allude to the absence of such powers. In the present situation, it would be more advantageous to resign," Krasavchenko told TASS.

Viktor Sheynis, member of the Russian Constitutional Commission," believes that Yeltsin "has put a lot at stake". "Once these powers are given to him, they will bolster the democratic camp and the positions of all forces which want to change the situation that has arisen in the republic," Sheynis noted.

He thinks that the principal purpose of this initiative is "to expand the field for political manoeuvre."

"This resolution will not entail signficant changes in the republican constitution. The congress will retain the key functions," Sheynis said.

Goryacheva 'Horrified' at Prospect

LD0404132291 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1200 GMT 4 Apr 91

[Remarks by Svetlana Goryacheva, deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic, RSFSR, Supreme Soviet, at the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies in Moscow on 4 April—recorded]

[Text] Esteemed people's deputies. Please excuse me for mounting this rostrum. I ask you to let me speak, in infringement of our rules. But do we actually have rules? Are they actually operating at this congress, where there reigns open deception and pressure, where deputies have been forced to vote several times on one and the same decision disguised in different forms of wording?

Boris Nikolayevich. This congress has witnessed your self-unmasking. It has become clear not only to me, but to many people, that for you the presidency is the main aim. For the sake of that aim you engage in deception and falsification, and are ready to go to any length, not stopping even at [heckling in hall; Yeltsin calls the congress to order; Goryacheva continues] plunging the country into crisis for the sake of power. You are ready to do anything.

The president of the republic ought to be an embodiment of the honor and dignity of its people. You are the embodiment of quite different qualities. I am horrified, and shudder to think about the possibility of your holding that post. You ask for additional powers, yet you have not been able to make proper use of the ones you have.

Esteemed people's deputies. Before you vote, ponder into whose hands we may be delivering the people's fate—that of our children, and our own fate. Thank you for your attention.

Congress Approves Powers Request

LD0404140691 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1351 GMT 4 Apr 91

[Excerpt] The Congress of People's Deputies today adopted a resolution investing Boris Yeltsin, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet, and Russia's Supreme Soviet with extraordinary powers until the next Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies. The Russian leadership needs these powers to shape a mechanism for implementing the anti-crisis program approved by the congress. Let me remind you that this program was set out in the report to congress by Boris Yeltsin and in the speech by Ivan Silayev, and received the support of the majority of deputies. [passage omitted]

Pechora Coal Basin Situation 'Deteriorated'

LD0304181291 Moscow All-Union Radio Mayak Network in Russian 1447 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Report by correspondent Yevgeniy Zubarev in Vorkuta]

[Text] [Zubarev] The situation in the Pechora coal basin has deteriorated. The Severnaya mine has joined the strikers. Thus, only two mines in the Pechora coal basin—Vorgashorskaya and Khalmer-Yu—are fully working for consumers, that is, extracting and dispatching coal beyond the Komi republic. The others are all either partially working or standing completely idle.

Cables are arriving in Vorkuta from various Soviet towns. Here is one of them, from Archangel: Because of the short supply of coal from Inta, we are halting production of stone chippings, gypsum and lime. Builders and power and microbiology enterprises are standing idle. If we do not get Inta coal, the Komi republic will not get our products.

The men of the northern railroad are worried because trains are at a standstill. In reply to a request from Comrade Yeltsin and an appeal from Cherepovetsk metallurgical workers, the Vorkuta strike coordinating council has sent representatives to Chrepovets to coordinate joint actions, and in order to save the coking by-products—batteries—of Cherepovets, the men of Vorkuta have allowed partial despatch of coking coal to Cherepovets.

Losses over these last few days at Vorkuta alone have passed the 70 million ruble mark. And after failing to get anything from the union government, the miners of Vorkuta and Inta have turned their attention to the

Russian government. Yuriy Vladimirovich Skokov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Council of Ministers, has been to Vorkuta. He discussed with the miners the conditions for the transfer of the mines of the Pechora coal basin to Russian jurisdiction. Yuriy Vladimirovich proposed that an integrated independent territorial association, Vorkuta-Cherepovets-Kostomuksha, be set up. He said that he will await specific decisions from the miners, and if the miners agree to his proposals, the Russian government will assist them in tackling this complex and difficult matter. The Russian Government will take over the mines of the Pechora basin, given any margin of strength, even a zero one.

In the view of Comrade Skokov, the mines should become joint-stock enterprises. The miners should get shares either free, or at a nominal price. The buy-out of mines from the state could be carried out by means of gradual increase in the value of assets over a certain period of time.

Well, the miners accepted Yuriy Vladimirovich Skokov's proposals, but are still on strike because the discussion is very long, difficult, and complex. Kostomuksha is in Karelia, Cherepovets in Vologda Oblast, and Vorkuta in the Komi republic. The views of other basins in Russia and in the country as a whole, in addition to the Pechora basin, will of course need to be sounded out, so this will run and run. I telephoned Inta and Vorkuta before sending this report. So far no news has reached these towns from Moscow on the results of the talks between the miners' representatives from Inta and Vorkuta and Valentin Sergeyevich Pavlov. Thus, the strike goes on.

Karaganda Court Refuses To Rule Strike Illegal

LD0404081791 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0700 GMT 4 Apr 91

[Text] Karaganda Oblast court has made an unprecedented decision by refusing to recognize the miners' strike as illegal. As the court said in its resolution, the decision is based on the fact that the miners' demands have a general political character and are addressed to the national and Russian governments. Correspondingly, they do not fall within the remit of the articles of the law on labor conflicts and strikes.

AZIYAPRESS agency reiterates the demands of the Karaganda miners: an early conclusion of the union treaty in line with conditions which are mutually beneficial for the republics; and adoption of a law on the indexation of the population's wages; a definition of the consumer basket; and increased wages for those working in the coal industry.

Yeltsin Criticizes Attempt To Confiscate Paper

PM0304140591 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 30 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[A. Gamov report: "Adventure at the Congress"]

[Text] Moscow—V.A. Yugin: "SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA?... There is no place for it here!... I will now call the guard!"

B.N. Yeltsin: "The attemped confiscation of issues of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA at the congress is an illegal action."

I never thought or guessed that I would ever witness...the confiscation of my own newspaper. And in a place—the Great Kremlin Palace, at the Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] People's Deputies—where you might think there must be an invisible presence of glasnost, democracy, and common sense...

...This outrage happened 20 minutes before the start of the congress. As always, piles of "free" newspapers lay on tables before the entrance to the sessions hall. Anyone who so wished could simply take them and read them. This time too the official and "independent" publications which had been placed there were being distributed without impediment.

But someone had placed a pile of fresh issues of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA on one of the tables. People's deputies were on the point of heading for them, but they were forestalled by three hefty guys; despite protests from those round about, they rolled up the pile of newspapers, crumpled them, and tried to stuff them into the table drawer.

"Why such discrimination? How has SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA displeased you?" I asked one of the men, who was defending our newspaper from our readers particularly zealously. He turned out to be...V.A. Yugin, member of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Mass Media, Links With Public Organizations and Citizens' Mass Movements, and the Study of Public Opinion. Not at all embarrassed, he shouted literally the following into my tape recorder:

"SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA?... There is no place for it here!... I will now call the guard!..."

"And yet dozens of other publications are distributed in just the same way as SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, and in huge print runs," I tried to object.

But V.A. Yugin was adamant. Despite deputies' insistent demands, he just would not agree to release SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. A scandal was already on the point of erupting, but then B.N. Yeltsin suddenly appeared. I switched my tape recorder back on and asked him to comment on the conflict which had arisen:

"As regards distributing the press at the congress, I believe that all newspapers must be on equal terms and not be distinguished by any privileges in this respect, so that there are no suspicions," B.N. Yeltsin said. "And the attempted confiscation of issues of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA at the congress is an illegal action."

"Do you promise deputies you will investigate the matter with Comrade Yugin?" I asked Boris Nikolayevich.

"I did not see what happened here," he replied evasively. "Let whoever saw it investigate."

The deputies were still able to get fresh issues of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. Most likely thanks to the appearance of Boris Nikolayevich. As regards illegal actions, it is a pity that this is how V.A. Yugin, the "guardian of Russian glasnost," understands his role.

Further on Newspaper Incident

PM0304141991 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 2 Apr 91 First Edition p 6

[A. Gamov report: "Who Makes a Mountain Out of a Molehill. Does the Office of the USSR President Really Distribute SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA?"]

[Text] Moscow—On 29 March this year SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA published a piece entitled "Adventure at the Congress" (incidentally, TASS carried it the next day on union channels), which dealt with an attempt by V.A. Yugin, member of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium and chairman of the Committee for the Mass Media, Links With Public Organizations and Citizens' Mass Movements, and the Study of Public Opinion, to prevent the distribution of issues of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA at the Congress of People's Deputies. We also described the reaction to that incident from RSFSR Supreme Soviet Chairman B.N. Yeltsin, who remarked, in particular, that "...the attempted confiscation of issues of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA at the congress is an illegal action."

You might think that this marked the end of the conflict and that there was nothing left for V.A. Yugin, the "guardian of Russian glasnost," to do but to apologize to the newspaper and its readers—the people's deputies—and to draw appropriate conclusions from what had happened. But literally the next day the newspaper KURYER [Courier], which is published at the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, accusing SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA of "trying to make a mountain out of a molehill or, rather, to make another political scarecrow inscribed 'democrats'"—this is stated in the article—carried an interview with V.A. Yugin, who made a rather strange comment on what had happened:

"As you see, here there is a table labeled 'Congress Sociological Service.' A bundle of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA newspapers was placed on it without permission for free distribution among the deputies. We remarked that this hinders the work of the congress' official service and asked the unknown distributor to produce his identity card. For some reason this disconcerted him, and we received a refusal. A while later we nonetheless managed to ascertain the workplace of SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's champion from the number of his guest ticket. He turned out to be G. Ostashkevich, an employee in the office of the USSR president's apparatus.

"Naturally, the question arises: Why does someone who holds such a post take it upon himself to distribute gratis the newspaper of the RSFSR Communist Party, which, as is well known, is certainly not published by the president? In my opinion, this is not quite proper. For he is not paid to be a press distributor. I also thought of something else. Are such 'staffers' not paid with money from the so-called 'presidential' 5-percent tax?"

I frankly admit that it was flattering to learn that our newspaper is distributed at the congress by an employee of the apparatus of the president's office. This is such an honor! But, on meeting with G.T. Stashkevich (incidentally, KURYER mispelled his surname), we learned that it was all a sheer fabrication.

"I do not understand where V.A. Yugin got this 'idee fixe' that I am a staffer of the office of the USSR president's apparatus," Gariy Tikhonovich expressed bewilderment. "I have never worked there, and I introduced myself to V.A. Yugin as an employee of the apparatus of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee, after which he simply tore my invitation to the congress out of my hands. As for V.A. Yugin's statement that, by distributing SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA, I was supposedly hindering the work of the Congress Sociological Service, this does not tally with reality either. KURYER, ZEMLYA I VOLYA [Land and Liberty], and other publications were lying on the same table where I put the pile of newspapers which I had brought to the congress at the request of a large group of communists, and this was not inconveniencing anyone at all. A mass of printed matter is distributed gratis at the congress by representatives of many parties and movements. But for some reason V.A. Yugin 'favored' precisely SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA with his close attention..."

At a meeting V.A. Yugin threatened to sue the author of the article in SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA "for libel." But when I suggested that he listen to the tape recording of the incident, at which he himself was present, he at once substituted mildness for anger: Is it worth, he said, taking any notice of an interview in some KURYER...? And yet the circulation of the congress publication is not that small—2,000 copies—and it also influences to some extent the shaping of public opinion.

As for the fairytale that SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA's distributor is supposedly "...paid with money from the so-called 'presidential' 5-percent tax," V.A. Yugin is not yet in any hurry to renounce it. "This must still be investigated," he remarked. Maybe the leaders of the president's office will help him in this?

Western Republics

Minsk Workers Strike, Protest Price Hikes

LD0404113391 Berlin ADN in German 1101 GMT 4 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow/Minsk (ADN)—Thousands of workers have stopped work in Minsk to protest the drastic price increases coming into force in the Soviet Union on Tuesday. According to a report from the Moscow news agency Interfax, the majority of enterprises were paralyzed by 11 o'clock local time today. Work stopped in the Minsk car and tractor factories this morning. The staff marched in columns to the Belorussian Government building on Lenin Square. There, according to Interfax, around 10,000 people gathered for a protest rally. The workers called for; their wages to be increased two to three-fold; for the recently introduced five percent sales tax to be abolished; for higher compensatory payments for the price increases in children's clothing; for Soviet President Gorbachev, the union government, as well as the USSR and Belorussian parliaments, to resign.

Strike Causes Traffic Delays

LD0304151291 Tallinn Domestic Service in Estonian 1400 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] The Belorussian information agency reports via ETA that a spontaneous strike began this morning at the Minsk electrotechnical plant. The main demand of the participants is an increase in wages. Hundreds of protesters went beyond the premises of the plant and for this reason traffic had to be stopped in one of Minsk's main streets. Government and Minsk city soviet representatives arrived and tried to calm the workers down. They reminded them that the compensation paid in the republic is in any case higher than the all-Union rate, but their explanation did not produce any results. A proposal to continue work and elect representatives among themselves for further talks with the government was also rejected. A representative of the Minsk Union of Workers proposed the election of a strike committee; he also proposed that workers of other factories should join the strike, and not only for economic demands. Demonstrators also approved of his proposal to demand that the USSR president and government should stand down. By noon hundreds of workers from the nearby tractor plant had joined the demonstrators. The strike continues.

Negotiations Begin

LD0304215691 Minsk Domestic Service in Belorussian 1725 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] Representatives of the strikers [at the Minsk electrotechnical plant] and the government started negotiations, which lasted for about three hours. The workers demanded a wage increase and the total abolition of the five percent value added tax on all kinds of goods in the republic. The strikers expressed their support for the miners. They demanded the resignation of the president and the USSR Government, dissolution of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, and the holding of new elections on a multiparty basis.

Uladislau Pilyuta and Syargey Ling spoke about the difficulties of the republican budget. According to Ling's calculations, the general compensations, including additional payments from the enterprises, will amount to 115 rubles in Belorussia. That is almost double to what is being paid in the rest of the country. The strikers were told that the government of the republic and the Minsk city soviet will give information about the first measures taken to satisfy the demands that had been put forward in a week. The strike then stopped.

Caucasus

Gamsakhurdia Cables Gorbachev on Girls' Injuries

AU0304154091 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] Zviad Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Georgian Supreme Soviet, sent a telegram to the USSR President Gorbachev. The following is the content of the telegram:

On 2 April 1991, in the village of (?Tskhuyavi) in the Gori rayon, a column of armored troop carriers of the USSR Interior Ministry internal troops ran over two 14-15 year-old girls. One of them, Nina Mitraveli is near death and is hospitalized in Gori. This is yet another tragic consequence of your recent telegram, just like the killing by the Soviet manufactured "Nur" missile of peasant Lagomcheblidze and the wounding of other peasants in the village of Nikozi. These are the consequences that the [word indistinct] of the center is causing. I demand that all interference in the affairs of the sovereign Republic of Georgia be stopped to avoid further destabilization of the situation.

[Signed] Zviad Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia.

Ignatenko Cited on Georgian Referendum

PM0304154991 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Apr 91 Second Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Meeting With Journalists"]

[Excerpts] By tradition the 2 April meeting in Moscow between V.N. Ignatenko, aide to the Soviet head of state and leader of his press service, and correspondents began with the journalists being familiarized with the USSR president's engagements. [passage omitted]

Asked about the USSR president's attitude to the results of the referendum in Georgia, V.N. Ignatenko said that no particular statement should be expected from M.S. Gorbachev on this score. He has already made a statement to the effect that he accepts the will of the people and of all republics. At the same time, the leader of the USSR president's press service continued, we do not believe that the referendum in Georgia is legal, since it was held without observing the demands of the USSR Constitution and Soviet laws, and we view it as a piece of sociological research.

More USSR Troops Said Deployed in Tskhinvali

AU0304163591 Tbilisi Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] On 2 April, the situation in Tskhinvali was quite tense. This was due to the fact that large amounts of additional military equipment belonging to the internal troops were brought into the town from various regions of the country. Ossetian extremists and a part of the anti-Georgian-minded population perceived this as obvious support by the center. In the village of Achabeti, the Ossetian bandits wounded a local resident (?Gindzhukhadze) with a submachine gun. During the day, an enterprise manufacturing varnishes and dyes was burned down in Tskhinvali. As a result of the fire, poisonous substances were released into the atmosphere and created a serious hazard for the population. The chief of the Provisional Headquarters, militia lieutenant colonel [name indistinct] immediately got in touch with the [words indistinct] Ministry of Health, which sent the recommendations of an expert. Besides, a fire-engine was sent from Gori to help extinguish the fire.

The press center of the Georgian Interior Ministry is receiving many phone calls from citizens who are asking whether the Georgian militia has left its posts in reference to bringing in additional internal troops to Tskhinvali. The commandant of the town, colonel of the interior troops Tengiz (?Aditashvili), stated on this occasion: The Georgian militia is continuing to occupy its posts and fulfill its duties.

On 3 April, it was relatively quiet in Tskhinvali and neighboring villages.

Situation in South Ossetia 'Relatively Calm'

LD0304193491 Moscow TASS in English 1905 GMT 3 April 91

[By TASS correspondent Valeriy Shanayev]

[Text] Vladikavkaz April 3 TASS—The Soviet parliament resolution, which recommends that President Mikhail Gorbachev introduce a state of emergency throughout South Ossetia, as well as a resolution by the extraordinary Congress of Russia's People's Deputies in connection with the tragic events in the region are having a positive effect on the situation in the region.

For the first time in recent months, last night was relatively calm in Tskhinvali, a spokesman at the press centre of the special committee under the authority of the North Ossetian parliament president told TASS today.

However, the blockade of the city is still being maintained. According to the North Ossetian Interior Ministry, Tskhinvali is tightly surrounded by armed militants from unlawful formations, the aggregate strength of which is more than 15,000. Practically all Ossetian villages, of which there are more than 30, have been burned down and looted.

Tbilisi April 3 TASS—Georgian parliament President Zviad Gamsakhurdia today sent a message to President Gorbachev. According to SAKINFORM correspondent Eduard Ediberidze, the message contains a demand for an end to "any intervention in the affairs of this sovereign republic to avoid a further destabilisation of the situation".

Central Asia

Accidental Explosion in Kazakhstan Arms Dump

LD0304203991 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 0200 GMT 3 Apr 91

[Text] Last Saturday, an alarming report about a huge explosion near Saryozek village reached Alma-Ata, Taldy-Kurgan and their suburbs, though the destruction of missiles of any range is no longer carried out here. The rumors turned out to be exaggerated. However, there was an explosion, and not only one. A serviceman carelessly fired a grenade thrower. A stray grenade reached the ammunition dump, where shells and grenades began to explode and window-panes in Saryozek village rattled. Representatives of the Turkestan Military District headed by General (Ryassov) went to the scene of the explosion. They visited labor collectives of the village and explained to the people that there was no reason for panic. Despite the rumors, no missiles with warheads were exploded. According to preliminary data, the material damage amounts to approximately 300,000 rubles. There are no victims, a criminal case is underway, and an investigation is being carried out.

Uzbek-Turkmen Agreement on Flour Prices Signed

LD0104125991 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1130 GMT 1 Apr 91

[Text] An agreement has been signed in Ashkhabad between the presidents of Uzbekistan and Turkmenia. It stipulates that the prices of flour and macaroni products should not be raised in either of the republics this year.

Leaders Sign Kirghiz-Ukraine Cooperation Accord

LD0204210191 Moscow Central Television Vostok Program and Orbita Network in Russian 1530 GMT 2 Apr 91

[Report by correspondent V. Fedorov in Bishkek, from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] A friendship and cooperation treaty has been signed in Bishkek between Kirghizia and the Ukraine.

[Fedorov] To start with, here are two facts typical of Kirghiz-Ukraine cooperation. The first is that Zaporozhye transformers and Kharkov turbines are at work on the series of the Naryn cascade. The second fact is that against the background of many enterprises which have suffered as a result of the slipping cogs of the old economic ties, the Bishkek Pervoye Maya sewing factory is a picture of health and prosperity, thanks to reliable suppliers of cloth, including Ukrainian ones: these are the Darnitsa and the Cherkassy silk combines.

The treaty signed today by the leaders of the two republics envisages the development of mutually advantageous bilateral relations. For the first time, joint ventures will be set up. A particular point is cooperation between the foreign ministries of the two republics. [video shows L. Kravchuk, chairman of Ukraine Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet and A.A.Akayev, president of the Kirghiz Republic, seated signing documents]

[Kravchuk] Perhaps, from the standpoint of today, when we are signing the treaty on friendship and cooperation between the two republics, one perceives especially acutely what is going on in Moscow at the congress of the Russian Federation. You know, of course, the deputies of Russia are on a quest—as we all are—and I personally would like to appeal to the deputies that in defining this path they think about the country, and that they do not take a step today which would lead to destabilization and which would result in our intention of creating a union and signing treaties remaining just wishes.

[Akayev] I want to say, in development of the thought of Leonid Makarovich, concerning the significance of concluding today's treaty with respect to the union treaty. I think that this is a manifestation, in fact a true manifestation of federalism. Leonid Makarovich and myself, I believe, have laid another solid stone in the foundations of a future renewed union.

Karakalpakstan Legislature Head Replaced

PM0403102391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 2 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Correspondent A. Kaipbergenov report: "Replacement Decided On"]

[Text] Nukus, 1 Mar—An extraordinary session of the Karakalpakstan Supreme Soviet has examined an organizational question. The people's deputies relieved T.A. Yeshimbetova of the duties of chairperson of the republic's Supreme Soviet in connection with her personal petition.

As a result of a secret vote, the head of the republic is now 43-year-old D.N. Shamshetov, recently elected first secretary of the Karakalpakstan Republic Committee of the Kazakhstan Communist Party.

Uzbek Leader Greets Soldiers on Spring Festival

PM2203090991 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Lieutenant Colonel V. Astafyev report: "Happy Holiday, Fellow Soldier-Countrymen!"]

[Text] Today, for the second year in succession in recent decades, Navruz—the spring folk festival—is coming to the inhabitants of Central Asian republics. On the eve of the festival Islam Karimov, president of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, sent a congratulatory telegram to all Uzbek servicemen serving in the USSR Armed Forces:

"Dear youths of Uzbekistan! I wholeheartedly congratulate you all on the splendid festival of Navruz. During the days of the awakening and renewal of nature I express to you the feeling of love and concern of your compatriots.

"Navruz is a festival of beauty, mercy, friendship, fraternity, unity, and solidarity. I am sure that this festival will strengthen these panhuman values in your young hearts. On behalf of everyone who will gather today around the festive dastarkhan [meaning unknown], I send you good wishes for peace and prosperity. I wish you worthy fulfillment of your duty and a very speedy return to your parents' home and joyful meeting with relatives and friends.

"In connection with Navruz please convey our festive wishes and greetings to all who are alongside you and with whom you share your difficult but necessary service."

Move To Name Sovkhoz for Ex-Leader Rashidov

PM2603161191 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 Mar 91 Union Edition p 1

[INTERFAX Agency report: "State Farm Named for Rashidov?"]

[Text] At a conference of workers of Uzbekistan's agroindustrial complex a proposal has been submitted to name a Dzhizak Oblast sovkhoz for Sharaf Rashidov, Uzbekistan's former leader. This idea was backed by Islam Karimov, president of the Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] and first secretary of the Republic Communist Party's Central Committee, who addressed the conference, INTERFAX reports.

New Religious Weekly in Uzbekistan

LD2803125891 Moscow All-Union Radio First Program Radio-1 Network in Russian 0500 GMT 28 Mar 91

[Text] LIFE's WORLD [SLOVO ZHIZNI] is the name under which the state press committee of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic has registered a new weekly, the founder of which is the Tashkent Central Asian eparchy. The new publication is primarily intended for Orthodox believers living in the territory of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenia, and Kyrgystan. The first edition of the weekly is to appear very soon, probably in time for the Orthodox festival of Easter.